APACHES AND TARGETS
AFTER THE FIRST DAYS of the air campaign, we needed better means to measure our efforts. I asked my staff to develop a system, setting our objectives against Milosevic's probable objectives, and then rating each side. The results did not look good.
In Phase I we had wanted to destroy or neutralize Milosevic's air defense system. Our analysis showed that we were still short of our objectives in destroying his early warning system, taking out his surface-to-air missiles, disrupting his command and control, and taking down his radio relay and communications sites. Moreover, the Serbs still retained their surface-to-air missile capability, some airfield capability, and so on. Now we were moving to Phase II strikes against forces facilities and support, including lines of communications in southern Serbia, and to frustrate us here, all Milosevic had to do was disperse the Serb heavy weapons and headquarters, continue operations against the Kosovars, and avoid a NATO ground intervention. We had lost the element of surprise, so the results were disappointing in purely military terms.
I conveyed this assessment in draft form at the U.S. video teleconference, just to help us put our efforts in perspective. Afterward I got