if as a result the Soviet political system is to change
fundamentally, the change will have to come primarily from the outside and not from the inside.
Originating in bona fide Communist states and
formulated within the framework of the common
ideology, alternative and more tolerant notions might
gradually penetrate the ruling elite and only afterwards affect the society as a whole.
9 However, if
one considers what it took and how long it took for
foreign ideas to penetrate the far less controlled
Tsarist Russia, to merge with domestic trends and
eventually to emerge supreme, and weighs all this
against the power of the Communist regime, one
may well be justified in cautioning that this erosion
must be awaited with a great deal of patience.
For a theoretical analysis of this relationship see William
Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, 1959).
For discussion see Amitai Etzioni, "Authority Structure
and Organizational Effectiveness," Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1959), as well as the following
sources cited therein: Robert Dubin, Human Relations in
Administration (New York, 1951); Melville Dalton, "Conflicts Between Staff and Line Managerial Officers," American
Sociological Review, Vol. XV, No. 3 (1950); A. W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of
Latent Social Roles," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.
II, No. 3 (1957) and No. 4 (1958).
John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A
Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York, 1959);
David Granick, The Red Executive (New York, 1960).
I have tried elsewhere to define what I mean by ideology
and in what way I think it affects the conduct of Soviet
leaders. I will not therefore cover the same ground here. See
chapter xvi of my The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict
(Cambridge, Mass., 1960), and "Communist Ideology and
International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, September, 1960.
It may be tentatively posited that the ideology-action
generalizers at the apex are usually in a closer relationship to
the ideologues than to the more subordinate experts. On
lower levels, the party apparatchiki are usually in a closer
relationship to agitprop than to the experts. (By closer
relationship is meant less direct subordination of latter by
former.) In revolutionary times (in early post-1917 Russia or
even in China today) there tends to be a relative fusion
between the ideology-action generalizers and the ideologues
(symbolized by Lenin or Mao Tse-tung). With stability a
process of differentiation took place, and in some respects
the apparatchiki came closer to the experts. In recent years
Khrushchev has been trying to counteract this process by
stimulating increased activity by the agitprop and by assigning greater responsibility to the apparat, thus compensating
for the necessarily greater importance of the experts, given
Soviet industrial-technical development.
One may add that an older example of the expression
of the survival instinct of a goal-oriented movement through
such organizational compulsion towards indoctrination and
social integration is provided by church history.
By the former is meant that type of community which
because of a continuous and often competitive interplay of
groups is necessarily responsive to the impact of new ideas.
New York and Paris are good metropolitan examples of
actively receptive communities. By a passively receptive
society is meant one which does not set up purposeful impediments to the inflow of new ideas.
The political experience of intellectual unrest in Hungary
and Poland on the one hand and in China on the other might
be relevant here. In the former it was closely associated with
demoralization in the party and led to an eruption. In the
latter it did not penetrate the party and the regime could
quickly suppress it.
There might be an analogy here to the political history
of religiously oriented societies. It was only after the Protestant and Catholic states learned to coexist with one another
and, for that matter, with non-Christian states, that Protestants, Catholics, and others learned to live with one another within given states. An "interfaith council" in the United
States is thus not only an example of conscious toleration
but also of a decline in absolutist commitment.
Modernization and the Maoist Vision—Some
Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals
What can be said at this point about the broad
goals and motivations of the present Chinese Com‐
munist leadership? The question is, of course, distressingly imprecise and begs further definition. Is
the leadership a monolithic group? Have its goals
remained constant and unchanging? Is there a rigid
Chinese Communist "goal structure," etc.?
On the question of leadership I shall simply ad