DIPLOMACY BACKED BY FORCE
BEFORE LEAVING FOR Albania on the morning of June 2, I received a memorandum from Doc Fogelsong on the results of Strobe Talbott's meeting in Bonn that day with the Russians, detailing the principles on which an agreement to end the fighting was to be based. It seemed to have maintained the "red lines" I had established, but just barely: it called for the withdrawal of "all" Serb military, police and paramilitary; it required a subsequent Military Technical Agreement to work out the details for the withdrawal of the Serbs and suspension of military activity; and it required "an international security presence with substantial NATO participation [to be] deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment," and under U.N. authority. A footnote explained that "substantial NATO participation" meant having NATO at the core, and that in turn meant a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council. Russia's participation was recognized to require additional agreements.
I had no doubt that Washington was determined to insure that NATO was in charge of the mission. Still, my political adviser, Mike Durkee, and I were uncomfortable. The reference to NATO authority