Bank Operations, Control Arrangements, and the State
The fundamentalist/economic analysis and the distinct micro and macro tracks it set appear to have thrived in the academy as if they were unchallenged by Friedman's work. There are several possible reasons for maintaining the old distinctions and retaining the distinct analyses for money and production. They include: the congeniality inherent in maintaining numerous, if artificial distinctions in the subject matter; a latent awareness that monetary analysis carries with it some heavy methodological and ideological baggage, of the sort pointed to in The Legacy ( Frazer 1994a, Sections 2.4c, 3.4); a residual of inadequate understanding of the alternative analytical system Friedman offered; and the severity of the challenge Friedman provided on any number of fronts. These reasons for maintaining the old distinctions extend to the previously noted time frames (Figure 1-4), to the place assigned to episodic change and the interdependence of time series, to the emphasis on prediction outside the sample period and/or for policy in another country, and to the presently noted control arrangements I associate with theory choice and central bank stances on public policy.
In any case, I adhere to the monetary revolution and to the ideological- interplay thesis associated with the Keynesian economics and the Friedman substitute for it as discussed in The Legacy ( Frazer 1994a, part 11). In doing so, I continue with the interest-rate and money-aggregate distinction and extend the focus to the 1930s, to the post-World War II directions and experiments in economic policy, and to later developments in the previously introduced causation controversy. As previously introduced, the question was whether ΔẎ → ΔṀ and ±Δi → ∓ ΔM (Equation  in Section 1.4a) or ΔṀ → ΔẎ → Δi (Section 1.5b). From the controversy's a priori beginnings with the American