Academic journal article Public Administration Quarterly

The Reinvention Trail: An Account of One State Agency's Quality Journey

Academic journal article Public Administration Quarterly

The Reinvention Trail: An Account of One State Agency's Quality Journey

Article excerpt


Nothing is as painfully pleasurable as true learning. When organizations learn, the personal perceptions of pain and pleasure vary. The following article presents the author's view of the internal organizational learning to date by an agency that is committed to the continual improvement and learning associated with life on the reinvention trail. Recommendations from the following case study should prove useful to any organization interested in reinvention, reengineering, total quality management, continuous improvement, cultural change, organizational development or, put bluntly, interested in survival.

This article presents the case study agency's original cultural paradigm. How the original paradym was lost and how it is being regained are explored. Seven specific "rules for reinventing" are derived from the internal organizational experiences of the case study agency. These rules are set forth to assist other organizations on their journey. The article closes with a plea for others to follow this example of organizational reflection, critical self-assessment, and open sharing.


An unfortunate maxim exists in organizational life: "All problems beg solution while every solution breeds new problems." This article illustrates that Total Quality Management (TQM) and the "Reinvention Movement" which sprang from it are no strangers to this maxim.

The following case study examines the internal organizational development of one state department of transportation which has embarked on a reinvention journey. Although the agency's journey is not complete, the learning should prove useful to other governmental entities undergoing reinvention. The focus of this article is on organization development within the agency. No attempt is made to examine the numerous external improvements attested to by outsiders.

Briefly, these improvements recognized by external customers and suppliers include: 1) better relations with contractors and consultants; 2) less litigation, saving about $5 million per year; 3) improved products through value engineering; 4) incentives for better paving, resulting in 7 percent smoother roads; and 5) increased public information through a revived public information office. Beyond describing these significant positive external outcomes of the agency's reinvention journey, this article focuses on internal organizational and professional development issues within the agency.

Even though this article is focused totally on internal issues, the views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the agency or its top managers. Neither are the views expressed necessarily those of a trained scholar seeking truth in the murky swamps of organizational life. Therefore, the reader is warned at the outset against accepting what is presented to be the "whole truth," even regarding issues internal to the agency.

A certain degree of idiosyncrasy is inherent in the anecdotal. case study approach used in this article. The presence of this idiosyncrasy introduces the requirement for caution. Nonetheless, while the specifics presented tend to be the views of a single "reinvented" state government worker, they correlate well with findings from several focus groups and employee surveys conducted within the agency. Although this article does not present the "whole truth," it reflects reality as it is perceived by many employees within the case study agency.

The article begins by defining the organizational culture of the agency prior to embarking on the reinvention trail. Second, is a description of the major ideological and practical problems encountered as the agency's journey progressed. Third, the article delineates some aspects of learning within the agency in its journey to date and some positive steps currently underway. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for those who would embark upon a similar journey toward reinvention.


Before defining the organizational culture of the agency, it is useful to review a little of its history. The state department of transportation was created in the mid-1970s by legislative fiat. the 2,700member highway function and the 900-member motor vehicle function, which had been together in one agency since the mid-1920s, were joined with the existing 50-member aeronautics department and a newly created 100-member transportation planning function. As might be expected, the culture of this new department of transportation was heavily influenced by the highway and motor vehicle functions. A close network of contractors and engineers dominated the highway function as they perceived their role to be one of enforcing transportation laws.

In each function, finite resources chased infinite needs. The two coexisting functions, though differing in many respects, shared a high view of their professional decision rules. For the engineers, their professional decision rules were summarized in the technocratic phase, "sound engineering judgment." For the regulators, their professional decision rules were summarized in the bureaucratic phrase, "enforce the law." Relationships and expertise guided the individual processes and budget decisions within each group. In short, each group pursued its own mission in accordance with its own culture (Pruitt, 1979).

Although organizational culture has been variously defined by scholars, one convenient way to identify the culture of a specific organization is to use a series of questions developed by Schein (1985:86). Several of Schein's questions are used in the following paragraphs to determine the major aspects of the organizational culture of the case study agency prior to embarking down the reinvention trail.

Schein's first question is: How do key members of the agency view the relationship of the organization to the environment? Schein gives the relationship options of dominance, submission, harmonizing or finding an appropriate niche. For the agency, the relationship was one of dominance, based on expertise. The transportation engineers and motor vehicle personnel believed they knew what the public needed. Based upon the lack of general societal friction and specific forces to the contrary, the public may well have believed this also.

Schein's second question is: What rules define what is real and what is not, what is a "fact," and how is truth ultimately determined? Professional standards and professionalism were the final arbiters of truth for both of the dominant groups in the agency. For the transportation engineers, "fact" and "truth" resided in professional standards for design and construction. These standards were solidly based on technical research studies conducted under the strictest rigors of science. Arguments were solved by appeal to the professional standards for design and construction.

For the motor vehicle personnel, "fact" and "truth" resided in laws, regulations, and policies. The laws were passed by legislative bodies and confirmed within the court system. The regulations were developed within the professional community as public safety and motor vehicle enforcement personnel jointly developed implementing regulations. The policies resulted from the studied opinions of professionals within the agency. All conflicts were adjudicated through application of the appropriate law, regulation or policy, For the transportation engineers and the motor vehicle personnel, "fact" and "truth" were to be found in the professional standards of their respective groups.

Schein's third question is: What attributes are intrinsic to human nature and is it good, evil, or neutral? Both the transportation engineers and the motor vehicle personnel believed "rationality" to be intrinsic to human nature. The human ability to reason that "sound engineering judgment" is vastly superior to political interests and that "laws to protect the public" are better than anarchy were the chief articles of faith in the agency. Both groups believed that human rationality working through the laws of the natural order and/or the laws of society would prevail.

Schein's fourth question is: What is the right thing for human beings to do, given the preceding assumptions about the environment, reality, and human nature, to be active, passive, selfdevelopmental, fatalistic or what? Based on the organizational approach of dominance through professional standards and public statutes, and the inherent human rationality and expertise that supported this dominance, the agency's engineers and motor vehicle personnel thought the right thing to do was to be actively involved in fulfilling the agency's mission. The right kind of planning, designing, building, operating, and maintaining highways required active practice of professional engineers. The right kind of motor vehicle policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation needed active involvement from professional regulators. The right thing to do was to put one's expertise to action in pursuit of the organizational mission.

Schein's final question is: What is the right way for people to relate to each other--that is, is life cooperative or competitive; individualistic, group collaborative or communal; based on traditional lineal authority, law, charisma or what? Professional standards and legal requirements comprised the right way for both engineers and motor vehicle personnel to relate to others in their business environments.

In summary. the cultural paradigm of the agency, before embarking on its TQM journey toward reinvention, was that transportation engineers and motor vehicle personnel actively and rationally use their professional expertise to pursue the best interest of the public and was expressed as professional standards and public statutes. In this cultural environment, tradeoffs constantly had to be made between efficiency and effectiveness. Professional expertise was the decision rule for making these tradeoffs. Quality was viewed as the ultimate outcomes of the tradeoffs made by professionals between the competing values of efficiency and effectiveness.


The culture paradigm based on professional expertise and on quality tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness was lost as the agency embarked upon the journey down the reinvention trail. This paradigm was lost as the operating reality of the organization in the early 1990s.

When top management embraced TQM, nearly everyone was excited about the change and positive about the agency's future. When top management openly asserted that the organization was going to embark on a journey into quality, almost everyone was willing to listen, to learn, and to grow. When, however, top management subsequently indicated that the agency had no idea what quality was and had never performed in a quality way, nearly everyone quit listening.

The reaction was negative among transportation engineers and motor vehicle personnel alike. New metaphors from business that should have increased learning were seen as totally inapplicable to government. Slogans that should have spurred personal growth and organizational development were received as empty cliches. The whole new "paradigm" of TQM and of reinvention was viewed with suspicion.


One of the first assertions made by top management was that TQM represented an entirely new paradigm. Those who would be successful in the agency would have to abandon their old paradigm and accept the new quality paradigm. This quality paradigm, according to top management, was based on teams, tools, and training.

Although the team concept is often successfully implemented within organizations (Larson and LaFasto, 1989), the agency encountered problems from the outset. Teams, as the notion was applied in the agency, meant that individual contributions were no longer to be recognized. Team activities and successes were to receive rewards not individual efforts. As a result, the professional expertise of individuals was no longer to be trusted. Teams were to become the decision-makers.

The results of this change were immediately felt by the agency's middle managers and first-line supervisors. In the old culture and under the "old" paradigm, these managers had "earned their spurs" through years of experience. Professional expertise was usually a stronger basis of personal power for managers than was their official position within the agency. Yet their professional expertise and their positional power as decision-makers were undercut due to the manner in which the concept of teams was applied throughout the agency.

Most of the teams that were established within the agency, some 300 were "registered" at one point of time, became a shadow organization. These teams focused on "quality" while the existing managerial ranks were left to focus on "operations." Two different types of meetings were held throughout the agency to mirror these two organizational structures. Quality meetings were held for quality teams while operational meetings were held by the middle managers. In many cases, the middle managers and first-line supervisors were rejected as team leaders or even members of the quality teams. In a sense, two organizations coexisted ... and it was not always a peaceful coexistence.

Tools, in this instance, meant the "quality techniques" of brainstorming, nominal group technique, Delphi method, force-field analysis, flow charting, fishbone diagrams, customer survey, focus groups, and similar types of tools. These techniques were presented as an indispensable part of the new paradigm. Quality teams were to use these new tools to plan continuous improvements in the agency. Gone were the former tools of engineering and the former techniques of program evaluation and policy review.

Training focused on team training and tools training. Gone were the technical training courses for the engineering and motor vehicle functions. Replacing them were courses on team dynamics, team personality profiles, team chartering as well as courses on each of the team tools listed above.

While it is true that the culture had been altered in that professional expertise was no longer valued, the paradigm had not changed! Efficiency and effectiveness were still the key measures. Team training had merely transitioned to courses on organizational development and small group dynamics. Team tools had become standard statistical techniques and group decision-making processes. However, the main issue remained: productivity through people; process changes were still incremental; and the organization was still being viewed as a machine. For all the internal alterations, there was nothing new under the sun.


Supporting the notion that a new paradigm had arrived were several key metaphors. Unfortunately, these new metaphors, which should have increased organizational learning, were directly borrowed without "translation" from TQM articles on private sector business. As a result, many organization members felt they were inapplicable to government. These major metaphors included teams, customers, and empowerment.

"Teams," as a metaphor for work groups, brought confusion within the agency. In the business world, this competition-based metaphor made sense but in the agency it did not. Comparisons could be made between agencies, but competition was harder to identify in the public sector. Organization members were also confused about several other aspects of the "team" metaphor. For instance, on teams there are positions or roles to be played and players with specific expertise to fill each of those positions or roles. On the agency's version of quality teams, all members were equal in role and assumed to be equal in expertise. This was hard for many to accept.

Additionally, teams in the agency were given no particular ground rules for the game they were playing. Going beyond their assignments was the common fault but, in fairness, they had been given no ground rules or "out-of-bounds" markers to assist them in their pursuit of improvements. As it turned out, the "team" metaphor didn't work well as it was initially handled within the agency. Had more investigation been done by top management on how to implement teams, the probability of success would have been increased.

"Customer" was another metaphor that seemed to confuse organizational members. Customers volitionally choose to purchase a product or service in a competitive market place based on its value to them. Cost-quality tradeoffs are made by customers every day in such markets. The products and services provider by the case agency, however, didn't seem to fit the customer metaphor. People did not volitionally choose these products or services. No other agencies or entities were producing competing products or services. The value of the agency's products and services raised serious cost-quality tradeoffs for the public and the agency alike. The "customer" metaphor proved to be very weak as it was applied within the public sector organization. Again, had more investigation been dome by top management about the nature of customers versus captives (Hyde, 1992), greater understanding of the metaphor and its importance could have been achieved within the agency.

The final metaphor which proved troublesome was "empowerment." "Empowerment" should heave been constrained by the charter or mission of the team; however, this was not the case. Instead, empowerment delivered the final blow, severing the quality teams from their operating work groups and agency management. Under the incomplete notion of empowerment implemented at the agency, employees no longer had to listen to their managers or supervisors regarding quality or operational issues. This metaphor, which had great promise, degenerated into license as teams were allowed to do whatever they wanted regardless of their mission, authority or realm of responsibility.


Overlaying the teams, tools, training, customer, and empowerment were slogans to reinforce the new "paradigm." Many of these slogans could have and should have brought personal growth and organizational development within the agency. However, due to the previously mentioned failure to connect the new with the old, quality with operations and management with employees, these slogans were generally received as empty cliches. Some of the valuable slogans set forth and used within the agency were:

"Be the preferred partner of business and industry."

"Attract and retain the best and the brightest."

"Be a model of efficient, effective, responsive government."

"Continuous improvement is our way of life."

"Astonish the customer."

"Partnering -- our key to success."

"Add value to everything you touch."

Along with these agency slogans there was also a constant stream of platitudes from "pop" management tools that were circulated throughout the agency. The slogans and platitudes were flowing so heavily that, at one period, a team member commented that top management seemed to believe that "a slogan a day keeps reality away." Again, it should be realized that each of these slogans have been, and should have been a key unlocking personal growth and organization development within the agency. To most employees, however, they were empty cliches holding no meaning and serving no motivational purpose.


After about three and one-half years on the trail, employees within the agency began to view the New-TQM-Paradigm-Reinvention as the fabled emperor's new clothes. Disgruntled employees strongly voiced their disappointment in several organizational surveys conducted during 1995.

One such opportunity for employees was the "Annual Employee Assessment." Thirty-one percent (31%) of the employees responded to this survey instrument sent out in February 1995. The assessment, taken more than three years into the TQM journey, revealed the following employee opinions:

1. Approach: Seventy-nine percent (79%) were not satisfied with the agency's approach to TQM.

2. Vision: Seventy-eight percent (78%) were not satisfied with the agency's TQM-based guiding vision and mission.

3. Leadership: Sixty-eight percent (68%) were not satisfied with the direction given to the TQM-based reinvention effort by the agency's top management team.

4. Teams: Eighty-one percent (81%) indicated that the agency's TQM teams were not effective.

5. Progress: Eighty-four percent (84%) were not satisfied with the agency's progress in becoming a quality organization.

6. Impact: Seventy-six percent (76%) said the TQM-based reinvention had no impact on improving the agency.

Findings from this survey indicated that employees weren't satisfied with major aspects of the TQM-based reinvention effort. The TQM approach taken by the agency and the TQM vision being followed had little employee support. Serious doubts existed as to the effectiveness of the agency's leadership and quality teams. In an overall sense, employees were dissatisfied with the progress and impact of the TQM-based reinvention.

Another opportunity for employees in the agency to voice their opinions specifically on the leadership aspect of the reinvention effort was the "Survey on Leadership." Sixteen percent (16%) of the employees responded to this survey instrument sent out in July 1995. This assessment had the following findings:

1. Top Management Honesty: Top management was viewed as lacking honesty by thirty-seven percent (37%) of the respondents. Written comments on the respondents' forms indicated that this "dishonesty"' was directly related to "not walking the talk" and "confusing TQM and reinvention with downsizing."

2. Top Management Awareness: Top management was also viewed as lacking awareness of what was really happening at the rank-and-file level within the organization by thirty-one (31%) of the respondents.

3. Middle Management Communication: Middle management was seen as not communicating with those below them in the organization. Thirty-six (36%) of the respondents noted a lack of communication and sharing information on the part of middle managers.

4. Middle Manager Honesty: Middle managers were seen as lacking honesty by thirty-three (33%) of the respondentso.

5. Supervisor Honesty: Supervisors, the first line of management within the agency, were deemed to be dishonest by sixty percent (60%) of their subordinates.

6. Supervisor Trust in Employees: Supervisors were also seen as not trusting their employees to do their jobs properly by forty-eight percent (48%) of the respondents.

Findings from this survey indicated that employees perceived a serious lack of leadership within the agency. Honesty, awareness, communications, and trust are basic to a healthy organizational life but they are essential to successful organizational development interventions like reinvention, reengineering, total quality management, continuous improvement, and other cultural changes.

In response to these clear messages of internal failure, the agency began to reassess its progress. Employee feedback indicated that rebuilding within the organization was desperately needed. The reinvention itself required reinvention. Paradigm lost had to become paradigm regained.


There is an old saying about competition that goes "The race isn't always to the swift or the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet!" Perhaps someone should coin a new saying about organization development efforts which would say, "They don't have to be simple and they don't have to be focused, but that's the way to be successful!"

For the case study agency, things began to turn around when the old culture paradigm was regained through simplicity, focus on real issues, and appropriate responses under reinvention. Some major initiatives giving focus and simplicity to the case study agency are presented in the following paragraphs. Clearly delineated is some of the learning within the agency along its journey so far. Also provided are some of the positive steps toward reinvention and quality which are currently underway.


If the organization was to survive, then its teams must be made successful. However, if its teams were to be successful, then individuals must actively and productively participate. If individuals were to participate actively and productively, then they must understand their mandate to make continuous improvement in all that they do. The agency had come full-circle from only valuing individuals to only valuing teams, to where the agency valued teams comprised of active and committed individuals. The agency learned to see individuals as the basic building block of organizational success. Top management at the agency still believed that individuals will work better and smarter in teams but now it understood that teams can't work without the active participation of committed individuals.

As previously noted, the cultural paradigm of the agency, prior to its reinvention journey, was transportation engineers and motor vehicle personnel actively and rationally using their professional expertise to pursue the best interest of the public as expressed in professional standards and public statutes. Professional expertise was the decision rule for making tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness. To this cultural paradigm, the reinvention effort finally added the simple mandate of survival.

Under this mandate, continuous improvement became everyone's business. Continuous improvements could easily be seen as relevant within the existing culture and could even be made using many of the existing tools. "Value-adding," for instance, was very close to "value engineering" espoused and used by the agency's engineers. An approach which included "a public-focus and a partner-focus" could easily inform the "streamlining" that was being pursued by the motor vehicle personnel within the case study agency. In each instance, where continuous improvement for survival sake became the simple focus, progress was made. The initial negative experience and ultimate organizational learning by the case study agency accords with what some organizational culture theorists have asserted (Schein, 1996:64):

The critical thing to understand about cultural dynamics is that leaders cannot arbitrarily change culture in the sense of eliminating dysfunctional elements, but they can evolve culture by building on its strengths while letting its weaknesses atrophy over time. Culture cannot be manipulated by announcing changes or instituting programs. If the organization has been successful doing things in a certain way and has evolved mental models based on those methods, it will not give them up. However, mental models can be broadened and enlarged. .pml

In short, the case study agency is now making progress because it has returned to its own culture. To that culture, however, it has added the mandate of survival. Personal responsibility to make continuous improvements, add value, use the tools, and seek to work together with those inside and outside the agency is now everyone's business! It's simple and it's focused!


In addition to focusing on each individual's mandate to make continuous improvements, the agency has implemented a 360-degree performance appraisal system in order to widen the agency's accountability. The wider accountability afforded by this system arises from the performance feedback given by superiors, peers and colleagues, subordinates, and internal and external users ("customers") of products and services. This formalized feedback system assists the agency in pursuing continuous improvements.

The mandate to the individual is to make continual improvements in products, processes, procedures, and services. This new 360-degree performance feedback system lets the individuals know how they are perceived as performing as well as how their products, processes, procedures, and services are perceived as performing. User opinion about what needs improving is a major output from the system.

As with the continuous improvement mandate, this new 360degree performance feedback system fits well with the original cultural paradigm. Engineers and motor vehicle personnel can actively respond to the performance feedback which the system provides by using their professional expertise to pursue the best interest of the user. Quality is more easily determined by the new quantitative and qualitative performance feedback from the system. Additional values, provided by users through the 360-degree feedback system, have been added to the former values of efficiency and effectiveness. Professional expertise has been expanded from merely "getting the work done" to include "improving how the work is done." Professional expertise is now applied to improvement initiatives also.

Again, as in the case of the previous mandate, this 360-degree approach to identifying candidates for improvement initiatives is simple and focused. How do the engineers and motor vehicle personnel within the agency know what improvements to focus on? It's simple; it's provided for them twice each year in the 360-degree performance feedback.


The final initiative to revive the reinvention effort within the agency grew out of the middle management ranks. In the original approach to the reinvention, middle managers were seen as part of the problem--those holding relentlessly onto the old paradigm. Initially, middle managers within the agency were neglected as important implementers of the reinvention effort. Empowerment had "freed" the rank-and-file employees from the shackles of middle management "opposition" and loosed them to follow the findings of their teams. The resultant low productivity and morale within the agency led a few managers to get together to establish a legitimate role for the middle manager and supervisor in the organizational reinvention process.

This group soon expanded its numbers and spawned the Middle Managers' Network--a group of about 150 middle managers--within the agency. The Middle Managers' Network is currently addressing several issues surrounding 1) the role of the manager in a quality environment; 2) how to motivate employees and make work more fun; and 3) how to implement empowerment correctly. These activities, undertaken by the Middle Managers' Network, are being supported and nourished by top management in the case study agency.

As part of the solution to these issues, the middle managers are pursuing the application of the notion of "servant leadership" (Greenleaf, 1977). What servant leadership does is turn the organization chart upside-down. Top managers serve middle managers who serve supervisors who serve employees who serve users ("customers") needs. The group is in the process of helping "middle managers" to realize that a significant part of their job is to facilitate the work of the rank-and-file. Likewise, the group is seeking to help the agency's "top management" to realize that part of their job is to facilitate the work of middle managers. Top management within the agency is strongly backing the idea and application of servant leadership.

The application of this upside-down approach has already established a role for middle managers and is beginning to improve their morale. Top management no longer sees middle managers as part of the problem. Middle managers are now seen as part, and a big part, of the solution. How the rank-and-file will react to this new approach is not yet known. It is believed, however, that, if middle managers and supervisors truly serve the needs of the rank-and-file by resourcing them and removing obstacles from their paths, that these employees will experience improved productivity and morale too.

Time will tell. In the interim, the application of the servant leadership notion has altered the focus of management from "doing through others" to "doing for others." It is a simple change that promises great results.


Although much of what happens during a specific organizational development process within one agency isn't necessarily useful in predicting what might happen in other agencies, some lessons are transferable. In the agency, the old cultural paradigm may have had more to do with the dismal outcome than any other single factor. And, perhaps, even if the recommendations below had been followed by top management, the results within the organization might have been the same. Nevertheless, it seems useful to conclude this idiosyncratic, anecdotal case study with some directions for those who would embark on a similar journey down the reinvention trail. With this hope in mind, the following recommendations are offered:

1. Be sure to appreciate the existing organizational culture. You must first learn to value the existing culture, to understand it, and to treat it with respect. Then and only then can you build on its strengths. Never attempt to overthrow it unless you intend to fail.

2. Be careful what you call things. Cautiously use words like "paradigm." Use metaphors and slogans sparingly, if at all. People appreciate actions more than words because actions are easier to generalize, visualize, understand, and follow.

3. Be sure that negative messages get through. Celebrate good news to be sure but also be sure to hear bad news. Bad news tells you what's working and what's not--what to fix and what's to leave alone. View bad news as free "market research."

4. Make continuous improvement your passion. The continuous improvement of people, processes, and products should be your compelling passion. Don't get hung up on how improvements are made but allow individual and team diversities to flourish in pursuit of improvements--even allow them to use and misuse tools creatively. Don't get hung up on "ultimate" answers and "perfect" solutions. Incrementalism rules!

5. Provide focus and simplicity. Focus on continuous improvement as the mandate for organizational and personal survival. Stress personal responsibility to add value, to use the tools, and to seek to work together. It's really that simple!

6. Institute feedback loops from all. Every employee, supplier, client, customer, partner, and authorizing agent should be given an opportunity to assess your organization's performance. Pay attention to them! Listen to what they are saying! Support and resource those closest to the problem and empower them to address the concerns.

7. Turn the pyramid upside-down. Make "middle managers" realize that they exist to facilitate the work of the rank-and-file. Make "top managers" realize that they are hired to facilitate the work of middle managers.

Of course, there is no guarantee that all will go smoothly on the reinvention journey if the preceding recommendations are followed. There is, however, some degree of certainty that the reinvention trail will be straightened for those who follow the directions given above. Surely the reinvention trail of the agency would have been significantly straightened by these directions.

The case study agency has paid an organizational price to learn these lessons. Others can now be spared these costs. Yet additional agencies are needed to further everyone's organizational learning by 1) heeding these recommendations; 2) making their own new mistakes; and 3) sharing their insights for life on the reinvention trail. To that end, this article has been written

Happy trails!




Greenleaf, Robert K. (1977). SERVANT LEADERSHIP. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

Hyde, A.C. (1991-92). "Feedback from Customers, Clients, and Captives." THE BUREAUCRAT 20(4) (Winter):49-53.

Larson, Carl E. and Frank M. LaFosto (1989). TEAMWORK: WHAT MUST GO RIGHT, WHAT CAN GO WRONG. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Pruitt, Charles (1979). "People Doing What They Do Best: The Professional Engineers and NHTSA." PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 39 (July/August):363-371.

Schein, Edgar H. (1985). ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP: A DYNAMIC VIEW. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. (1996). "Leadership and Organizational Culture," in THE LEADER OF THE FUTURE. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

[Author Affiliation]


University of Phoenix

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