THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to expand on some key ideas raised, but not fully developed, in my November/December 2008 Military Review article entitled "Re-Thinking IO: Complex Operations in the Information Age." That piece makes the argument that the core competencies of information operations (10) are far less integrated and effectively employed than they should be. Psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception (MILDEC) are two vitally important elements that are especially ineffective today because of the way we organize ourselves to use them.
Logic and experience suggest it will be more important to pursue three ever-present, but practical, mission needs than to pursue the grander, doctrinal, but over-ambitious task of achieving "information superiority" to "influence, disrupt, corrupt," and so on. These needs are:
* Win the psychological contest with current and potential adversaries.
* Keep the trust and confidence of home and allied populations while gaining the confidence and support of the local one.
* Win the operational and strategic, cognitive and technical "informationage applications" contest with current or potential adversaries.
It will be necessary to integrate core capabilities for meeting these needs into a combined arms pursuit of multiple objectives (rather than, as aforementioned, pursuing one separate IO LLO). As my earlier article notes:
Effective application already also requires expertise in very different disciplines. It will become even more important to reorganize IO capabilities into groupings for staff oversight that share common functional purposes, causal logic, and art- and science-based competencies. Leaving the collection of IO tools under the oversight of one staff officer has become an untenable option, and proper preparation and education will be increasingly difficult to achieve.1
Here I am concerned only with the difficult challenge of winning the very complex psychological contest with current and potential adversaries. If this is one of the things we want to do, our doctrine should provide the general causal logic and principles for getting it done. But neither the current Army and Joint IO doctrine nor the new Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations, provides useful guidance on this subject. (The coordinating draft of the new FM 3-13, Information, devotes an entire chapter to this need specifically; ideally the next FM 3.0 will expand on this subject as well.)
The psychological aspects of full spectrum operations ought to be as second nature to every commander and operations officer as psychology in general is to a sports team coach. Several decades ago the Army banished its psychological operators to the Special Forces. More recently, in the 1990s, the Army bundled PSYOP and MILDEC in an awkward conceptual construct called 10. The recent FM 3.0 returned MILDEC to the operations staff's responsibility, but re-bundled PSYOP into another awkward construct called "information engagement" that bridges the first two of the needs identified in the earlier article. The U.S. Army, as an institution, still does not appreciate the normality and utter necessity of the close relationship evinced by the fact that these specialists are today far more deeply engaged in public relations work than in leveraging the psychological impact of physical capabilities and actions. I argue the case for re-thinking this vital relationship by reviewing the logic for a natural blending of the physical and the psychological dimensions of war and by suggesting remedies on the road ahead.
Military Power and Perceptions
Excellence in the use of firepower, armor, speed, precision, and armed physical presence to "create new facts on the ground" is less than half of the whole without excellence in intimidating, demoralizing, mystifying, misleading, and surprising at the same time (as well as leveraging that reputation for excellence to influence the decisions of real or potential adversaries not yet subject to physical force). …