Journal of Risk and Insurance

This academic risk management and insurance journal provides research in industrial organization of insurance markets, management of risks in the private and public sectors, insurance regulation and more.

Articles from Vol. 76, No. 2, June

A Cross-National Study of Government Social Insurance as an Alternative to Tort Liability Compensation
ABSTRACT Litigation rates in the United States have long been considered out of proportion with the remainder of the world, leading to a good deal of economic research trying to understand the causes. Much of that literature has focused on lawyer...
Adverse Selection and the Opaqueness of Insurers
ABSTRACT While adverse selection problems between insureds and insurers are well known to insurance researchers, few explore adverse selection in the insurance industry from a capital markets perspective. This study examines adverse selection in...
Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage
ABSTRACT In the empirical analysis of information asymmetry in automobile insurance markets, prior research used a dichotomous measurement approach that induces excessive bundling in coverage measurements and sample selection biases. To improve...
Getting Feedback on Defined Contribution Pension Plans
ABSTRACT With the growth of private and public defined contribution (DC) pension plans around the world, market rates of return should increasingly play a large role in the retirement patterns of individuals. The reverse could, however, also be...
Insurance Markets with Differential Information
ABSTRACT This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information...
Multidimensional Credibility with Time Effects: An Application to Commercial Business Lines
ABSTRACT This article considers Danish insurance business lines for which the pricing methodology has been dramatically upgraded recently. A costly affair, but nevertheless, the benefits greatly exceed the costs; without a proper pricing mechanism,...
On the Possibility of Profitable Self-Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets
ABSTRACT Several studies extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance contracting with adverse selection by incorporating additional dimensions of private information and conclude that some insurers may earn positive profit in a...
On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market with Asymmetric Information
ABSTRACT We analyze a two-period competitive insurance market that is characterized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which...
Simulation Techniques in Financial Risk Management
Simulation Techniques in Financial Risk Management, by Ngai Hang Chan and Hoi Ying Wong, 2006, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ, pp. 240. ISBN: 978-0-471-46987-2Reviewer: Puneet Prakash, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityThe Wiley InterScience "Statistics...
The Term Structure of Reserve Durations and the Duration of Aggregate Reserves
ABSTRACT Estimating the duration gap of a life insurer demands the knowledge on the durations of liabilities and assets. The literature analyzed the durations of assets extensively but rendered limited analyses on the durations of insurance liabilities....
Time Deductibles as Screening Devices: Competitive Markets
ABSTRACT Seminal papers on asymmetric information in competitive insurance markets, analyzing the monetary deductible as a screening device, show that any existing equilibrium is of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance, whereas low...
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