Canada's Window on Asia: The Establishment of the Tokyo Legation in 1928 - 1931
TOU CHU DOU LYNHIAVU
Canada's decision to establish diplomatic ties with Japan in 1928 was an important foreign policy initiative. It represented a clear if reluctant recognition on the part of the Department of External Affairs of the importance of Asia - Pacific in general, and Japan in particular. It also reflected the need for Canada to have a "Far Eastern" policy. Canada and Japan had just signed an agreement on immigration, and Japan was Canada's fourth largest trading partner. The Japanese producers demanded protective measures, and the Tokyo Legation worked hard trying to protect Canadian interests. The Depression and the collapse of international trading systems, meanwhile, rendered it doubly difficult for the Tokyo mission to maintain Canada's favourable trading relation with Japan. Finally, the Legation provided Ottawa with vital information on Japanese internal politics and external relations, although Ottawa did not always use this information accurately in its statements during the Manchurian Crisis: the Legation was too small to cover all of Asia - Pacific and thus could not give a "China View" when the Manchurian Crisis occurred. The attempt to gather materials essential for the formulation of Canada's "Far Eastern" policy proved beyond the reach of a single understaffed diplomatic mission. It was, nevertheless, an important first step.
On 18 September 1929, Herbert M. Marler, in full diplomatic uniform as Canadian Minister to Japan presented his credentials to Emperor Hirohito. The audience came one year after the 1928 decision to establish formal diplomatic ties with Japan. With this decision Canada would no longer entrust its interests to Britain, intending to carry the Imperial Conference of 1926 to its logical conclusion. Canada's first diplomatic missions, therefore, were in London (in the form of the High Commissioner's Office) and Washington. Socio - economic, political and military considerations required that Canada maintain and promote the Anglo - American friendship, but Canada's francophone population also ensured that a diplomatic mission with France(f.1) would come sooner rather than later. The decision to establish a legation in Japan, however, surprised many.
Until very recently this 1928 decision received little scholarly attention. Some academics have suggested that the move reflected Prime Minister Mackenzie King's geo - political perspectives.(f.2) Yet, these historians, like officials of the Department of External Affairs, comment only occasionally on the topic.(f.3) The little research done on the 1920s and 1930s has focused largely on trade and immigration. Indeed, some suggest that Canada's primary interest in this diplomatic exchange was the desire to control immigration, with trade a secondary consideration.(f.4) This interpretation is incomplete. Trade and immigration dealings with Japan have a long history dating back to the nineteenth century; immigration had been handled satisfactorily without having either immigration agents at the source of the problem or diplomatic ties.(f.5) In 1907, Canada had negotiated with Japan a "Gentleman's Agreement"(f.6) which by 1923 restricted Japanese labourers in Canada to only 150 arrivals and by 1928 to a total of 150 immigrants per year. The Tokyo Legation, however, facilitated the implementation the 1928 Canada - Japan immigration agreement.(f.7) All these ad hoc measures had proven to be effective, and so it would appear that diplomatic ties were not a pre - condition for dealing with immigration and trade issues.
Canada, however, wanted closer and better economic ties with Asia. Although the legendary riches of the Orient had long attracted attention, trade was slow to develop.(f.8) The first official contact between Canada and Japan took place in 1889, when both nations signed the "Convention for the Exchange of Money Orders" between the Canadian Post Office Department and the Japanese Communication Department. This agreement provided the means for exchange, which would facilitate trade. In 1894, Britain as the mother country signed with Japan a commercial and navigation treaty.(f.9) Canada initially rejected this Anglo - Japanese treaty because it guaranteed "the full liberty" of their respective subjects to move into, travel to and live in the other's territories. Canada demanded a clause restricting Japanese immigration, and although Japan agreed, Canada again rejected the treaty in July 1896 because of concerns about a "most - favoured - nation" clause.(f.10) Canada would not accede to this treaty for another decade. Despite this rejection, Canada sent a commercial agent ("trade commissioner") to Japan in 1897. This effort proved half - hearted. In 1920, there were still only three commercial agents in East Asia; by 1930 there were only six.(f.11)
In spite of their small numbers, these agents performed their duties well. Trade between Canada and Asia increased steadily, with Japan looming ever larger as Canada's primary trading partner in the Asia - Pacific region. For many years, Canada had a large trade deficit with Japan. The gap soon began to close however, and after World War I Canada enjoyed an "enormous advantage"(f.12) in trade with Japan. The trade surplus grew at a rate of two and a half times annually. By 1926 Japan emerged as Canada's third best external market. Booming trade and a growing surplus demonstrated that Canada also was successfully pursuing its trade objectives without diplomatic contacts. Thus, trade and immigration alone do not sufficiently explain Canada's motives in its hesitation to formalize relations with Japan.
The 1928 decision, I would argue, reflected King's global perspective. During the 1920s Canada was primarily concerned with its position within the British Empire/Commonwealth of Nations and with its relations with the United States. King's appreciation of world politics and understanding of the growing importance of Canada's relations with Asia - Pacific in general and with Japan in particular encouraged the development of independent lines of communication. The evidence, although limited, indicates that while King had no intention of thrusting Canada onto the world stage, he certainly wanted to be kept well - informed. The Tokyo Legation, then, provided Canada with a crucial "window" or a "listening post" on Asia; it gathered intelligence essential to the formulation of Canada's Asia - Pacific policy, and was a means to make Canada's presence felt and to "gain the attention of those countries on matters that are of concern" to Canada.(f.13)
The Tokyo initiative thus was motivated by a number of considerations. The Legation would implement the 1928 Canada - Japan immigration agreement.(f.14) It would enhance the status of the Canadian trade commissioner in Japan and it might expand further an already favourable trade relationship. In addition, Canada recognized the Asia - Pacific region as an emerging geo - political force and Japan as one of the major international players. (Japan had the world's third - largest navy). A ten - page memorandum clearly set out King's concerns that Japan might become the source of potential Anglo - American conflicts because of Japan's expansion in the Far East.(f.15) Canada neither wanted to be caught off - guard nor did it wish to rely on what Britain and the United States said about Far Eastern diplomacy. King had a good appreciation of Asia - Pacific's significance for changing international politics, and more experience in dealing with Asia, than any of his contemporaries and subordinates at External Affairs. In 1907, King chaired a Royal Commission on Asian immigration. He was opposition leader and then prime minister during the Washington Conference of 1921 - 22 which dealt with the Anglo - Japanese alliance - an alliance Canada came to oppose - and with Far Eastern problems.(f.16) He was clearly aware of Anglo/American/Japanese disputes and rivalries in the Pacific. "The Pacific," King noted, was "bound to be of increasing and decisive importance in world developments; for this Tokyo [is the] natural centre."(f.17) He believed that world politics had changed significantly, and Canada could not afford to see itself exclusively as a North Atlantic nation. The Pacific, he argued, would have as great an impact "upon world's destinies" as "the Atlantic in the next fifty years." As the parliamentary debate unfolded, King clearly had Far Eastern diplomacy in mind. He wrote in ink at the bottom of the memo outlining Canada's objectives: "present difficulties; unrest in Orient - China, India, Japan; further international goodwill." King, in fact, went a step further. Geographically, according to him, Canada was ideally located to bridge the worlds of the Atlantic and Pacific. This new task "offers a great opportunity and imposes a great responsibility." The least Canada could do was to "learn more of our neighbours across the sea, study their problems [and] adjust our relationships." The best way of achieving those objectives was through "diplomatic exchange which every country has recognized as the necessary and best means."
According to King, Canada's political relationship with Britain and the latter's relations with France, Japan and the United States were of utmost concern.(f.18) King believed that any disputes involving Britain in this relationship between four powers would directly affect Canada:
Whether we like it or not, our country cannot escape rapid growth in her international relations, and least of all can she escape those special responsibilities and obligations, as well as opportunities, which arise out of her geographical position and her position as a nation in the British Commonwealth of Nations.(f.19)
King believed that "the problems of the Atlantic and ... of the Pacific, and all that lie between, are bound up in that [four - power] relation. This is, in turn, an all - sufficient reason why Canada should seek to inform itself." The post - war naval arms - race, the Imperial Conference of 1921, the Anglo/American/Japanese tensions and the Washington Conference of 1921 - 22 all confirmed King's belief that Canada had every interest in the maintenance, if not the promotion, of good relations among these powers.(f.20)
Canada, meanwhile, had been elected to a non - permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations in 1927. Increased diplomatic contacts with other nations, especially with Asian - Pacific countries where Canada had few ties, could not be postponed. The League's primary objective was to help nations avoid all confrontations and, as a responsible member of the Council, Canada needed to be better informed if it were to carry out its new responsibilities. This context, then, required an independent source of information and helped explain the 1928 decision.
After the 1926 Imperial Conference, Canada moved quickly to implement its resolutions. That conference had resulted in senior British dominions being allowed to pursue a more independent foreign policy, and Canada took full advantage. On 22 November 1927 King, who was his own external affairs minister, informed Sir Austen Chamberlain, the secretary for the Dominions, of Canada's desire to establish diplomatic ties with France and Japan. Ottawa also indicated that the Japanese Consul General in Canada, Matsunaga, had been informed of Canada's intention before he returned to Japan in October. Even so, a more explicit case needed to be made to the Japanese authorities. The British government instructed its ambassador in Tokyo to inform the Japanese of Canada's wish.(f.21)
Matsunaga seems to have dismissed the Canadian initiative and had not, according to the British ambassador, fully explained Canada's position to his government. The Japanese foreign minister, however, "promised an early reply."(f.22) Two weeks later, London confirmed Japan's readiness to exchange ministers. Matters now proceeded quickly. On 26 January 1928, the throne speech announced Canada's decision to open two new legations in France and in Japan. For diplomatic reasons, obviously, no one objected to the French initiative, and King wrote in his diary that the initiative would be seen by French Canadians as a "compliment."(f.23) The case of Japan, however, surprised many.
Most opinion - makers supported the government's decision. The Toronto Globe suggested that the decision was not a "departure in principle" but a "more rapid extension of the principle" than the Imperial Conference had anticipated.(f.24) Similarly, the Manitoba Free Press suggested that "if the ministers abroad can promote the interest of Canada" then Canada should send them forth, and anyone who opposed this initiative "for political or other reasons" would have no chance of derailing "the course of events."(f.25) The Vancouver Sun also congratulated the government for raising "Canada's international status" and for making "an impressive bid for world trade." Thus, Canada should pursue the "diplomacy of salesmanship."(f.26) The Vancouver Board of Trade expressed a similar view. The Japan Society, whose purpose was to promote friendship between Canada and Japan, suggested that either "your diplomatic representative or a member of his staff" should study both the trade matters and the "oriental question" thoroughly before going to Japan.(f.27) The Liberal MP from Row River, E.J. Garland, suggested that the Tokyo Legation should not be Canada's only information - gathering centre for Asia.(f.28)
Most Japanese newspaper reactions were cautious and reserved. The Kokumin commented on "growing importance in trade" and hoped that the diplomatic exchange would change the "anti - Japanese attitude of Canadian people."(f.29) Similarly, Tokyo Nichi - Nichi hoped for a "complete settlement" on the immigration and fisheries(f.30) questions that "block better intercourse between the two nations." The Yamato took a far more critical posture: Canada was as guilty of anti - Japanese feelings as were the United States, and unless she could furnish a good reason for such practices, deserved no separate diplomatic treatment, and should be content with the current arrangement in which a British ambassador spoke for the whole Empire.(f.31) A Japanese consul general in Ottawa, the paper suggested, was more than sufficient. Diplomatic exchanges should only be established if Canada intended to settle once and for all the questions of fisheries and immigration. It was precisely Canada's desire to deal with these matters independently that led Canada to establish separate diplomatic ties with Japan.
In Parliament, King made clear Canada's desire to bring the resolutions of the 1926 Imperial Conference to their logical conclusion. The intention to appoint ministers to Japan and France was "not in the present stage of our international relations proceeding with undue haste." This decision drew fire from the Opposition leader, R. B. Bennett, who accepted the Paris initiative but opposed the Tokyo one. The Japanese, "unaccustomed to our institutions," would treat Canada as an independent nation, an outcome for which Canada was not ready. Bennett "propose[d] to die protesting against that independent condition being achieved."(f.32) For King, it was the Tory leader rather than "the Oriental mind" that failed to understand the principle of Canadian sovereignty within the British Empire.(f.33)
Justifying the decision, King noted that one of the reasons was trade, emphasizing the hope that the effectiveness of a trade commissioner would be considerably enhanced through diplomatic exchanges. Bennett, on the other hand, criticized the decision. According to him, what Canada needed was more commercial agents rather than "our diplomatic skill and power." Bennett also criticized Marler, the Canadian minister to Japan, as "a glorified trade commissioner in the disguise of a minister."(f.34) The problem, King explained, involved the status of Canadian trade commissioners:
no trade commissioner as such ... has any right to approach ... the government of the country in which he holds office, nor does he speak with any authority on behalf of the government by whom he may be employed. He is not the representative of that government.... Canada was suffering because they [trade commissioners] had not the [diplomatic] status which would enable them on behalf of the Dominion to have those relations with the governments of the countries in which they stationed....(f.35)
Yet without diplomatic status, official responsibility and authority, Trade Commissioners could exert little or no influence on the host nation's political decisions. In Japan, Canada needed to have diplomats who would be in a position to present the Canadian case and influence the Japanese government, particularly if Japan began adopting discriminatory trading practices against Canadian goods. According to Hugh L. Keenleyside, then charge d'affaires, who had preceded Marler to Tokyo.
Many of our most active contacts with the Japanese government were concerned with economic matters rather than with international or domestic politics or cultural relationships, and almost from the beginning a considerable part of our time was spent in working up material relating to trade between Canada and Japan. We had a large and consistently favourable balance with which the Japanese were naturally dissatisfied.(f.36)
Enjoying advantageous trade with Japan, Canada had cause for concern because Japan might try to redress the imbalance by adopting protective tariffs to reduce imports.
The timing of the establishment of the Tokyo Legation proved fortuitous. Shortly after the Legation was established, the crash of 1929 - 33 disrupted the international economic system and exacerbated both Canadian and Japanese economic problems. Japanese producers demanded protective measures. It was also in this context that the Legation proved critical. It worked hard to maintain and protect Canada's advantages. Immigration and trade may have been of equal importance when the decision to establish the Legation was made, but trade and its related problems quickly turned out to be the major preoccupation of the Legation.
Canada's initiative, meanwhile, would be limited. It took Canada more than a year to establish its Legation. Logistics and staff shortages partly explain the delay. More important, however, was King's procrastination. This delay led Japan to question Canada's motives.(f.37) In any case, the scope and the responsibility were enormous, and the resources insufficient, with only three executive positions in the staff assigned to the Legation. The government chose Marler as its minister between 1929 - 36.(f.38) Marler's only international dealing before being appointed Minister, according to Keenleyside, was his involvement in the negotiation of a commercial treaty with the British West Indies in 1925.(f.39)
The government chose as its charge d'affaires Hugh L. Keenleyside. The appointment fulfilled the promotion he had long been promised.(f.40) Keenleyside's academic training - especially in history - proved extremely useful: observing political developments was his keen interest. As we shall see later, he assumed the primary responsibility for preparing intelligence for Ottawa.
As third secretary, the government chose Kenneth P. Kirkwood,(f.41) who was the second secretary at Canada's Legation in Washington. The new appointment was both unexpected and a disappointment. Kirkwood mused in his diary that
I sometimes wonder what a Canadian Legation can accomplish in Japan. Unlike our European missions, which are largely concerned with encouraging immigration, our Japanese Legation must be concerned with discouraging immigration, with all the tact and diplomacy at our hand.(f.42)
In the end, he reluctantly accepted because there was no one with comparable experience available for the Tokyo position. Despite his initial lack of enthusiasm, Kirkwood followed developments in Japan and in East Asia very closely.(f.43) His academic training, like Keenleyside's, equipped him well for the task at hand.
The team Canada sent was certainly competent. Both Keenleyside and Kirkwood had intelligence and good judgment. Observing political developments was their chief preoccupation and travelling throughout Japan, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and the Soviet maritime provinces while posted in Japan deepened their knowledge, gave them first - hand experience and contributed to the quality of political reports they sent Ottawa. Minister Marler was an intelligent businessman and his almost exclusive interest in trade complemented the work of Keenleyside and Kirkwood.
The staff included a commercial attache, J. Langley, who was already a trade commissioner in Kobe, Japan. Some of the support staff were Canadians; others were Japanese nationals among whom the most important was the translator, Yoshito Mikasa, who compensated for his imperfect English by being "conscientious, industrious and knowledgeable in his official duties."(f.44)
Japan sent to Canada as its Minister Tokugawa Iyemasa. He was the grandson of the last Tokugawa Shogun and the son of the speaker of the Japanese House of Peers. Born in 1884, he was educated at Perse School, Cambridge, and the Imperial University in Japan. From 1909 to 1913 he served as a junior in the Japanese embassy in London before returning to Tokyo to become secretary of the Foreign Office and private secretary to the Japanese foreign minister. Before coming to Canada, he served as first secretary in China, as the secretary in the Japanese Embassy in England, and as consul - general in Australia.
Canada rented the head office of Teikoku Seimei (the Imperial Life Insurance Company) for the site of its Legation headquarters until a new building was completed in 1933. When Canada celebrated the opening of its headquarters on 1 July 1929, both "God Save The King" and the unofficial national anthem "O Canada" were played, the latter meaning to symbolize a new era in Canadian independence and identity. With Keenleyside working very hard in Japan since May, the minister along with the rest of the staff finally arrived on 31 August 1929. While the American - owned Japan Advertiser reported the event as "Introducing The British Empire," the editors clearly understood its significance:
Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. She is an independent nation in complete control of her own destiny. She is, like the United States, Japan's nearest Occidental neighbour; the peace of the Pacific is as important to Canada as to the United States and Japan.... Canada desires to cultivate closer relations with Japan in whom she recognizes the leading Asiatic power.... Mr. Marler ... will have the pleasure of introducing something of the vital, vigorous, confident spirit of those young nations to a community in which they are little more than geographical expressions.(f.45)
These sentiments were echoed in the Canadian press. "Canada, Canadian Affairs and Canadian prospects," wrote the Vancouver Sun's correspondent, "were emphasized in the Empire of Japan today as never before." Canada's first diplomatic mission in the Far East was firmly established by the time the Canadian minister "was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Hirohito."(f.46)
Once established, the Legation's problem, however, concerned the capacities of the three men appointed to meet the challenges set before them. Not only had they to adjust to major cultural and linguistic differences, but they also had arrived at a critical moment in the history of East Asia and Japan. Evaluating the Legation's performance involves looking in more detail at its mandate, which included implementing the 1928 Immigration Agreement, improving the status of the Canadian Trade Commissioner, redoubling efforts to promote trade and gathering reliable political information on events in Asia. Between 1929 and 1931, the London Naval Conference, the Manchurian Crisis and the Lytton Commission tested the fledgling legation, while the rapidly changing political situation in Japan complicated working conditions.
No sooner had the Legation been established than the 1928 Immigration Agreement, which limited Japanese immigration to Canada to 150 annually, went into effect. There were, however, complications. First, the Japanese suggested that all Japanese citizens had the right to leave Japan any time after a passport was issued; some might wish to delay their departure, and consequently the limit of 150 persons allowed to leave might vary from one year to the next. For example, if 150 passports were issued for the 1931 - 32 fiscal year but only 100 people left, the remaining 50 people should be added to the 1932 - 33 fiscal year quota, which meant that 200 people would leave Japan in that fiscal year. Under the circumstances, the Japanese proposed that 200 visas be issued by Canada for the 1932 - 33 fiscal year and so on. If 200 people left during the 1932 - 33 fiscal year, however, then it would be reasonable to issue only 100 visas for the 1933 - 34 fiscal year. Alternatively, since the Japanese passport was only valid for six months, it be extended to a year. Marler advised rejection of these proposals. On this occasion, Under - Secretary of State for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton seemed to overrule his officials:
Under the present arrangement, it is the number of passports rather than the number of visas issued in a given year which it is understood will not exceed the maximum of one hundred and fifty. In view further of the fact that Japanese passports at present have a validity of six months, it is quite conceivable that in the course of a single year more than one hundred and fifty passports should be presented by applicants entitled to the grant of a visa. We agree that in this case it would be within the terms of the present understanding to issue more than one hundred and fifty visas within a given year.(f.47)
Skelton, however, cautioned Marler in order to avoid controversy, care be taken to ensure that only 150 persons came to Canada. The Legation notified Japanese officials of Canada's decision and no further complications arose. With this arrangement Canada finally "controlled" Japanese immigration.
The Legation's attention also turned to trade commissioners and their status. Both the Departments of Trade and Commerce and External Affairs began discussing Langley's future status and agreed that Langley be transferred from Kobe to Tokyo and elevated to the position of Canada's first commercial attache. The Department of Trade and Commerce continued to pay Langley's salary and living allowances "until advised ... to the contrary."(f.48) For the moment, Langley still retained his former responsibility of supervising trade operation in Kobe.
Marler, meanwhile, was very much interested in trade. In 1930, he visited North China, Manchuria and Korea, and wrote a two - volume report. He single - mindedly concentrated on economic issues and emphasized the future potential of Asia and Canada's place in this part of the world.(f.49) Japan, according to Marler, was the bridgehead - he repeatedly pointed out that Japan was among Canada's five largest trading partners. Indeed, even before leaving Canada, Marler urged Canadian banks to expand their holdings in Asia and in Japan. Canadian banks, Marler wrote,
were accorded some special privileges and advantages not accorded to other organizations and as a consequence it was not improper for the country to call on them for special service where such service was advantageous to it as a whole, even if the service demanded might not in its initial stages be profitable to the banks themselves.(f.50)
Bank officials, meanwhile, demonstrated little interest. That lack of interest, according to Marler, prevented Canada from becoming better known.
In Japan, Marler visited industrial centres and stressed the need for increased trade between the two nations. "By comparatively few in Canada," Marler wrote, "is appreciated the immense importance and possibilities of the markets of the Pacific Area.... If we want to procure our fair share of the trade of the Orient ... we must make our name and our products far better known than they are at the present time."(f.51) Marler pursued trade so diligently that it almost became an obsession. Even after the Manchurian Crisis of September 1931, Marler insisted that Canada open trading offices in the area. He was clearly unaffected by and unconcerned with the situation in Manchuria. Reflecting on Marler's attitude, Keenleyside wrote in 1981 that Marler seemed ready to "sink the League of Nations [just] to sell a million bushels of Canadian wheat."(f.52) Meanwhile, Marler informed King that methods of accomplishing things in Asia were "utterly different." He was convinced that Canada's interests lay beyond its own borders and the North Atlantic Triangle. Canada should emphasize higher principles such as peace and friendship, so that in "not too many years" Canada "will be the outstanding factor in Far - Eastern diplomacy."(f.53) "Peace and friendship," for Marler, meant trade - the only entree to this larger world. In fact, Marler was so anxious to introduce Canada to the Japanese people that during a Dominion Day celebration he talked directly, with simultaneous translation, to the Japanese people in a live radio address.(f.54)
Marler visited China in September - October 1930 and again in January 1931. Under instructions from Ottawa he was, on both occasions, to sell wheat. What Marler saw following his first trip, however, convinced him that the practice of trade commissioners' occasional visits "from one area to another" was insufficient.(f.55) All Canadian trade commissioners must be part of the community and learn the local languages and the "Eastern method" of conducting business, rather than applying methods learned and practised in Canada, the United States and Europe. Marler also wanted Tokyo to be "the central office for Canadian interests" in Japan and China and the training centre for all Asian trade commissioners before they were posted elsewhere. To help co - ordinate efforts, Canada should have a charge d'affaires in Shanghai, the most important trading centre of China, "under the minister in Tokyo" whose "attention could be directed" mainly to trade matters. Such an arrangement would solve the interim problem until there was a Sino - Canadian diplomatic exchange. King, however, was cool to the idea.(f.56) Marler's second trip was equally fruitless: China was facing political instability and financial difficulties and declined Canada's offer of long - term credits. Private businessmen in China were interested, but the new Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, was not prepared to provide such credits.(f.57) For the moment, the Legation simply did its best to co - ordinate trading operations in all of the Far East.
If the political masters in Ottawa were cool to Marler's idea, co - operation in the field also proved very difficult. In early 1930 Marler planned to visit China following his attendance at a conference scheduled for March in Hong Kong. The conference was to plan and co - ordinate the efforts of Canadian trade commissioners stationed in East Asia. Under instruction from the Minister of Trade and Commerce J. Malcolm, Paul Sykes, the trade commissioner in Hong Kong, was to visit G. Heasman, the trade commissioner in Singapore to discuss the question of who would supervise operations in French Indochina. Apparently, the Legation instructed Sykes to return to Hong Kong pending Marler's visit. In what spirit and under whose authority this instruction was issued remains unclear. Malcolm, however, got wind of the incident when Sykes requested authorization to cover the cost of Marler's visit, and protested External Affairs' interference. King in turn sided with Malcolm. Marler wrote both King and Malcolm maintaining his innocence, but regretted that the incident had happened.(f.58)
While on this occasion there had clearly been a mix - up in communications, personality conflicts would make subsequent co - operation difficult to achieve. Sykes was independent, jealous, sensitive and of a "temperamental nature." He interpreted his colleagues' occasional incursions into his territory as "intrusion" or "interference." In one dispute between Sykes and L.M. Cosgrave, the trade commissioner in Shanghai, L.D. Wilgress, the director of the Commercial Intelligence Service, had to intervene. On that occasion, Wilgress wrote Sykes that "a little self - effacement is occasionally good in the general interest."(f.59) Sykes no doubt saw the "instruction" from Tokyo as yet another invasion of his territory.
Attempts were made to prevent such a recurrence after the Conservative party came to power. Marler discussed with both the new Tory Minister for Trade and Commerce, H.H. Stevens and his Deputy Minister W.G. Parmelee, a plan which if approved would have given Marler some control over all trade commissioners in Asia. Although Parmelee had reservations, he went along with the plan on the condition that all trade commissioners be promptly informed of Marler's "official supervision."(f.60) The plan, however, was not swiftly communicated to trade commissioners, and as soon as Marler tried to exercise his new authority, he met with resistance. Once again, Sykes proved to be the most outspoken critic. Marler wanted the situation clarified and all trade commissioners to realize that "they are associated with me and are not to be, crudely speaking, 'ordered around' by me."(f.61) Difficulties were resolved only after posting Sykes to Europe in 1934.
If there was no effective co - operation in the field, both External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce were also cool to the idea of having Tokyo supervise trade commissioners in the Far East. Following the Manchurian Crisis, Trade and Commerce began removing trade commissioners who had acquired experience in the Far East and posting them elsewhere. Both Trade and Commerce and the trade commissioners suggested that such removals stemmed from the harsh climate and the political instability of the area. It was more likely a result of trade commissioners' desire for promotion; Europe provided the quicker route up the bureaucratic ladder. Such decisions upset Marler, who told Malcolm that
the more I see of our foreign service as now developing the less confidence I have in it. People are shifted around from this Far Eastern area after they have learned something about it and others are sent out who can only acquire experience by years of training.(f.62)
Greater co - operation would not come until after the Second World War.
Despite these difficulties, the Legation enhanced the status of trade commissioners in Japan; hindsight suggests that it was perhaps unrealistic to have expected the same for China and the Far East. For the difficulties in the pursuit of economic objectives the Legation and its staff were in no way to be blamed. The international economic system had collapsed by 1929 - 30, making the Legation's mandate doubly difficult. Similarly, the rapid deterioration of Sino - Japanese relations further complicated matters, rendering effective co - ordination of activities in China from Tokyo nearly impossible.
Diplomatic missions also provide political intelligence and advice to governments. In November 1929, the Legation sent Ottawa its first political report so that headquarters would have a "connected outline and interpretation of events of importance in this country."(f.63) Analysis of these reports, which dealt with the debates over the London Naval Conference, Sino - Japanese relations in general, the Manchurian Crisis and the general implications of "Shidehara Diplomacy"(f.64) (a diplomacy Canadian diplomats clearly favoured) - provides a basis for evaluating the Legation's performance. The reports demonstrated that the Legation performed very well when commenting on Japanese domestic politics. It was less able to report on either the Chinese or the broader Asian political landscape. This is a reflection of both the size and the divergent views within the Legation itself, views that emerged over the Manchurian Crisis in particular.
Although Marler approved all reports, their quality no doubt owed much to Keenleyside's and Kirkwood's good judgment and first - hand knowledge of the Far East, garnered during their travels in early 1930 throughout Japan and East Asia. Keenleyside relied heavily on (mainly English) foreign - language newspapers, daily radio news and his father's former business acquaintance, Baron Tamura, a member of the Japanese House of Peers. Decades later Keenleyside reported that he met many times with Yoshida Shigeru, at the time deputy foreign minister, who always received him with "unusual cordiality,"(f.65) but gave no detailed accounts of their conversations. While contacts with British and American officials in Tokyo no doubt provided informal sources of information, there was no indication that Canadian, British and American diplomats co - ordinated their efforts in any official way.
The Tokyo Legation opened at a time when stability in Asia rested on the "Washington System." Following World War I, the major powers had gathered in Washington between 1921 - 22 to deal with the Anglo - Japanese Alliance,(f.66) the naval arms race and policy concerning China. The Anglo - Japanese alliance ceased to exist upon ratification of the Four - Power Treaty. The conference also limited the relative naval strength of the United States, Britain and Japan to a ratio of 5:5:3 respectively. All the powers, under the Nine - Power Treaty, agreed to respect the status quo and help China develop gradually into a modern state. Subsequent treaties to eliminate extra - territorial and tariff concessions to Britain, France, Japan and the United States demonstrated that the Washington System could, albeit slowly, promote progress.
Sino - Japanese relations had always been precarious despite Japan's "good neighbour" policy towards China during the 1920s. Since 1894 - 95, China had made attempts to modernize and improve its international status, as reflected in the 1911 revolution led by Sun Yat - Sen. After Sun's death, Chiang Kai - Shek carried on the reforms. By 1927 - 28, with Chiang's military successes against the Chinese Communists and rival warlords the political reunification of China seemed imminent, and with it, anti - foreign and anti - Japanese demonstrations in particular became more pronounced.(f.67) In light of these developments, both the Japanese military and various extremists desired the conquest and control of Manchuria,(f.68) an area blessed with rich minerals and fertile agricultural land and thus viewed by them as essential for Japan's well - being. It was felt that Japan ought to protect vigorously its interests by abandoning the "weak - knee" policy of Shidehara, by seeking increased military spending, by encouraging anti - Chinese movements in Korea and by opposing the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. In addition, various factions within the Japanese Army instigated both the failed coup d'etat of March 1931 and the Manchurian Crisis of 18 September 1931.
Meanwhile, the Japanese domestic scene was far from stable. Shortly after Keenleyside arrived in Japan, the Japanese government was "beginning to abandon its ... program of democratization. It was also at a juncture when its practice of international co - operation was being officially modified in form and unofficially abandoned in practice."(f.69)
In its very first report, the Legation reported the repressive measures the government adopted to "stamp out radical propaganda." It cited the 15 March 1928 nation - wide search in which 483 alleged Communists had been arrested and subsequent raids in which more people were arrested. All these raids, Ottawa was told, had been kept secret until early November 1929. The report concluded that the agitators were university students who in no way posed a serious threat to the peace of the nation.
The political upheavals stemmed from economic hardship. As Japan sank deeper into depression, the debate on economic solutions took an extreme course. The great industrial and financial groups known as the zaibatsu - particularly Mitsui and Mitsubishi - were heavily involved. In analyzing the situation, Marler reminded Ottawa that
In the political realm the Seiyukai Party is generally supposed to represent the Mitsui group, while the Menseito had maintained very close relations with Mitsubishi. This alignment is clearly evident in the development and denouement of the recent political crisis.... The Mitsubishi group refrained almost entirely from speculation and supported the government in every possible way.(f.70)
Those associated with autarchy included the military, the extreme nationalists and at least one of the big zaibatsu, Mitsui. Japan's self - sufficient empire, they argued, could only be achieved and maintained by conquering China and East Asia, and by creating a "sphere of influence" which later became known as the Greater East Asia Co - Prosperity Sphere.(f.71)
The "internationalists" was a term used to describe the supporters of both the Washington System and the "Shidehara Diplomacy," which included some zaibatsu such as Mitsubishi. Japan should and could, they believed, compete economically and pursue a diplomacy of co - operation rather than aggression in addressing its economic problems.
Shidehara Diplomacy clearly won Canadian approval. "[I]t would be next to madness," Marler informed King, "to adopt any other attitude with the Chinese in their present frame of mind and growing consciousness."(f.72) There was no question who the Canadians wanted to win this debate. They understood very well that if Shidehara and the moderates lost control, the consequences would reach far beyond Japan. Their concern proved justified. Once Prime Minister Yuko Hamaguchi(f.73) and Shidehara were effectively removed from the political scene, the Manchurian Crisis launched Japan on a policy of further aggression against China.
Like Sino - Japanese relations, Soviet - Japanese relations, were far from cordial. The Legation kept Ottawa informed on those relations, which constituted one of the critical elements in Far Eastern diplomacy. Soviet - Japanese relations were rooted in their long struggle in the northern Pacific regions, which had already produced the 1904 - 5 Russo - Japanese War. The Japanese also used the Bolshevik Revolution as an excuse to invade Siberia in 1918 and it was not until 1925 that Japan finally withdrew its troops. A number of issues, however, remained unsettled: chief among these was control of Sakhalin Island.(f.74)
By 1930 the disputed territory came close to igniting a Soviet - Japanese clash. The Legation reported that Soviet patrol boats began firing on and seizing Japanese fishing boats around Sakhalin Island. According to Soviet authorities, Japanese vessels encroached upon their "three - mile limit." Without revealing its sources, the Legation reported that the Soviet patrol ships had "in fact fired on Japanese vessels when the latter were far at sea." Both sides increased their naval strength. The Soviet Union sent more ships to patrol the territorial waters near Kamchatka, while Japan increased its naval forces in the north and its fishing vessels, supported by the Departments of War, Navy, and Agriculture and Forestry, armed themselves for defensive purposes. The Japanese government, while urging restraint, decided against prohibiting the vessels from carrying weapons and recalled its ambassador for consultation, during which time another Japanese fishing vessel was seized. Marler, in light of this development, wrote King that only Shidehara and his policy could settle this matter peacefully.(f.75) The Legation did its best to keep Ottawa posted on these potentially dangerous developments.
As Soviet - Japanese relations deteriorated, two other issues dominated Canada's Pacific concerns: the London Naval Conference (January to October, 1930)(f.76) and the Manchurian Crisis. Shortly before the London Naval Conference began, Keenleyside's "first serious discussion with [Shigeru] Yoshida as deputy foreign minister had to do with the fear of the Gaimusho [the Japanese Foreign Ministry] that the vital concerns of Japan might be overlooked in the negotiations for a new agreement on naval armaments that were to culminate in the London Naval Disarmament Conference in 1930."(f.77) In addition, Yoshida clearly recognized the important role Canada played back in 1921 - 22 during both the Imperial and the Washington Conferences and the potentially decisive role Canada might play in the upcoming London Naval Conference. Yoshida "knew, of course, that ten years earlier the Meighen government in Ottawa had strongly urged the renunciation of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance and that Canada had exerted some influence in support of the American desire to restrict Japan's growing strength at sea."(f.78) Yoshida consequently called on Keenleyside, hoping to use Canada's good offices to communicate to Britain and the United States the difficulty the Japanese government had in dealing with the military. This clearly reflected the Japanese government's fear of being accused by the military and the nationalists of letting Britain and the United States place further limits on Japanese military strength. If Britain and the United States, through Canada, clearly understood the situation, they might soften their demands. This, in turn, would help the government to deal with the military.
Although the official Japanese position was to achieve a greater degree of relative strength in some areas and parity in others, the Japanese, according to Keenleyside, hoped that "a positive reduction in naval forces, rather than mere limitation, may be achieved." Economic difficulties meant that Japan could ill - afford to maintain as large a navy as that authorized by the Washington Conference. Moreover, the Washington Conference had not adequately dealt with the new naval technology, particularly aircraft carriers and submarines. Keenleyside concluded that the West should seek
a comprehensive plan of reduction. If this opportunity is overlooked it may well be that, when at a later date Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy are themselves desirous of reducing their forces, Japan may prove recalcitrant. When this country enters an era of economic prosperity it may not be so willing to forgo the psychological satisfaction which comes from rapidly growing naval armaments.(f.79)
Keenleyside clearly understood the situation and informed Ottawa accordingly. The London Conference replaced the old ratio of 5:5:3 for the United States, Great Britain and Japan with the new one of 10:10:7.
The Japanese government, without consulting the navy, instructed its delegation to accept the compromise.(f.80) The navy, as a result, opposed the treaty and tried to block its ratification. Hardliners, particularly the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Kato, which represented the Emperor and had a few civilian members, exerted enormous pressure to have the Treaty rejected by the Privy Council. A confrontation between the government and the military had enormous implications for the future of Shidehara Diplomacy.
The Canadian diplomats followed the debate very closely. Japanese supporters of internationalism rallied to the defence of the Treaty. Both Baron Sakamoto, a retired Admiral, and Baron Shidehara suggested that the ratio of 10:10:7 in no way undermined Japan's security and that Japan should not oppose the United States and Britain.(f.81) The press asked whether the government would "side with the people and wage war against the Army, or will it flirt with the Army betraying the nation?"(f.82) Keenleyside intuitively added that "within the next few years the Japanese people will have to face this issue of the Army versus the Government." The Legation further suggested that if the economic situation worsened the government might be forced to resign. With the imminent defeat of the Menseito government and the possible emergence of a Seiyukai administration the situation could not "be viewed with equanimity by those who are unselfishly interested in the political progress of Japan." The Legation summarized the debate as follows:
It is noteworthy that criticism of the government was not so much directed against the terms of the Treaty as against the manner in which the government issued instructions without full consultation with the Naval authorities. This has raised a serious constitutional issue, as to the relation of the Naval and Military Councils to the Cabinet.(f.83)
The press and the public, according to Canadian diplomats, became increasingly dissatisfied with the way the military pressed its case.
This treaty, according to Keenleyside, was a critical test for the Hamaguchi government's commitment to internationalism. Ottawa was told that the Japanese government was determined to ratify the naval treaty. Although the Legation was worried, it remained optimistic. A special committee headed by Count Ito Miyoshi, one of Japan's leading constitutionalists, examined the issue. Ito concluded that by not consulting the navy the government may have been guilty of some "misconduct," but there was not sufficient reason to cause "anxiety ... to the throne" or to cause rejection of the treaty. This report facilitated the eventual ratification of the treaty in October 1930.
The army also created problems for the government. In 1925 it re - instituted universal service and by 1930 the army numbered 210,000 men. The General Staff, however, still considered this insufficient for the nation's security and demanded more resources. During the election campaign, however, the government had promised a military reduction. The difficulty arising over the London Naval Treaty, meanwhile, forced the government to deal with the naval question first, "before antagonizing another large group of Japanese officials and public men" by attacking the military. The government, then, "with the approval of the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Inspector - General of Military Education,"(f.84) appointed a Military System Enquiry Commission to examine expenditures. It largely concluded that there should be no reductions. It suggested as well that the army restructure existing units and "mechanize" itself. There were clear signs that trouble was brewing.
The military, meanwhile, focused its attention on Manchuria where it ultimately determined the course of events. On 18 September 1931, it blew up a section of the Manchurian railway and assigned blame to the Chinese army. Before the incident could be investigated, the Japanese commanders, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishiro, ordered swift military "retaliation." The Manchurian Crisis was a fait accompli and the government in Tokyo was left to deal with the international implications. The Tokyo Legation's performance during this crisis illustrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of Canada's policy.
In July 1931, there had been a clash between Korean farmers and Chinese officials in Wanpaoshan, Manchuria.(f.85) When the Korean farmers dug a canal they destroyed land belonging to the Chinese farmers, exposing it to potential floods. The Chinese farmers appealed to local authorities and refilled the canal without awaiting mediation. The Korean farmers in turn appealed to Japanese officials and the Japanese consul backed the Koreans. Both sides then attacked each other. China in turn protested Japanese action in Korea, brought its case to the League of Nations and re - submitted its complaint to Japan, accusing the latter of failing to protect the Chinese. While refusing to accept responsibility, Japan put aside Y125,000 to pay indemnities.(f.86) China promised to prevent a recurrence, but warned that success depended upon Japan's willingness to co - operate.
While negotiations proceeded, many prominent Chinese political and business leaders encouraged boycotts of Japanese goods. Although the Chinese officials "deprecated such action," Ottawa was told, they were either "unable or unwilling effectively to suppress it." Indeed, radical students, youths and other agitators, dissatisfied with the way the Chinese government handled the issue, stormed the Chinese foreign minister's residence and demanded Chiang Kai - Shek's resignation. They also demanded that the Chinese government: "enforce the revolutionary diplomacy and recover all lands from the Korean farmers;" boycott Japanese goods and sever all ties with Japan; force Japan to withdraw its police and pay indemnities; and most important of all, give all members of the Koumintang "military training for a proclamation of war against Japan."(f.87) The Legation further informed Ottawa that the Chinese warlord, General Chang Hsueh - liang, had proposed to mass "500,000 Chinese troops" to enforce Chinese claims. The tone of the report to Ottawa reflected a marked anti - Chinese bias. The Legation was proving "nearsighted." The closer the events to the Legation, the more accurate was the Legation's assessment; the farther the events from the Legation, the more blurred the vision became. The Legation, however, cannot be blamed; it was not realistic to expect three men in Tokyo to be able to assess events on the mainland adequately or to understand fully the Chinese view.
Meanwhile, the already tense situation took a turn for the worse when the murder of Captain Nakamura in Manchuria became known. Nakamura, carrying 100,000 and accompanied by a Mongolian guide, a Russian and a Japanese, was reported to be on a "historical and geological" expedition.(f.88) In late July, without revealing its source, the Tokyo Legation reported that Chinese troops murdered the group and burned their bodies. Although the Japanese foreign ministry tried to have the matter dealt with diplomatically, the military fostered "a bitter anti - Chinese agitation" and claimed that it was a "deliberate 'massacre' of a Japanese Staff Officer and his companions." As events unfolded, Kirkwood wrote in his diary that China's half - hearted efforts and insincerity in searching for the culprits had contributed to the growing extremism in Japan. As a consequence, Shidehara's policy, the Legation informed Ottawa, became increasingly "incompatible with the aspirations of the military" and the situation "may in future become critical."
In its August report the Legation sounded a clear alarm.(f.89) Sino - Japanese relations had "reached a stage of unusual tension, incidentally being reflected in the extra Japanese police guard which has recently been maintained day and night at the Chinese Legation in Tokyo." According to the Minister of War, General Minami, the problems in China and Mongolia were the direct result of the "decline in Japan's prestige." He demanded from the military a "stronger sense of loyalty and public service" and immediate action to prevent the current situation from developing into "a more serious phase." The Legation report concluded that "The present situation is therefore not without serious possibilities." It did not take long for these "possibilities" to materialize. On 9 September 1931, Kirkwood noted in his diary that General Minami had given a short but rather illuminating speech outlining the military's (rather than the government's) plan to deal with the Nakamura incident. Kirkwood quoted Minami as having said:
no questions were asked.... The War Office will, however, cooperate with the Foreign Office in collecting further proof. Regarding the proper measures to take if negotiations fail, I have definite plans. I shall not disclose them for the present.... It is my duty to place reliance on the Foreign Office and to watch the attitude of Japan and public opinion at home. It is noteworthy that public opinion in Japan is changing and is assuming a serious tone.... Because of the proofs, the Army is determined to take proper measures should the Chinese authorities deny the truth of the accusation.(f.90)
About a week later the Japanese Commander in Kwantung, General Honjo, issued a general mobilization order. Determined to punish the "Chinese agitators," General Minami proposed sending more troops to the area, but the Cabinet rejected the idea. The proposal, however, demonstrated the increased influence of extremists within the government. As one of the leading Japanese - English language newspapers commented,
preparedness which makes a collision certain has been in evidence on the Japanese side for sometime [sic]. There has been a steadily increasing demand for a more assured position in Manchuria; and since General Minami made his warlike speech to the divisional commanders, and gave it out to the press, there has been talk of war.(f.91)
Still hoping for moderation, the editors of Japan Chronicle added that "it cannot be maintained that the whole blame lies with the Chinese."
When the crisis erupted, Marler was on home leave and would not return until 6 November 1931. Keenleyside and Kirkwood were in charge of Legation affairs. Within hours of the clash in Mukden, Keenleyside informed Ottawa that all of this information was "from Japanese sources only,"(f.92) and within days the Legation appraised Ottawa of unfolding events. Shidehara and the government, according to Keenleyside's telegram, wanted troops withdrawn and an immediate cessation of hostilities.(f.93) To further its policy, the government gave "drastic orders to protect Chinese in Japan."(f.94) The Legation went on to say that "pressure through [the] League of Nations [is] highly desirable" in order to bring the Japanese military under control.(f.95)
On 25 September, Keenleyside sent Ottawa another telegram highly critical of the Japanese: "The weakness of the Japanese case" was not "the lack of skill on the part of its expositors, but from the inherent impossibility of justifying injustice."(f.96) The change in tone reflected a deliberate attempt on the part of the Japanese military to derail a peaceful settlement.
Marler's return from Canada led to confusion, as he completely disagreed with Keenleyside's and Kirkwood's interpretation of events. Marler advised Ottawa to do nothing against the "sensitive" and "proud" Japanese(f.97) for fear of losing trade.(f.98) The Japanese, Marler told Keenleyside, "are in Manchuria and are going to stay there, so we may as well recognize that fact, and not arouse animosity by criticizing them."(f.99) Some Canadians along with certain officials at External Affairs shared Marler's view, and were happy that Japan expanded into Manchuria rather than across the Pacific.(f.100) Marler, meanwhile, sent Ottawa a 41 - page memorandum calling the Japanese action "self - defence" and the actions of other major powers "a gigantic game of bluff."(f.101) Skelton responded that "you [Marler] have given Japan rather too clean a bill of health." Keenleyside reported that Marler's reaction to Skelton was to observe that External Affairs "knows nothing, never reads our dispatches and does not keep us informed." His comments about the Chinese, meanwhile, were unrestrained: the Chinese, Marler suggested, were insincere and their "leaders won't even live in their own country: they live in the foreign concessions," and were "only interested in their opium traffic." He called the League "a pack of fools" and the United States "utterly unreliable" and "fools."(f.102) Two years later, Marler changed his mind and regretted that he had not pushed for "a more definitely hostile attitude."(f.103) Canada, for the moment, followed Britain, the United States and France in being conciliatory, hoping that the Japanese government would be able to regain control.
There were also divergent views between Ottawa and Canadian representatives at Geneva once the Lytton Commission (which investigated the Manchurian Crisis) submitted its findings to the League of Nations. At Geneva, Canada's Secretary of State C.H. Cahan gave a rather controversial speech in which he, like Marler, blamed China for the conflict. Marler was delighted; Keenleyside called Cahan's speech "very silly."(f.104)
Despite divided counsel on the Manchurian Crisis, the Legation performed its intelligence role as well as could have been expected. Although Marler demonstrated a general lack of interest in political affairs, Keenleyside and Kirkwood kept Ottawa informed of Japanese developments. They assessed both the general political climate and specific issues. They provided Ottawa with useful information and advice, despite a small staff, lack of experience and divergent views over the Manchurian Crisis. The Legation also suffered from "near - sightedness": the Legation and its staff were simply too far away from Manchuria. Thus, when commenting on Sino - Japanese relations, the Legation sometimes seemed ready to present Japan as the aggrieved party. When commenting on Japanese domestic politics, however, the Legation clearly articulated Canada's interest in the success of Shidehara Diplomacy. The lack of detailed coverage of China and the rest of Asia reflected the unrealistic expectation of External Affairs that the Tokyo Legation alone would be able to cover the whole of Asia. Canada's attempt to formulate its Asian - Pacific policy represented not so much a vision beyond reach as a failure to appreciate the complexities of issues by either ignoring or by paying insufficient attention to the Legation's reports and assessments. Efforts in the Pacific, however, remained limited. A single understaffed legation in Tokyo could never adequately cover all of Asia. Nor did Ottawa always make use of the information provided, as can be seen in Canada's response to the Manchurian Crisis. This was partly due to a result of division within the Legation and partly due to Canada's meagre influence on the world stage. The Legation was an important first step, but Canada's international behaviour remained characterized by indecision. Yet, on the whole decision - makers in Ottawa had the benefit of sufficiently reliable information to make an informed decision when the Lytton Commission submitted its report stating that Japan was indeed the aggressor, and Japan, in turn, walked out of the League of Nations in protest.
The decision to exchange diplomatic representation with Japan at such an early date constituted an important foreign policy decision. Canada's Asia - Pacific relations had for many years revolved around trade and immigration, yet these two factors alone cannot explain the 1928 decision. Canada had successfully dealt with trade and immigration on an ad hoc basis without diplomatic exchanges. Exclusion acts in the case of the Chinese, the prevention from landing in the case of the East Indians and the "Gentlemen's Agreements" with Japan in 1907, 1925 and 1928 had proven to be efficient and effective means of implementing policy. The same can be said in the realm of trade issues. The promotion of trade and the sale of Canadian products required no diplomatic missions. Canada already carried out bilateral trade negotiations with Japan, and Canadian trade commissioners were already carrying out their responsibilities without benefit of diplomatic status. These two issues alone - trade and immigration - are not sufficient explanations for Canada's decision in 1928. Indeed they were insufficient to warrant diplomatic exchanges with China, a country with which Canada had similar trade and immigration concerns. There was no urgent need to establish diplomatic missions merely to deal with these issues.
The diplomatic exchange in 1928 clearly signalled that Canada wanted more than just immigration controls and the promotion of trade. The decision stemmed from Canada's need to have a resident diplomatic official in Asia who would make Canada's presence felt. While the North Atlantic Triangle clearly dominated Canada's international outlook, this did not negate a concern with other global issues. By opening the Tokyo Legation, Canada came to terms with the geographical reality that it was as much a Pacific as an Atlantic nation. While Canada had no "Far Eastern policy" in the full sense of the term, it remained concerned about its relationship with the Asia - Pacific region. Establishing the Legation immediately improved Canada's relations with the dominant power in the region. Canada also provided itself with the machinery to gather information on this critical region.
A single, understaffed legation provided with inadequate resources, however, could not realistically be expected to provide External Affairs with all the divergent and opposing views on the Asian political landscape. If Canada had no "Pacific - Blind - Spot,"(f.105) it did suffer from tunnel vision. As Keenleyside concluded,
I had not been long in Tokyo before we began to suffer in a mild way from the disease that afflicts all field officers: apparent lack of interest on the part of the headquarters at home.... In our case, of course, although our initial problems were of concern to ourselves, once we were settled Ottawa had little reason to spend time worrying about legation affairs. There were no major problems disturbing Canada - Japan relations. Nevertheless, we did begin to feel a bit deserted.(f.106)
Keenleyside clearly felt alone, if not abandoned, in his new posting. Marler too felt that the Legation was "in a distant part of the world" and that he and his officers seemed to "be entirely forgotten."(f.107)
Despite neglect and inadequate resources, the Legation performed as well as could be expected. It not only implemented the 1928 Immigration Agreement with Japan in a satisfactory manner, but also pursued the expansion of trade in Japan and in the Far East. Unfortunately, the collapse of the international trading system made the mandate of the Legation doubly difficult to carry out. It worked very hard, in the end, merely to maintain and protect the already existing trade advantages that Canada enjoyed. The Legation, in addition, consistently forwarded to Ottawa useful political information, although there was division within the Legation regarding the Manchurian Crisis. This information, however, came through Tokyo; there was no "China view" to provide balance. While there was much quality information on Japan, there was little on China or Asia in general. This situation reflects as much the small size of and the division within the Legation as it does the unrealistic expectations of External Affairs. The attempt to gather materials essential for the formulation of Canada's Far Eastern policy proved beyond the reach of a single understaffed diplomatic mission in Japan. While the initiative turned out to be a half - hearted effort on the part of Ottawa, the Tokyo Legation did provide a greater service than simply dealing with trade and immigration matters.
The author would like to thank M. Piva, N. Hillmer and R. Jones for their constructive criticism.
(f.1) For a quick summary, see La Presse, 20 about 1960 and B. Penisson, "Le Commissariat canadien a Paris, 1882 - 1928," Revue d'histoire de I'Amerique francaise, 34.3 (decembre, 1980).
(f.2) K.H. Pringsheim, Neighbours Across The Pacific (London: Greenwood, 1983) 31; E.H. Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," 76 and G.A. Johnson, "Canada and the Far East during the 1930s," 112, Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century, eds. J. Schultz and Kimitada Miwa (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991); H.G. Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad (Toronto: Ryerson, 1945) 235 - 7; and A.R.M. Lower, Canada And The Far East (NY: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940) 6, 14 - 15.
(f.3) For example, J.E. Read, "Problems of an External Affairs Legal Advisor, 1928 - 46," International Journal XXII.3 (Summer, 1967). Read did not even mention the Tokyo Legation. H.F. Angus, "The Development of Canadian Far Eastern Policy," Twenty Five Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. E. McInnes (Toronto: 1953). It is hard to believe that the analysis of Canada's Far Eastern policy could have been written without acknowledging the existence of or making reference to the Tokyo Legation.
(f.4) J. Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs (Montreal and Kingston: McGill - Queen's, 1990) 112 and 206.
(f.5) For detailed treatment of this project see K. Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1980), P. Ward, White Canada Forever (Montreal & Kingston: McGill - Queen's, 1978) and P. Roy, A White Man's Province (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1989).
(f.6) Hilliker, Department of External Affairs, 27, note 59, suggests that the 1907 Gentleman's Agreement was rejected, and Lemieux was recalled despite Pope's attempt to persuade Laurier to accept it. Hilliker did not look at National Archives of Canada (NAC) R. Lemieux Papers, MG 27, II, D24, Vol. 7. Canada had denied entry to East Indians and since 1886 had imposed a series of head taxes on Chinese, who were completely excluded in 1923.
(f.7) (NAC) W.L.M. King Papers, MG 26, J4, microfilm C - 2478, 45513 (hereafter cited as King Papers). King's articles "Canada's Legations Abroad," The Canadian Nation 2.1 (March - April, 1929) and "Canada's Inter - Imperial and Foreign Relations," Empire Review 1929, XLIX. King's Diary, 25 May 1928. See also House of Commons, Debates, 31 January 1928, 60; 9 June 1928, 4162 and 11 June 1928, 4162 - 3. R. B. Bennett, the Opposition leader, 4163 (hereafter cited as Debates). (NAC) Department of External Affairs Records, RG 25, Vol. 1430, file 799, part I, S. Tomii to R. Forke, 29 May 1928 and O.D. Skelton to Tomii, 26 November 1928. (hereafter cited as DEA).
(f.8) For a quick summary see P. - Y. Ho, "A Survey of Sino - Canadian Trade," Chinese Economics Journal (February, 1934).
(f.9) Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Great Britain and Japan, 1894 (London, 1894), British Parliamentary Papers, C. 7588, Vol. CIV, Article I.
(f.10) Canada, Senate Debates, 4 May 1897, Senator R. W. Scott, 261 and 269, and Senator W. J. MacDonald, 275; and Debates, 22 June 1905, Honourable S. Fisher, the Agriculture Minister, cols. 7908 - 15.
(f.11) Auditor General's Annual Reports, 1910 - 11, 1920 - 21 and 1930 - 31. For Canada's diplomacy of salesmanship, see O.M. Hill, Canada's Salesman To The World (Montreal: McGill - Queen's, 1977).
(f.12) Hugh L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside: Hammer The Golden Days, Vol. I, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981) 296. (hereafter cited as Memoirs). Canada Year Books, 1921 through to 1930. King Papers, microfilm C - 2478, "Trade with the Far East: Japan and China," 45523.
(f.13) Debates, 11 June 1928, 4157. Ibid., 30 and 31 January 1928, 60;28 May 1928, 3466 - 7 and 8 April 1930, 1382.
(f.14) King Papers, microfilm C - 2478, 45513.
(f.15) Debates, 11 June 1928, 4155 - 67. King Papers, microfilm C - 2796, "Memoranda & Note: Canada's Political Relations with Japan, August, 28, 1929," 15734.
(f.16) See Footnote Number 66.
(f.17) King Papers, microfilm C - 2712, "Exchange of Ministers," 84216 - 24 and C - 2478, "Legations," 45521. Debates, 31 January 1928, 60; 28 May 1929, 3466 - 7 and 11 June 1928, 4155 - 61.
(f.18) It is interesting to note that King did not mention Germany.
(f.19) King, "Canada's Legations Abroad," 26 and "Some Recent Developments in Canada's External Relations, November 22, 1928," Toronto Board of Trade, 28 - 29.
(f.20) King Papers, microfilm C - 2796, "Political Relations With Japan," 15734.
(f.21) Canada. Department of External Affairs, Relations Exterieures/External Relations, Vol. 4, (Ottawa, 1970), Document no. 35, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominion Secretary, 22 November 1927 and Document no. 36, Representative to League of Nations to Under - Secretary of State for External Affairs (Geneva), 4 December 1927. Document no. 37, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominion Secretary, 6 December 1927. Document no. 39, Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 December 1927. (hereafter cited as Relations Exterieures/External Relations).
(f.22) Ibid., Document no. 43, Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 13 January 1928.
(f.23) King's diary, 18 October 1927.
(f.24) Toronto Globe, 10 January 1928.
(f.25) Manitoba Free Press, 10 February 1928.
(f.26) Vancouver Sun, 28 January 1928.
(f.27) DEA, Vol. 1501, file 901 - B, Japan Society of Vancouver to Prime Minister King, 29 December 1928.
(f.28) Debates, Garland, January 30, 1928, 109.
(f.29) All quotations from Japanese press cited here are from the diplomatic exchange, DEA, Vol. 1501, file 901 - B, "The Japanese Press Reaction," from Secretary for the Dominions to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 20 April 1928.
(f.30) For detailed treatment, see C. Young and H. Reid, The Japanese Canadians (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1938), 43 - 44 and H. Yonemura, "Japanese Fishermen In British Columbia and British Fair Play," Canadian Forum (July, 1930).
(f.31) It is not clear, however, whether or not Yamato advocated the severance of diplomatic ties with the United States because of its racist policy.
(f.32) Debates, 31 January 1928, 60; 30 January 1928, 28 - 29; 2 February, 1929, 117; 28 May 1928, 3466 - 7 and 3484; and 11 June 1928, 4153 - 63 and 4165 - 6. Once he became prime minister in 1930, Bennett came to support the Legation.
(f.33) King Papers, microfilm C - 2478, "Memoranda & Note: Legations: Paris and Tokyo: arguments for," [n.d.] 45511.
(f.34) Debates, 30 January 1928, 29; Vancouver Daily Province, 22 August 1929, Vancouver Star, 23 August 1929, Vancouver Sun, 23 August 1929 and Toronto Daily Star, 30 August 1929.
(f.35) Debates, 31 January 1928, 60.
(f.36) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 296.
(f.37) External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 1501, file 901 - B, Vincent Massey to O.D. Skelton, 31 October 1928.
(f.38) He graduated in law from McGill with first - class honours. He was a successful Montreal businessman and a millionaire. Elected in 1921, he joined the King Cabinet in 1925. Before joining the King Cabinet, he chaired the Parliamentary Committee on Soldiers' Pensions and Civil Re - Establishment in 1922 and the Committee on Transportation. For Marler's view and recommendation, see DEA, Vol. 2611, "Recommendations For The Canadian Legation in Japan, March 7, 1929."
(f.39) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 253.
(f.40) Ibid., 247. He had entered the Department of External Affairs in 1928. He had been born in Ontario but grew up in British Columbia. He received his BA in 1920 from the University of British Columbia, his MA in 1921 and PhD in 1923 from Clark University. Between 1918 - 1919, he served with the Canadian Field Artillery. He wrote Canada and the United States and while in Japan, collaborated with A.F. Thomas in the preparation of a History of Japanese Education.
(f.41) Kirkwood had been born in 1899. He received his BA and MA in history from Columbia University and joined the Canadian diplomatic service in 1928. He had co - written a volume on Turkey in the Modern World Series. He had seen service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and in the Royal Air Force during the war.
(f.42) (NAC) K. P. Kirkwood Papers, MG 27, III, E3, Vol. 2, file "Diplomatic Diary: Canadian Legation In Tokyo, 1929 - 1939," 14 July 1929.
(f.43) Kirkwood's close observation of these developments were clearly and abundantly apparent in his private papers in the National Archives of Canada which remain, until now, the only private and insightful daily account of the work of the Legation during the first years.
(f.44) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 278.
(f.45) Japan Advertiser, 1 July 1929, press clipping in King Papers, Vol. 166, file 18.
(f.46) Vancouver Sun, 4 July 1929 in Ibid.
(f.47) King Papers, microfilm C - 2320, Marler to SSEA, 5 February 1930, 151483 - 86 and Skelton to Marler, 10 April 1930, 151514 - 16.
(f.48) DEA, Vol. 795, file 476, Skelton to O'Hara, 24 April 1929 and O'Hara to Skelton, 29 April 1929; King Papers, microfilm C - 2712, "Diplomatic, Consular and Trade Commissioner Representative," 84250 - 57.
(f.49) Indeed, Marler hardly talked about political issues, as evident from his many speeches on Canada - Japan relations. See Marler's speeches in DEA, Vol. 795, file 472 and DEA, Vol. 1561, file 80 - G (FP), report on "Minister's Visit to Korea, Manchuria and North China, September - October, 1930," and "Press Conference Note of Canadian Minister to Japan, March 1930."
(f.50) King Papers, microfilm C - 2311, Marler to King, 5 September 1929, 140109.
(f.51) DEA, Vol. 1575, file 894, Marler to Skelton, 1 September 1930.
(f.52) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 405.
(f.53) King Papers, Vol. 26, file 2, Marler to King, 15 October 1929 and Marler's speech "Canadian And Trade With Japan," in DEA, Vol. 795, file 472.
(f.54) Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, file "Diplomatic Diary," 1 July 1930. Unfortunately, Kirkwood did not give a detailed account.
(f.55) DEA, Vol. 1561, file 80 - G (FP), "Minister's Visit," Vol. 1, 198 - 9, 203, 209 and 217.
(f.56) It was not until 1942 that Canada and China exchanged diplomatic ties. By then, Canadian Japanese diplomatic relations had been severed.
(f.57) (NAC) R.B. Bennett Papers, MG 26, K, Vol. 332, Bennett to Marler, 22 January 1931, no. 216123 (hereafter cited as Bennett Papers). See also Relations Exterieures/External Relations, 1931 - 35, Vol.5, (Ottawa, 1973), Document no.545 and "Press Conference Note," DEA, Vol. 1561, file 80 - G (FP) and Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, "Diplomatic Diary," 2 February 1930.
(f.58) King Papers, microfilm C - 2320, King to Marler, 28 February 1930, 151492 - 6; Malcolm to Skelton, 19 February 1930 and Marler to King, 31 March 1930, 151499; and (NAC) Malcolm Papers, MG 27, III, B6, Vol. 2, file "Correspondence, 1926 - 35," Marler to Malcolm, 1 March 1930. (hereafter cited as Malcolm Papers).
(f.59) DTC, Historical Section Records, Industry, Trade and Commerce, file 559, Cheney to Parmelee, 28 September 1934 and DTC, Vol. 1446, file 18 - 1 - 1, part II, Wilgress to Sykes, 16 October 1933.
(f.60) (NAC) H.H. Stevens Papers, MG 27, III, B9, Vol. 12, file 3, Marler to Stevens, 9 June 1931 and Stevens to Bennett, 15 June 1931. (hereafter cited as Stevens Papers). See also DTC, Vol. 139, file 26128, part I, Parmelee to Stevens, 27 July 1931.
(f.61) DTC, Vol. 133, file 26308, Marler to Parmelee, 26 November 1931 and see also Keenleyside, Memoirs, 419.
(f.62) Malcolm Papers, Vol. 2, file M, Marler to Malcolm, 18 March 1935.
(f.63) King Papers, microfilm C - 2311, Marler to King, 2 November 1929, 140161 and "Political Developments in Japan, October 1929," 140162 - 197. Although King had some of these reports, the bulk of them are located in DEA, Vol. 1546, part I, II, III.
(f.64) "Shidehara Diplomacy," pursued by the Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, was based largely on a need for co - operation with Britain and the United States in international relations affecting the East Asian region, disarmaments, the maintenance of a policy of good neighbour toward with China and the pursuit of Japanese interests in China and the Far East through economic rather than military means. For "Shidehara Diplomacy," see I. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1864 - 1942 (London, 1978) Chapters 7 and 8.
(f.65) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 299 and 364 - 66. See also Chapter 12 for his travel in the Far East.
(f.66) In his article, "Canada, The Anglo - Japanese Alliance And The Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly, L (1935), J. Brebner claimed that Canada forced Britain to abrogate the alliance. H.F. Angus, too, made a similar claim in "Canada and Naval Rivalry in the Pacific," Pacific Affairs VIII.2 (June, 1935). For a more balanced analysis, see M.G. Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance," Journal of Modern History 39.1 (March, 1967) and R.A. Dayer, "The British War Debt to the United States and the Anglo - Japanese Alliance, 1920 - 1923," Pacific Historical Review 45.4 (November, 1976) and I. H. Nish, "Japan and the Ending of the Anglo - Japanese Alliance" in Studies in International History, eds. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London: Longmans, 1967).
(f.67) DEA, Vol. 1546, file 577, "Political Developments In Japan," July 1931, 2 - 8. For the Chinese nationalist view see Chiang Kai - Shek, China's Destiny and Economic Theory (NY, 1947).
(f.68) For Japanese policy see H.P. Bix, "Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian economy, 1900 - 1931," China Quarterly 51 (1972) and Ito Shinkichi, "Japan's Policies Toward China," in J.W. Morley, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy (NY: Columbia University Press, 1974).
(f.69) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 300 and King Papers, microfilm C - 2701, Political Report, November 1929, 70817 - 20 and DEA, Vol. 1546, file 577, Political Report, May 1930, 7.
(f.70) DEA, Vol. 1546, file 577, Part I, Marler to SSEA, 24 December 1931. See also Keenleyside, Memoirs, 397.
(f.71) For detailed treatment see J. Lebra, ed. Japan's Greater East Asia Co - Prosperity Sphere in World War II (Kuala Lumpur: 1975); W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 221 and 224; K. Yamamura, "Zaibatsu Prewar and Zaibatsu Postwar," Journal of Asian Studies XXIII (August, 1964), and J. Crowley, "A New Asian Order: Some Notes on Prewar Japanese Nationalism," Japan In Crisis, ed. by B. Silberman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and T. Bisson, "The Zaibatsu's Wartime Role," Pacific Affairs 18.4 (December, 1945).
(f.72) A letter attached to the Political Report of March 1931 in DEA, Vol. 1546, file 577, part I, Marler to King, 11 March 1931.
(f.73) Although he survived an attempted assassination, he did not recover from it. See for example, see J.J. Stephan, Sakhalin Island (NY: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1971) and "The Kurile Island: Japan vs. Russia," Pacific Community 7.3 (April, 1976); I. Nish, The Origins of the Russo - Japanese War (NY: Longman, 1985) and H. Chihiro, "Japan's Policies toward Russia," Japan's Foreign Policy and J. Kovalio, "Japan's Perception of Stalinist Foreign Policy in the Early 1930s," Journal of Contemporary History, 19 (1984).
(f.75) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1930, 1 - 3 and Marler to King, 11 March 1931, personal letter attached to Political Report, March 1931 in ibid.
(f.76) While the actual London Naval Conference took place between January and February, I have indicated the period January to October to allow for the analysis of internal Japanese debate over its ratification.
(f.77) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 300.
(f.78) Ibid., 300 - 1. For Canada's view, see Department of External Affairs (Ottawa), Christie Memorandum, 1 June 1921, "The Anglo - Japanese Alliance,"' Monthly Bulletin XVIII (September, 1966); A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921 - 22," Canadian Historical Review XLVII (March 1966) and M.G. Fry, Illusions of Security (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).
(f.79) King Papers, microfilm C - 2701, Political Report, November 1929, 70820 - 1 and DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, February 1930, 7 - 8.
(f.80) For the government's view, see Wakatsuki's speeches in Japan Chronicle, 20 June 1930. For Kato's and Togo's views see DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, 5 and June 1930, 1 - 2 and Political Report, July 1930, 7. See also, J.B. Morley, Japan's Quest For Autonomy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Chapter I. "London Naval Treaty Controversy."
(f.81) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, May 1930, 3 - 5. According to American records, Shidehara "was personally willing to accept the American position but was afraid of the Navy." US Ambassador Castle (to Japan) to Cotton (Acting Secretary of State), 7 March 1930, in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Far Eastern Series, 1930, Vol. I, 49 - 50. See also Shidehara's speeches in Japan Times, 29 September 1930 and 23 January 1931, and Japan Chronicle, 24 January 1931.
(f.82) Tokyo Nichi - Nichi as quoted in DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, 3 - 4 and Political Report, August 1930, 5 - 6.
(f.83) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1930, 4 and 9 - 10; Political Report, May 1930, 4 and Political Report, August 1930, 4 - 5; Political Report, September 1930, 3. For detailed treatment of Japanese constitutional structure see G.M. Beckmann, The Making Of The Meiji Constitution (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1957).
(f.84) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, June 1931, 5. Emphasis in original.
(f.85) For a first - hand account see Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, File "Manchurian Journal," Sections 1 and 2 "Korean Troubles," and "Chinese Attacks." See also W. Wang, Wanpaoshan Incident and the Anti - Chinese Riots in Korea, (Nanking, n.d.).
(f.86) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, July 1931, 5 - 7.
(f.87) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, 6 - 7.
(f.88) Ibid., 6 and Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, file "Manchuria Journal," Section "Nakamura Murder," 6 - 8. Although the August 1931 political report stated that the real purpose of the expedition was "unknown," Kirkwood stated that the mission was under the order of the general staff. It is reasonable to conclude that Kirkwood's statement was probably the correct one, given the organized search by the Japanese Military Staff when the Nakamura Expedition failed to reach its destination in Inner Mongolia. See also D.B. Ramsdell, "Nakamura Incident and the Japanese Foreign Office," Journal of Asian Studies 25 (1965 - 6).
(f.89) DEA, Vol. 1546, Political Report, August 1931, 4, 7 and 12.
(f.90) Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, file "Manchurian Journal," 5. This speech did not appear in the political report. It is, thus, reasonable to assume that, at the time, Kirkwood's source was not known. See also Keenleyside, Memoirs, 397.
(f.91) Japan Chronicle, 20 September 1931, cited in Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, "Manchurian Journal," Section "The Mukden Incident," 12 - 14.
(f.92) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 399.
(f.93) (NAC) Governor General Office, RG 7, Vol. 394, file 6274, part 5, Charge d'Affaires to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 September 1931. (hereafter cited as GGO). Decades later, scholars revealed that the Emperor favoured containment of the war. See for example, A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (NY: Longman, 1987) 9. For the Emperor's position and responsibility, see C.D. Sheldon, "Japanese Aggression and the Emperor, 1931 - 1941," Modern Asian Studies X.1 (February, 1976) and "Scapegoat or Instigator of Japanese Aggression?" Modern Asian Studies, XII.1 (February, 1978); K.L. Mitchell, "The Political Function of the Japanese Emperor," Ameasia VI (October, 1942) and Yamamoto Shichihei, "The Living God and His War Responsibility," Japan Echo III.1 (Spring, 1976).
(f.94) GGO, Vol. 394, file 6278, part 5, Charge d'Affaires to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 September 1931.
(f.95) GGO, Vol. 394, file 6278, pt. 5, Charge d'Affaires to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 September 1931.
(f.96) DEA, Vol. 1606, File 786, Part I, No. I, Keenleyside to Secretary of State, No. 178, 25 September 1931; for a detailed account, see also Kirkwood Papers, Vol. 2, file "Manchurian Journal," Section "Mukden Incident," 54 - 64 and Keenleyside, Memoirs, 401.
(f.97) DEA, Vol. 1606, File 786, Part II, No. II, No. 258, Marler to Secretary of State, 1 December 1931; No. 52, Marler to Secretary of State, 10 March 1932 and Vol. 1606, File 786, Part IV, No. I.
(f.98) External Relations/Relations Exterieures, Vol. 5, Document no. 304, Minister in Japan to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1 March 1932.
(f.99) Marler as quoted in Keenleyside, Memoirs, 404.
(f.100) H.F. Angus, "Canada and Naval Rivalry in the Pacific," Pacific Affairs 8.2 (June, 1935) 179 - 80 and Keenleyside, Memoirs, 221.
(f.101) DEA, Vol. 1606, File 786, Part II, No. 258, Marler to Secretary of State, 1 December 1931 and No. II, Skelton to Marler, 23 January 1932. See also Keenleyside, Memoirs, 405 - 6.
(f.102) Quoted in Keenleyside, Memoirs, 425. Kirkwood's currently available papers at the National Archives neither confirmed nor denied any of Keenleyside's accounts, no doubt a result of his having been on home leave between January and June 1932.
(f.103) External Relations/Relations Exterieures, Vol. 5, Document no. 304, Minister in Japan to Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 1, 1932. Marler quoted in Keenleyside, Memoirs, 432.
(f.104) Keenleyside as quoted in K. Pringsheim, Neighbours Across The Pacific, 40, note 24. See also Keenleyside, Memoirs, 424 - 7 and, for a detailed treatment of this event, see F.H. Soward, "Forty Years On: The Cahan Blunder Re - examined," BC Studies XXXII (1976 - 77); R. Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); A. Mason, "Canada and the Manchurian Crisis," The In - Between Time, eds. R. Bothwell and N. Hillmer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); D.C. Story, "Canada, the League of Nations and the Far East, 1931 - 33: The Cahan Incident," International History Review III.2 (April, 1981).
(f.105) E. Downton, Pacific Challenge (Toronto: Stoddart, 1986) 9 and 30.
(f.106) Keenleyside, Memoirs, 281.
(f.107) Malcolm Papers, Vol. 2, file "Correspondence, 1926 - 1935," Marler to Malcolm, 1 March 1930.
Tou Chu Dou Lynhiavu is a PhD candidate in Canadian diplomatic history at Carleton University.