THE STRATEGIC BATTLEFIELD
AS THE STRESS and frantic pace of the first ten days gave way to the more steady and intense work of the campaign, some of my American commanders subscribed to a more doctrinaire view of the conflict. In this view Milosevic was an uncaring leader, a man who would be unaffected by losses among his military and police. This was the classic view of the American airpower adherents, combined with a perception of the parallels between Saddam Hussein and Milosevic—only the bombing of strategic targets was going to be effective. Forget about attacking the Serb forces in Kosovo.
This view was conveniently buttressed by the obvious difficulty the Air Force was having in attacking the Serb ground forces. As Mike Short said to me, "Boss, you show me the targets, and we'll strike 'em." But we were going to rely on the Air Force to find the targets. In practice this meant seeking additional means of information, a new way of processing intelligence, more flexible mission planning, potentially higher risks from Serb antiaircraft fire during the attacks, and higher risks of costly mistaken attacks on civilians or friendly elements on the ground.
This was also the classic struggle between Army leaders, who want