RESISTANCE AND PERSISTENCE
IN THE FIRST WEEKS of May, Milosevic embarked on a political‐ diplomatic campaign designed to blunt NATO's will and eventually halt its actions. First, there was the release of the three U.S. soldiers, a gesture of good will, accompanied by a letter to the President. Then he released the Kosovar Albanian leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and his family, whom his troops had taken prisoner early in the campaign. On May 6 he proclaimed victory over the KLA and ordered a halt to his military operations in Kosovo.
Diplomatic efforts by all sides were ratcheting up. On May 6, the G-8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, and Russia) agreed to a seven-point draft peace plan to be taken to the United Nations for authorization. The plan called for the withdrawal of Serb military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and the entry of an effective international civil and security presence. There was no reference to NATO leadership in the plan, but privately we were assured that the international military force would be led by NATO, as had been the case in Bosnia.
At the same time Russia announced its intent to inspect the NATO forces in Macedonia, under the terms of the 1994 Vienna Document,