Magazine article The Spectator

'Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy 1945-1975', by Max Hastings - Review

Magazine article The Spectator

'Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy 1945-1975', by Max Hastings - Review

Article excerpt

The 50th anniversary of the Vietnam war has produced an outpouring of books, along with Ken Burns's 18-hour television spectacular, which sparked in the United States yet another round of heated debate on the war. The journalist and military historian Max Hastings's fast-paced and often compelling narrative will surely rank as one of the best products of this half-century reappraisal.

Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy is a monumental undertaking. Many books analyse major Vietnam war policy decisions. Others discuss military operations; still others recount personal experiences. Hastings does all three in a single volume, although he gives greatest attention to the on-the-ground activities of North and South Vietnamese, NLF and NVA, Americans, Australians and even New Zealanders.

Americans usually date their Vietnam war from 1961, when John F. Kennedy drastically escalated the US commitment, or from Lyndon Johnson's 1965 decisions to bomb North Vietnam and send combat troops to the South. Hastings treats the first and second Indochina wars as a single entity. The conflict begins with Ho Chi Minh's declaration of independence from France in September 1945 and ends with the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

Controversy raged worldwide during the war itself, continued long after it ended, and persists a half century later. Hastings tackles the key issues head on. Why did the United States spend 58,000 lives and an estimated $150 billion on an area so remote and seemingly insignificant? He stresses Cold War exigencies and above all US domestic politics. There is no Reagan-like 'noble cause' here, no Ken Burns's good intentions gone awry. From Truman to Nixon, US leaders escalated the commitment rather than be 'seen to quit, fail, or lose... to the communists', while ignoring the needs and interests of the Vietnamese people.

Hastings is surely right in emphasising domestic politics. What he does not always provide is the unique context that helps explain each of the major decisions. There is no mention, for example, of the intense pressure on Washington from Paris and London in 1948 and 1949 to help stave off a French defeat in Vietnam, the last time Britain would urge US escalation.

Hastings is equally unsparing in assessing the reasons for US failure in Vietnam. Americans fought the way they knew how to fight in an area and type of war singularly inappropriate for it. They relied on air power (4 million tons of bombs were dropped on South Vietnam, significantly more than on the North), artillery and chemicals laden with dioxin, all of which wreaked massive destruction on the country they were trying to save and alienated the people whose hearts and minds they sought to win. They thrust aside the Saigon government, for which many Americans had contempt, and its army, in which they had no confidence. They inundated South Vietnam with money, materiel and men, undermining an already fragile social and political fabric.

The book also poses a question Americans seldom ask: how did a backward, post-colonial nation like North Vietnam ultimately prevail in a war with the world's greatest power? Hastings singles out the iron will of Hanoi's leaders, especially Le Duan, who wrested leadership from Ho Chi Minh as early as 1960. Even after the massive end-the-war offensives of 1964, 1968 and 1972 failed miserably, with catastrophic costs in men and materiel, Le Duan's politburo managed to negotiate the United States out of Vietnam in 1973 and mount a final offensive in 1975. Hanoi, Hastings adds, had the singular advantage of controlling information so that its numerous ghastly mistakes were not exposed to public scrutiny or debate.

Among the military leaders discussed in the book, there are no heroes. General William Westmoreland was out of his depth; his successor Creighton Abrams was a 'competent, decent officer, well suited to conventional warfare in Europe'. …

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