Academic journal article Air & Space Power Journal

American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War

Academic journal article Air & Space Power Journal

American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War

Article excerpt

American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War by John L. Romjue. Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1996, 160 pages.

In today's age, the United States Army has no immediate concern for a Soviet-backed attack against the Fulda Gap and Western Europe. No longer is it necessary for the Army to stave off a smashing T-72 attack across West Germany's borders In the hopes of airlifting American troops and equipment to resupply and counter Soviet land gains. How has Army doctrine changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the threat of an all-out conventional war with the Warsaw Pact nations? John L. Romjue presents an interesting, but somewhat vague, look at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) current views of the doctrine of the Army in dealing with post-coldwar threats.

Romjue provides an outstanding background of the process to change the cold war doctrine, known as AirLand Battle, into the doctrine of today. This was the foremost doctrine to last the Army until the end of the cold war, basically from 1982 to 1993. AirLand Battle doctrine provided the Army with its rules and instructions for such conflicts as the Persian Gulf War. The main thrust of the doctrine was the "deeper view of the battlefield," meaning to attack the enemy's advance combat units and his follow-on echelons, therefore disrupting his ability to arrive at the battle. This doctrine was rightfully rethought as the Soviet Union had become a gaggle of independent states. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) fear of the European conventional invasion of Western Europe became defunct around 1990-1991, and with that change, the AirLand Battle thinking needed adjustment.

What bothers me in the post-cold-war rethinking is that the leaders of the 1990s' military doctrine decided to remain consistent with the National Military Strategy and apply doctrine to combat in large land campaigns as well as operations other than war. There are far fewer chances for the United States to become involved in such an enormous war-requiring a large land battle-other than on the Korean peninsula or in the Middle East if the rogue nations of Iran and Iraq get anxious and land hungry. The most important aspect of the post-cold-war doctrine is the necessary importance of operations other than war.

In the final formulation of the new doctrine, an Army-Navy doctrinal meeting was held as an indication of the "growing reorientation to support of the land warfare mission. …

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.