TO DAYTON AND BACK
IN THE WINTER and spring of 1995, it wasn't only the Balkans that occupied major blocks of time for the Joint Staff. The Republicans now controlled Congress, and they had intensified the questioning of the military policy and strategy for the U.S. Armed Forces. The Armed Forces were continuing to shrink, in accordance with plans drawn up during the Bush Administration in the early I990s. Congress wanted to know why we needed the forces we had and whether we had enough. We were continuing to ask the same questions, as we always did in preparation for congressional testimony. The draft National Military Strategy was in its latest revision, but it wasn't yet published.
In the Pentagon, we had already completed the Bottom-Up Review, which established the requirement to fight two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies, or MRCs, one in response to our treaty commitments to defend South Korea, another to protect against another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or other Persian Gulf states.
I was directed to rewrite basic national military plans to incorporate the two nearly simultaneous MRCs. This seemed like a good stroke because it addressed the needs of our commanders and the service chiefs. It also could be cited to prove to the critics that there were sufficient existing forces to fight these two Major Regional Contingencies