The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence

By Francis A. Boyle | Go to book overview

CHAPTER FOUR
STAR WARS VS.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE FORCE WILL BE
AGAINST US!

The Deadlocked Geneva Negotiations

It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze the prospects for success during the current round of stalemated negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva over nuclear and space weapons. These negotiations consist of two interrelated components: First, negotiations on President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which involve new antiballistic missile system technologies in space and on the ground as well as antisatellite weapons. Second, strategic nuclear arms reduction talks (i.e. START), which, in essence, are a continu- ation of a previous set of negotiations on this subject between the United States and the Soviet Union that were broken off by the latter in December of 1983 in direct reaction to the decision by the Federal Republic of Germany to permit the actual deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 missiles there during the immediately preceding month. 1

A third element of the Geneva negotiations that dealt with so-called Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) successfully culminated in the U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1987. 2 INF are therefore no longer (or at least not yet again) a serious source of contention between the two superpowers and their respective European allies. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration precipitated another mini-crisis in the NATO Alliance by its insistence upon the modernization of shorter-range nuclear weapons systems that fell below the INF Treaty's threshold, most of which will be deployed in Germany. 3

Although both elements of the race between the two superpowers to deploy new nuclear arms and to develop space weapons have been incorporated into one set of negotiations at Geneva, there exists a major conflict between the respective positions of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the nature of the interrelationship between these two

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The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page *
  • Table of Contents *
  • Foreword 11
  • Special Introduction George Bush, Jr. September 11th, and the Rule of Law 16
  • Notes 38
  • Chapter One - The United States Embraces International Legal Nihilism 40
  • Notes 52
  • Chapter Two - The Lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 55
  • Notes 87
  • Chapter Three - The Relevance of International Law to the Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence 92
  • Notes 125
  • Chapter Four - Star Wars vs. International Law 136
  • Notes 155
  • Chapter Five - The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence 162
  • Notes 205
  • Conclusion - Democracy vs. the Nuclear Power Elite 206
  • Postscript 210
  • Notes 210
  • Index 211
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