resolving the war. The availability of expatriate funding, illegal light weapons,
and local recruits means that Prabhakaran can continue the war for as long as the
Sri Lankan army forces fail to secure key positions in the north that are linked to
the south by military supply routes. So far, the LTTE has done a good enough job
in keeping the armed forces at bay and, over time, frustrating any significant gains.
Although the government is facing a major resource crunch, it seems likely that
it will continue to enjoy a financial base robust enough to prevent the Tamil Tigers
from making the territorial gains they require for viability as a separatist entity.
An end to the war does not necessarily mean an end to the conflict. Although
the LTTE may now be deeply discredited, due to their tactics and behavior, its
original war aims were influenced by exclusion and uneven development. The
Sinhalese elite has much ground to give in the event of a peace settlement. If a
peace settlement coincides with a skewed program of economic reconstruction
similar to the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, Sri Lanka could all
too easily find itself back where it started, in the midst of violent conflict but with
Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World since 1945 ( London, 1991), 506.
R. Gunaratne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Forres ( Colombo, 1993), 2-3.
In November 1997, the Jain commission completed its report on the assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Criticism in the report of a number of key supporters of the United Front
and the political impact of the report eventually led to the Congress party's withdrawal of support for
the United Front government and an election.
Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam ( London, 1996), 186.
During this period, the Khalistanis were extremely active in the Punjab and a resurgent Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front was only just over the horizon. Lesser problems were evident in Darjeeling, Assam, Bihar, and Maharashtra, many focused upon state-level language policies.
Guneratne, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, xiii.
S. Ali, "Win Some, Lose Some: The Indian Airlift to Jaffna Has Mixed Results," Far Eastern
Economic Review, CXXXVI ( 25 June 1987), 23-24.
A. Nauriya, "The Flight of the Eagle: High Cost of India's Sri Lankan Policy," Economic and
Political Weekly, XXII ( 20 June 1987), 981.
The level of Indian anxiety over a non- South Asian foreign presence in Sri Lanka is reflected
in an op-ed piece by Jasjit Singh, director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in Delhi:
"Mere have been reports in the press about the possibility of an ELF (Extremely Low Frequency)
system being part of the Voice Of America (VOA) high-powered transmitting station being established
at Chilaw on Sri Lanka's west coast. If true, this has serious implications for strategic balance and
superpower conflict in the Indian Ocean besides grave environmental hazards of radiation to the population in and around the VOA transmitters this brings super power confrontation and possible nuclear
conflict to India's doorstep." US Transmitters in Lanka: Grim Dangers for the Region: Times of India
( 6 March 1985).