THE United States policy of containing Iran has run its course.
Given the geopolitical changes that have swept the Middle East
since the Gulf war, continuing on that course would not only
destabilize our allies, but undermine our strategic interests in
the region. The Clinton administration must now change its
adversarial policy toward Iran and initiate a process of "passive
engagement" that could lead to normalization of relations between
the two countries.
The Clinton administration's Iran policy rests on an attempt to
keep both Iran and Iraq relatively weak vis-a-vis each other, the
rest of the Middle East, and United States interests in the region.
In short, it is a policy of "dual containment."
A close look at the US and Iranian positions reveals a
misunderstanding of each other's motives, compounded by mutual
distrust fed by past confrontations. The US continues to regard
Iran as a state that sponsors anti-US terrorism, bent on exporting
its brand of Islamic revolution and determined to undermine our
Arab allies. The Iranians see themselves as reasonable and
conciliatory, pointing to their useful role during the Gulf war and
efforts to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon.
The litany of charges by each side against the other could be
extended almost indefinitely. The point is that we and the Iranians
have reached a stage in our relations where hostility no longer
serves any useful purpose.
First, our embargo and sanctions have failed to cripple the
regime, much less stem the growing trade Iran carries on with our
own European allies and the rest of the world. And there is no
little hypocrisy in our stance: We have been buying Iranian oil
through third parties for several years.
While the Iranian economy is in difficulty, it is by no means in
crisis. There is growing international interest in Iran as a
potentially lucrative investment area, and many companies that put
assets "on ice" during the revolution are now being encouraged to
reopen their offices.
Iranians themselves, for all the repressiveness and intolerance
of their regime, have begun carving out social and political space
for themselves, and it is clear that the religious zeal that
characterized the early revolutionary years has begun to diminish.
Finally, there is an inescapable fact: Iran, for all its problems,
is slowly regaining its position as the hegemon of the Gulf. As it
re-emerges, it has begun to signal that given the right conditions,
US-Iran relations could improve.
Although Iran and the US are two profoundly different societies,
there still exists in Iran a deep attraction for Western
lifestyles. Since the country borrowed much of its institutional
base, infrastructure, and technology from the West, Iran's clergy
knows that major changes will have to take place.
What is needed now is new thinking and initiatives based on the
changed realities of the region.
The US should adopt a policy that engages Iranians disposed to
seek American contact. There are now self-interested, pragmatic
people, both in and out of Iran's government, who can be approached
to our mutual benefit. The Iran of 1995 is a far different place
from that of 1979. There is a much clearer, less ideological view
of the outside world and the "Great Satan."
What should that policy include? …