Academic journal article International Journal of Communication Research

The Problematologic Analysis of the Philosophical Dialogue: From the Critical Function to the Minimal Epistemology

Academic journal article International Journal of Communication Research

The Problematologic Analysis of the Philosophical Dialogue: From the Critical Function to the Minimal Epistemology

Article excerpt


In its essence, the problematologic model assumes the possibility that a question can receive at the same time without contradiction, several answers. Multiple answers may retain the equivalence relation only to the extent not to lose touch with the question that generated the problematologic difference. In this context, the dialogue as a way of using the language performs, according to the problematologic theory, two functions: a critical and an epistemological one. These two functions, as I will try to argue, may indicate the dynamic evolution of the dialogue.

Keywords: problematology, historicity, dialogue, minimal epistemology.

The starting point of problematology1 as a discipline is the history of philosophy, i.e. the constant dialogue that establishes between the person that asks the question and tradition. This report highlights a key point: the philosophical questions are not new, they are returned to the surface by that one who asks the question. To ask a question and ignore tradition is quite inefficient. There is really no risk of reaching a new, but an existing, ignored result. The multiple responses entering in relation to one and the same question go beyond the way to resolve the question/ problem to the level of the binary logic. What makes problematology and hence its model, to send, or to be based on a fuzzy logic is the concept of possibility. From Meyer's perspective, this concept is not feasible only in terms of problematology. A dependency link is established between possibility and problematology:

"...the wish to give the answer sets the possibility as an alternative, as a choice, as a free plurality. The possible is for theory what freedom is for history."2

The possibility is conceived as an autonomous category as it does not interfere in any way in the problematologic model structure, according to Meyer, as a grid capable of dissociating between possible, impossible or necessary answers. Between a question and its possible answers Meyer installs another concept (which articulates the possibility of being the responses, whatever they are), that of historicity. The difficulties surrounding this concept are received directly by the definitions. Meyer, in De la problématologie... and Questionnement et historicité outlines its scope somewhat different, hence this ambiguity. In De la problématologie historicity is "...the constitutive dimension of questioning by what makes it current, whenever present under different forms. It is the discharge of what changes, the timeless expression of questioning that embodies a system that wants to be eternal in its validity that structures itself in a certain manner"3. In the same work historicity appears in the condition of possibile position of questioning and takes to a certain extent the role of problematologic difference (difference question answer) but the purpose is to suppress the question of "to appear and answer the reflective stage, making it possible to respond, which preserves the question, while keeping the difference. (...) being the discharge of the questioning report about what is being questioned of what makes the subject of questioning. It is in the same time the condition of objectivity, if not of objectification"4.

In Questionnement et historicité, the historicity appears as "putting away and when the historical point of view is not possible to overfill the tank itself, history appears by highlighting its own difference"5.

From here certain features of the concept of historicity may be extracted and especially those areas where it becomes active: between question and answer, between past and present, between history and historicity itself. If, as stated by Meyer, a historical event is perceived as a block of facts6; in other words, an event recorded in history cannot be understood only in conjunction with other events that preceded it, the relationships that can establish between them will reveal the relationship of cause and effect. …

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