Academic journal article International Journal

Would We Really Miss the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

Academic journal article International Journal

Would We Really Miss the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

Article excerpt

The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) has been described by one of its proponents as the most ambitious attempt to extend the civilizing reach of the rule of law over humankind's destructive capacity.1 In fact, the NPT is perceived by many as indispensable for international security and world order. Yet there is a widespread impression that the regime is in deep crisis and may soon collapse. Several factors contribute to this assessment: North Korea's nuclear weapons program; concerns about the growing noncompliance of regime members, particularly in the case of Iran; the fact that three nuclear-weapons countries continue to abstain from the nuclear nonproliferation regime-India, Pakistan, and Israel; insufficient verification procedures; limited consensus in the international community about enforcement of the treaty; an increasingly bitter struggle between nuclear haves and havenots about the nuclear disarmament commitments of the former; and a renaissance of the civilian use of nuclear energy and the possibility of access to weapons-critical technology for ever more states (and nonstate actors). In addition, the recent US-India deal on civil nuclear energy cooperation is a big disappointment for all those governments who thought that their decision to renounce nuclear weapons would be awarded with access to civil nuclear technology. If the US-India deal is implemented, India could have both weapons and reactors.

Consequently, the NPT's legitimacy is decreasing. One may however argue that the NPT will survive, if only because the five permanent members of the UN security council have a strong interest in maintaining the regime since it provides them with a privileged position as legitimate nuclear powers. But if the international community wants to preserve the NPT as a living document rather than an empty shell, governments will be confronted with some hard choices. This becomes particularly salient in view of the case of Iran. If Tehran manages to develop a nuclear weapons option despite its treaty obligations, a collapse of the NPT becomes very likely. More effective sanctions, though, let alone military action, would come at a severe price. Therefore, it seems appropriate to ask a question that may sound radical to many: would we really miss the NPT? For NPT pundits, the answer is obvious: the end of the NPT would result in a world with ever more nuclear weapons that would sooner or later get used. These experts also point out that without the NPT, the dream of a nuclear-free world would also come to an end. Others are more cautious. Even without the NPT in place, these analysts assert, more nuclear proliferation would not be inevitable.

Recently, the academic debate on the NPT and its future has become more philosophical in nature. William Walker argues that the treaty was a child of a grand enlightment project, setting up an international order of mutual commitments and cooperation among the nations. At the same time, Walker holds the Bush administration's nonproliferation policy responsible for the normative decline of the nuclear order. Engaging in both unilateral approaches and rogue states' rhetoric, the Bush administration has embarked on a counter-enlightment strategy.2 Walker's statements triggered a lot of criticism, and in many respects, his accusations made the discussion more controversial. This article seeks to calm the debate. In its first part, it asks if we would be confronted with a world of more nuclear weapons states instantly once the NPT had collapsed. It then proceeds with a discussion of the relationship between the NPT and nuclear disarmament. The article concludes by highlighting some often neglected aspects in favour of the NPT.

NOT LONG UNTIL TWENTY OR MORE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES?

Nuclear regime purists expect a nuclear avalanche once the NPT is buried. They believe that there are mainly three reasons why NPT members, previously once adhering to the regime and therefore convinced not to go nuclear, would then, in such a situation, decide to acquire nuclear weapons: assertiveness, security, and prestige. Iran is an example of a country that could be tempted to use its nuclear weaponry not only as a deterrent but also for power projection. Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan may perceive a nuclear deterrence capacity as indispensable for their security in the face of Iranian, North Korean, or Chinese nuclear threats. Moreover, countries such as Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, or Argentina may also come to believe that they need nuclear weapons capacity to underscore their aspirations as influential regional powers.

But is it realistic to assume that the existence of the NPT is the only reason why states have rejected going nuclear? Furthermore, would we be confronted with ever more nuclear countries as a more or less automatic result of regime collapse?

First of all, it should be realized that, looking ahead into the 21st century, the overwhelming majority of states would continue to lack the technological, financial, and bureaucratic base to conduct a nuclear weapons program. In addition, many of those countries with the capacity to go nuclear would still hesitate to do so. One important reason is their non-nuclear identity. Japan and Germany are cases in point.

Japan is often labeled as a virtual nuclear power. It is running an advanced civilian nuclear industry, currently using 55 nuclear reactors. The country also possesses large amounts of plutonium that could be used to develop hundreds of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, Japan is so far the only country that has suffered from the use of nuclear weapons. Although the generation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors is fading away, public antinuclear sentiments remain very strong. Public opposition to the development of a nuclear deterrence posture continued to be solid even in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006. Despite some politicians giving the impression that they would prefer Japan to reconsider or even reverse its non-nuclear status, Japan's identity as a non-nuclear weapon state still receives widespread acceptance even in conservative circles. Nonetheless, Japan can be expected to enhance its conventional military power. This will also include cooperation with the US in regard to improved missile defences.3

Germany's non-nuclear commitment seems to be even stronger. This country renounced nuclear weapons on three occasions: first, the 1954 Paris protocols to the treaty of Brussels that conditioned Bonn's membership in both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) on its renunciation of nuclear weapons; second, its adherence to the NPT in 1975; and third, the two-plus-four treaty of 1990, in which the newly reunified Germany again reconfirmed that it would not acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Today, there is no plausible scenario in which a reversal of Germany's nonnuclear stance could be envisioned. German public opinion is not only opposed to nuclear weapons but also-to a considerable degree-to the civilian use of nuclear energy. The country therefore decided to phase out this technology. It would be suicidal for any German politician to even dare mention reconsidering Germany's status as a non-nuclear power.4

Even in the event of a collapse of the NPT, both Japan's and Germany's non-nuclear identities would stand in the way of those then intending to change course. In addition, several reasons for not reversing the non-nuclear status would remain relevant. For Germany in particular, any discussion of a national nuclear weapons program would risk a political isolation of the country. Against the backdrop of German history, politicians across the board would be well advised to avoid such an outcome. Moreover, Germany's membership in the European Union would certainly prevent it from reversing its nuclear abstention.

Furthermore, in 1995, the Japanese defence agency conducted a secret investigation into the country's nuclear option. The study reaffirmed Japan's non-nuclear status in part because an acquisition of nuclear weapons would destroy the military balance in Asia. It could cause a cost-expensive nuclear arms race with China, motivate South Korea to also go nuclear, and create an openly hostile, nuclear-equipped North Korea. A decision to go nuclear therefore would weaken, not strengthen Japan's national security.5

Finally, in some cases the benefits of non-nuclear postures for national security could outweigh the costs of pursuing nuclear options. Modern conventional weapons could serve as strong deterrence, while improved modern missile defences could provide damage limitation options in case deterrence fails. Particularly for advanced industrial countries, such a course might turn out to be more favourable than developing nuclear weapons, even in case the NPT collapses.

The most important reason, though, why states can be expected to continue their renunciation of nuclear weapons even in a world without the NPT is that it would be easier for them to rely upon US security guarantees.6 This is the case for all NATO members. As far as Japan is concerned, it will be upon the US to convince Tokyo that the alliance still holds, even if faced with North Korean nuclear forces. Furthermore, it is indicative that both South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s abandoned their respective nuclear weapons programs not only because of American arm twisting but also as a result of the US security guarantees provided to these countries.7 Facing a nuclear-armed Iran, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt would have to weigh developing their own nuclear weapons against the consequences, which would affect their overall relationship with the US. The governments of these countries would need to take US security guarantees into account (above all conventional arms sales that include air and missile defences). Egypt in particular would also have to consider the negative economical ramifications if the US were to cut development aid as a result of the country going nuclear.

Those countries that might decide to go nuclear in an NPT-free world, for reasons of status and prestige, could be expected not to be the first to do so. Particularly in South Africa, some may think it was a mistake to destroy all existing nuclear devices in the 1990s and adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state now that India is respected as a nuclear weapon state outside of the regime due to the US-India deal on civil nuclear cooperation. Once the NPT ceased to exist, these critics might accelerate their efforts to change the nuclear course of their country, believing that South Africa would gain status and prestige by again developing nuclear weapons. It is, however, hard to imagine Pretoria taking such a decision as long as others like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt continued to resist the nuclear temptation. The same applies to Brazil or Argentina.

The argument put forward here is that an end to the NPT would not automatically result in ever more countries going nuclear. Even after a collapse of the NPT, we might witness a relatively stable continuation of the nuclear age without more nuclear proliferation taking place. In particular, countries that might be tempted to assemble their own nuclear weapons could prefer to rely upon US security guarantees.

However, a single conflict could change the situation entirely. One nuclear newcomer managing to pressure or even attack a smaller neighbour without the security guarantee defending the rights of the victim could be enough to convince more state leaders to play the nuclear card in order to preserve the security of the nation. But the opposite is also true. If a nuclear newcomer were to be made responsible for its nuclear aggression, this would function as a strong disincentive for all those thinking nuclear weapons would provide them a free hand in allowing assertiveness or aggression regarding their neighbours.

THE END OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT?

There is a widespread understanding in the arms control community that the NPT's final mission is to abolish all nuclear weapons. The weapons of mass destruction commission in 2006 described complete nuclear disarmament as an important final aim of the NPT.8 A group of former high-ranking US politicians pointed out that nuclear weapons present a tremendous danger for international security. Therefore, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, the original aim of the NPT, should be reasserted.9 Nuclear disarmament has even been portrayed as the eternal norm, which would eventually displace the provisional norm of nonproliferation.10 If those five countries permitted by the NPT to possess nuclear weapons intermediately would not one day renounce these arms altogether, but instead insist they were a significant part of their national security, how then could the nuclear have-nots be convinced that they should forswear nuclear weapons forever? Indeed, the 2000 NPT review conference in its final document decreed that the nuclear weapon states, in order to meet their commitments under article VI of the NPT, should completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, on the occasion of the 2005 review conference, the US and other nuclear haves again denied subscribing to this goal. As a result, this review conference failed to agree on a common wording.

If the NPT should collapse, its proponents would expect complete nuclear disarmament to become impossible. Nuclear disarmament would cease to be a legal requirement. This view assumes that the NPT indeed is a disarmament treaty and that the existence of the regime already contributes to this goal. It also asserts that more nuclear proliferation would occur if disarmament were lost. But the relationship between the NPT and nuclear disarmament is more complex.

To begin with, the NPT is not a disarmament agreement, but a nonproliferation treaty. In fact, during the first decade of its existence, the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union even accelerated. This was not surprising insofar as the two superpowers themselves never perceived the NPT as a treaty on nuclear disarmament. While Washington always saw horizontal nonproliferation as the main rationale for the NPT, Moscow's original aim was to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from developing its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, those NPT signatories who renounced nuclear weapons were more interested in preventing nuclear arms races in their respective regions than in the nuclear haves drastically disarming.

Some even argue that it was exactly the nuclear arms race of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s that prevented more countries from going nuclear. Despite an increasing Soviet nuclear threat, the US successfully convinced its friends and allies of the reliability of its security guarantees. To make extended deterrence work, ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons were needed.11

While more nuclear weapons, not less, contributed to a limitation of nuclear proliferation, the opposite is also true: more nuclear disarmament does not result in less nuclear proliferation. NPT members ran clandestine nuclear programs in noncompliance to their treaty obligations for several reasons. Disappointment about absent nuclear disarmament steps of the nuclear haves was not, however, among their central motivations.

The two superpowers began reversing the nuclear arms race in the second half of the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan wanted to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. In January 1986, his counterpart, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. When both leaders met in October 1986 for their historic summit at Reykjavik, they discussed their common vision to completely abolish nuclear arms. In the end, the meeting failed due to incompatible positions on missile defences and the ABM treaty. Nevertheless, Reykjavik gave a strong impetus for nuclear disarmament: the 1987 US-Soviet treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear forces and the 1991 START I agreement that significantly cut strategic nuclear arms on both sides.12

Exactly in the course of this historical period that ended the Cold War, Saddam Hussein accelerated his nuclear weapons program that had been damaged in the Israeli air attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981. Saddam's aim was to become a dominant regional power in the Middle East. Iran, which at the time was fighting a war with Iraq, began to develop its own nuclear program as a deterrent against a future Iraqi nuclear threat. As well, North Korea built up its Yongbyon reactor to separate plutonium and to create nuclear life insurance for the politically isolated country. Finally, Libya's Ghaddafi dreamed of his own nuclear bomb, making him a respected leader in the Arab world and beyond.

Since then, nuclear powers may not have met many expectations of nuclear have-nots. To be sure, the failure to set in force the comprehensive test ban treaty and to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty disappointed many. Concerns refer also to plans for modernizing nuclear forces in all nuclear possessor states. But it is also true that the US as well as Russia (and France and the UK) dramatically reduced the number of their nuclear forces. In the case of the US this amounted to a two-thirds reduction. After all, one of the important aims of the Bush administration's 2001 nuclear posture review was to reduce the country's dependence on nuclear weapons. The development of ever more sophisticated modern conventional ammunition enables even the use of conventional warheads for strategic systems.13 In sum, nuclear weaponry will become less and less relevant for the security of modern states. However, at the same time, we witnessed North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006. Iran pursues a nuclear program that is believed to follow military purposes. India and Pakistan, two countries that never joined the NPT, are accelerating their nuclear weapons programs. Finally, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and maybe even Turkey, are expected by many to counter an Iranian nuclear bomb with their own nuclear plans.

In conclusion, the NPT is not a nuclear disarmament treaty. On the contrary, nuclear security guarantees prevented proliferation in many cases. Despite nuclear disarmament taking place after the end of the Cold War, proliferation continued. A collapse of the NPT nonetheless would not automatically mean the end of nuclear disarmament. Modern industrial countries can be expected to rely less on nuclear weapons for their national security needs due to precision-guided conventional ammunition.

At the same time, abolishing all nuclear weapons is not an easy thing to do. It is-as Michael Quinlan has pointed out-tougher than giving up smoking on a global scale. In a non-nuclear environment, extremely intrusive verification arrangements would be necessary to convince all states of the non-existence of clandestine weapons programs or stockpiles. This is the case because as long as sovereign states exist, these often see the ability to default as an important feature of their sovereignty. But if only one nation cheated, it could become the master of the game. Against this background, it seems plausible to argue that the abolition of nuclear weapons can only be the result of a new peaceful international order, not the prerequisite. In other words: a world without nuclear weapons is an unrealistic goal for the foreseeable future. If this is the case, drawing attention to the failure of achieving complete nuclear disarmament is counterproductive. It gives those who have an interest in weakening the NPT, such as potential proliferators, the opportunity to argue that the NPT is weak because the great powers do not proceed with nuclear disarmament, not because they themselves pursue illegal nuclear projects. This is not to say that more realistic steps in nuclear disarmament would not be helpful. Indeed, they would enhance the credibility of the NPT But a world completely free of nuclear weapons is very different from maintaining a low number of nukes.14

WHY WE WOULD STILL MISS THE NPT

An end to the NPT would not automatically result in more nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the relationship between the nuclear nonproliferation regime and nuclear disarmament is more complex than often assumed by NPT proponents. Does this mean that we can easily do without the NPT? Three important arguments speak against this proposition: international coalition building, transparency and confidence-building, and style of international politics.

International coalition building

The responsibility to guard the NPT lies the United Nations security council. It has to ensure that the states parties comply with the treaty provisions and it has to take action in cases of non-compliance. But the security council can only execute this function properly if its five permanent members are united. In other words, coalition building against potential nuclear proliferators is of the essence. In the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan-all nuclear powers that refused to join the NPT-the security council was unable to fulfill this role.

In the case of North Korea, the security council outsourced the problem to the six-party talks (North and South Korea, US, China, Japan, and Russia). Recently, this group worked successfully to the extent that in February 2007 North Korea accepted an action plan for nuclear disarmament that includes the deactivation of its Yongbyon reactor under IAEA supervision. The final goal is to convince Pyongyang to completely abandon its nuclear weapon program in a verifiable manner and to adhere again to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.15

International coalition building against potential nuclear proliferators is most visible in the case of Iran. Tehran has frequently tried to split the international community. Instead of suspending its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as envisioned by the 2003 Tehran and 2004 Paris agreements it had signed with the EU-3 (France, UK, and Germany), it accelerated its nuclear program. But its tactics failed. Instead of separating the Europeans from Washington and the western partners from Russia and China, an international coalition called the E3/EU-Plus-3 emerged. At a meeting of the foreign ministers of the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, and Germany in June 2006, these governments agreed to confront Iran with a clear choice: either to open negotiations that could lead to political and economic cooperation and a suspension of all full fuel cycle activities, or to pursue such projects but face UN security council sanctions. This coalition building had become possible despite conflicting Russian and Chinese interests with the west. Both see Iran as an important economic partner-Moscow, because it wants to sell conventional weaponry and civilian nuclear technology, and Beijing, because Iran is China's second major oil supplier.

Since Iran continued with its nuclear program and the IAEA could not resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran's enrichment activities, the security council took action. In December 2006 and March 2007 and 2008, it passed resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 that requested Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing projects. It also agreed on sanctions to be implemented as long as Tehran did not meet these requirements.16 These resolutions made clear that a solid international coalition exists to prevent a nuclear Iran.

The jury is still out on whether the international coalitions against North Korea's and Iran's nuclear ambitions are sustainable and whether they will succeed in convincing both countries to reverse their nuclear courses. But strong international coalitions are a necessary precondition to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Coalition building is a lot easier as long as the NPT exists, because the regime provides a legal norm against nuclear proliferation. Without this normative framework, nuclear proliferation would not remain illegal, so that international coalition building against potential nuclear proliferators would become much more difficult, if not impossible. On the contrary: it could be expected that certain nuclear programs suiting the interests of some great powers would be approved by them, but opposed by others. This would result in the destabilization of international order.

Transparency and confidence-building

Currently, the NPT provides the legal basis for about 2000 annual onsite in spections carried out by the IAEA. During the 1970s and 1980s, these inspections concentrated on declared facilities where nuclear material was monitored to make sure that it could not be diverted for military purposes. After the bitter experience of Saddam Hussein running a clandestine nuclear program parallel to declared nuclear sites, the IAEA board of governors approved an additional protocol to the original safeguards. These modern verification procedures include additional information obligations. All nuclear fuel cycle activities, including research and development, have to be declared. The IAEA arranges profiles of each country including information coming from declarations, inspections, and open as well as other sources. In addition, the access rights for IAEA inspectors have been expanded considerably. In principle, they can now access undeclared facilities on declared sites Moreover, inspectors are allowed to take environmental samples at any location they like. Regrettably, only about half of the NPT members so far have ratified the additional protocol, but convincing more countries to join mains an important goal.17

This is particularly the case in light of the current renaissance of civil nuclear power. Today, 31 countries run 429 nuclear reactors. Twenty-five additional reactors are under construction. Seventy-seven more nuclear plants are planned and an additional 162 proposed. If all those were built, the number of countries operating nuclear power reactors would increase to 38, including Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Vietnam. Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates have also declared their interest in civil nuclear energy.

It can be expected that more countries will run breeder reactors in the future in order to decrease their demand for uranium fuel. The plutonium used in these generation IV reactors will be particularly suitable to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. At the same time, analysts expect more countries to develop uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to achieve independence from international suppliers. These are classical dualuse technologies that can easily be converted to military purposes.18

Without IAEA safeguards-ideally the modern verification procedures-in place, transparency would be lost just at a time when it is most needed. As a result, we would quickly be confronted with a world full of nuclear uncertainty. Governments would need to consider their neighbours becoming latent nuclear powers in the course of running civilian nuclear programs. In addition to state proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism may also increase. Through cooperation efforts with the IAEA, many civilian nuclear powers eventually learned to account for their nuclear fuel material. Without any international supervision of these nuclear activities, many governments and bureaucracies might forget these skills. Therefore, we would end up with more nuclear material in more countries without exact statistics about this material. For preventing nuclear terrorism, this is completely undesirable.

Style of international politics

The NPT has often been described as the cornerstone of multilateral arms control. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the two other important nonproliferation regimes, the biological weapons convention (BWC) and the chemical weapons convention (CWC), sustaining should the NPT collapse. The BWC is weak because it lacks effective verification provisions. But to enhance the BWC seems all the more important in light of new developments in the life sciences that are expected to result not only in useful civilian applications, but also in new military options. The CWC verification system is much more advanced, but this treaty might severely suffer if the two largest possessors of chemical weapons, Russia and the US, did not entirely destroy their chemical arms as foreseen by the CWC by April 2012 at the latest. If the NPT should cease to exist, the already extremely problematic business of multilateral arms control would become even more difficult. Finding ways to prevent the military misuse of the life sciences could prove impossible. By the same token, the political dynamic to free the world of all chemical weapons might be lost.

If this scenario turns out to be real, a whole set of norms of behavior would disappear. The idea of cooperating between nations to organize restraint in terms of access to the most destructive weapons and technologies for military purposes would go astray. As a result, the style of international politics would change. States might be tempted to limit further proliferation through export controls as well as military activities, including preemptive strikes. Unilateral action and confrontation would supersede international cooperation.

CONCLUSION

The collapse of the NPT would not inevitably result in more countries going nuclear. For many governments, there are more reasons than just the NPT to resist the nuclear temptation. They would still need to take domestic opposition into consideration. Non-nuclear identities will continue to be important. Security guarantees mainly provided by the US would remain relevant. If these were perceived reliable, it would turn out to be more convenient for many governments not to develop nuclear weapons and instead to preserve a stable relationship with Washington. At the same time, nuclear disarmament would still be possible, if not even likely, in a world without the NPT But a nuclear-free world would not necessarily be more stable with or without the NPT.

And yet, to enter the 21st century with a collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation regime would have severe negative ramifications. International coalition-building against proliferation would become much more complicated, if not impossible. Moreover, just at a time when more countries are expected to make use of civil nuclear technologies that can easily be misused for military purposes, the verification and transparency regime provided by IAEA safeguards would almost entirely disappear. The result would be nuclear uncertainty and mistrust.

Maybe most importantly, the political culture of dealing with emerging proliferation threats through cooperation would be lost. To extend the civilizing reach of the rule of law over humankind's destructive capacity would cease to be part of the international agenda. As with so many things in life, we might only miss the NPT once it was gone.

1 See George Perkovich, "The end of the nonproliferation regime?" Current History, November 2006, 355-62.

2 See William Walker, "Nuclear enlightment and counter-enlightment," International Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007): 431-53.

3 See Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan tests the nucleartaboo," The Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (July 2007): 303-28; Richard J. Samuels, "A more muscular Japan," International Herald Tribune, 7 August 2007, 6.

4 See Jennifer Mackby and Walter B. Slocombe, "Germany: The model case, a historical imperative," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 175-217.

5 See Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the unthinkable," The Nuclear Tipping Point, 218-53.

6 See Michael Rühle, "Enlightment in the second nuclear age," International Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007): 511-22.

7 See Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters, "Nuclear u-turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese rollback," The Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (November 2006): 1539-53.

8 See the weapons of mass destruction commission, "Weapons of terror: Freeing the world of nuclear, biological and chemical arms," Stockholm, 2006, 62.

9 See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A world free of nuclear weapons," The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, A15.

10 See William Walker, "Nuclear enlightment."

11 See Joachim Krause, "Enlightment and nuclear order," International Affairs, 83, no. 3 (2007): 1483-99.

12 See James E. Goodby, "Looking back: The 1986 Reykjavik summit," Arms Control Today, September 2006, 49-51.

13 See Steve And reasen, "Off target? The Bush administration's plan to arm long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads," Arms Control Today, July-August 2006, 6-11.

14 See Pierre Hassner, "Who killed nuclear enlightment?" International Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007): 455-67; Michael Quinlan, "Abolishing nuclear armouries: Policy or piped ream?" Survival 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007-08): 7-16; Harold Brown, "New nuclear realities," The Washington Quarterly 31 , no. 1 (Winter 2007-08): 7-22.

15 See North Korea, "Denuclearization action plan," US Department of State, office of the spokesman, Washington, DC, 13 February 2007. Many analysts remain skeptical regarding the full implementation of this plan. See for instance Jacques E.C. Hymans, "North Korea's nuclear neurosis," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2007, 45-49, 74.

16 See Oliver Thränert, "Sorting out the Iran puzzle," Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition) 7, no. 4 (fall 2006): 32-38; Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver Thränert, "The EU-3 and the Iranian nuclear program," Franz Eder, Gerhard Mangott, and Martin Senn, eds., Transatlantic Discord (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007), 95-119.

17 See model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between the state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards, www.iaea.org.

[Author Affiliation]

Oliver Thränert is head of the research unit for European and Atlantic security at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin. He is a specialist on nonproliferation and arms control.

Author Advanced search

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.