To command a division and to command an Army are as different as chalk and cheese—they require quite different qualities, though the greater will, of course, include the less.
Wellington, quoted in The Croker Papers
Much of the popular literature and even some of the more ponderous official and academic histories written in the past 20 years give the impression of incessant bickering and divergence of view between the Americans and the British. In fact the reverse is the truth: in few alliances in recorded history, thanks to a great extent to Roosevelt, Churchill and Eisenhower, was cooperation between two allies more sincere and effective. Nevertheless at this time both armies had much to learn of each other's virtues, prejudices and limitations. It is doubtful whether many Americans realised how the British had to pinch and scrape the bottom of the manpower barrel to keep their armies in the field; how they had had to bring their women into their war effort to a greater extent than the Russians and Germans ; how their soldiers' wives and children had to subsist, often under air bombardment, on a weekly meat ration less than that provided for a GI for a day and the effect this had on their approach to battle. The British on their part, because they shared a language of common origin, only too often assumed that American reactions in all circumstances would be the same as their own and that the curt, deliberately understated and forthright expressions they used amongst themselves were appropriate when dealing with allies whose values and vocabulary were very different. Above all, from Alexander downwards, they never realised the immense influence of the American Press and the need at all times to consider public opinion