Academic journal article International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy

Implementation Intentions and Artificial Agents

Academic journal article International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy

Implementation Intentions and Artificial Agents

Article excerpt

An intention is a type of state of mind that regulates the transformation of motivational processes in volitional processes. Such transformation would be verified in two steps (Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985): the first would consist in forming intentions while the second would appeal to the beginning of the action (see Figure 1). Recently, the intention concept has reappeared as a metacognitive instrument useful for the control of the actions. Gollwitzer (1993) distinguishes between goal intentions and implementation intentions. To adequately context them, one must think that three levels exist in action thoughts (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998): (a) the level of the strategy or superior level, the one which defines the goals and states that the agent wishes; (b) the intermediate level of the operative planning, in which the subject is committed in a concrete behavior directed towards the goal and (c) the inferior level of the tactics, that consists of the execution of the behavior guided to the goal.

Goal intentions act in the strategic level while implementation intentions operate in the planning level. The first admit to be formulated through the expression "I intend to achieve X!" where X specifies a final wish state. On the other hand, implementation intentions can be stated as "I intend to do X when situation Y is encountered!" (Gollwitzer, 1996). This means that in an implementation intention, a future anticipated situation or situational cue is linked to a certain behavior directed to a goal; implementation intentions are subordinating goal intentions and they specify how to carry out the answers to reach the goal. In the accomplished investigations, implementation intentions have been shown as effective strategies of self-regulation in comparison with the strategies based on goal intentions. Thus, for example, in what is related to promote not nice actions such as the accomplishment of frequent medical reviews (Sheeran & Orbell, 2000) or in the daily intake of medicines (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999). At the same time, implementation intentions have demonstrated that they facilitate the actions directed to a goal in samples of critical populations, as in heroin addict patients under the abstinence syndrome (Brandstätter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001), schizophrenic patients or patients with injuries in the frontal lobe (Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001). Implementation intentions act, since, as a powerful and flexible metacognitive instrument.

In implementation intentions, the agent passes, in good measure, the control of the action to a series of specified situational cues. The agent decides "in advance" what it will do and the conditions under those in which it will do it (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005); that is to say, in the measure in which the specified situations are found that act as support in guide towards the goal. In this article we accomplish a computer simulation comparing the behavior of two artificial agents: both simulate the fulfilments of implementation intentions, that allow to save obstacles and to be supported in critical situations which facilitate to achieve a final reward R; but while one of them will incarnate an agent A0 whose behavior is somewhat more capsized towards the goal intention of obtaining the goal R, the agent A1 will reflect a more planned behavior, that is, more guided towards the avoidance of obstacles and towards the utilization of the critical situations, for, at the same time, to attain the final objective R. The hypothesis to demonstrate will consist in, with a slight difference of the two agents' programming (related to a slightly different weight conferred to the search of R, to the search of the places L and to the avoidance of the sites S), the agent A1 will not only reach the goal R before A0 in a greater number of occasions, but its global yield, reflected in punctuation, will be superior. This is clearly in agreement with the results of Gollwitzer and collaborators, about the superiority of planning in humans the actions through implementation intentions front to the mere attempt of executing a goal intention to obtain an objective. …

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.