Russia and Germany: Is History Repeating? Russians Balk at the Notion That Vladimir Zhirinovsky Is a New Adolf Hitler, but the Economic Problems and Political Deadlock That Characterize Modern Russia and Pre-Nazi Germany Are Similar Series: VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY PROFILED. Part One of Two-Part Profile of Vladimir Zhirinovsky

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VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY stands by the map covering his office wall and, gesturing with a sharp metal pointer, carves up the world. With a jab here, Western Europe is awarded Africa. With a thrust there, Russia receives India, the Middle East, and the Far East.

"I stand for negotiating a deal with the West," the extreme Russian nationalist leader pronounces. "It is necessary to divide up the spheres of interest."

It is just such extravagant talk that has earned Mr. Zhirinovsky the derision of many of his countrymen and many outside these borders. They balk at the notion that Zhirinovsky is a Russian version of Adolf Hitler, on the verge of seizing power in a country whose deprivations and mood parallel those of Weimar Germany in the 1920s and `30s.

Even after his party won almost a quarter of the vote in the Dec. 12 parliamentary elections, the dominant reaction is to dismiss this as a one-time phenomenon, a "protest vote" over economic hardships.

"There are many poor people," Russian President Boris Yeltsin said this week. "It is they who voted for the Liberal Democratic Party. They voted not for its leader {or} for the program, but in protest against poverty."

Certainly historical parallels are dangerously seductive simplifications. But even a cursory view of events here and in Germany 70 years ago is enough to give veteran observers pause.

"One parallel does exist," insists Otto Graf Lambsdorff, leader of Germany's liberal Free Democratic Party. "We have ridiculed Hitler, we have laughed at Hitler, we have called him a fool and a lunatic. Yet he had written in 1923, in Mein Kampf, absolutely everything he did after coming to power. Now we think everything Zhirinovsky wrote and said is ridiculous."

Even in the notion of a "protest," there are echoes of Weimar Germany.

"Although history does not repeat itself, nevertheless conditions in Russia are hauntingly reminiscent of Germany," says John Dunlop, an expert on Russian nationalism at the Hoover Institution. Both states experienced the loss of a war, the collapse of an empire, rising unemployment and inflation, and a sense of national humiliation, he says.

The Nazi movement grew out of this ferment, an extreme expression of German nationalism and a widespread sense of national betrayal, fed by hyperinflation. With the encouragement of elements of the defeated German Army, Hitler led a putsch in Munich in 1923; when it failed he was sent to jail.

Out of this defeat, Hitler slowly rebuilt his organization. But it was not until the Depression struck in 1930 that the Nazis emerged as a serious political force. "Ever since he came out of prison at the end of 1924, Hitler had prophesied disaster," writes Hitler biographer Alan Bullock. "Those who had ever heard of Adolf Hitler shrugged their shoulders and called him a fool. Now, in 1930, disaster cast its shadow over the land again, and the despised prophet entered into his inheritance."

Elections were held in September 1930, amid an economic crisis, with the parliament deadlocked by fractured parties and power concentrated in the hands of an aged President Paul von Hindenburg and his advisers.

"Let Germany awake and renew her strength, let her remember her greatness and recover her old position in the world, and for a start let's clear out the old gang in Berlin," Mr. Bullock summarizes a typical Hitler campaign speech. The Nazi party shocked everyone by jumping from nowhere to grab 18 percent of the vote. By 1932, the Nazis peaked at 37 percent support. The rule of threats

Between that first election victory and January 1933, when Hindenburg appointed Hitler as chancellor, the Nazi leader pursued a complicated game. As Bullock recounts, he used the threat of his revolutionary movement to force the German elite - the Army and the industrialists - to give him the power he would never achieve through elections. …


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