ON THURSDAY, JUNE 10, most of us in NATO were focused on verifying the Serb withdrawal and suspending the bombing.
None of us fully appreciated how fast events were moving in Moscow.
During my VTC with Secretary Cohen that afternoon, I expressed concern that the Russians might hold hostage the U.N. Security Council Resolution to use as leverage to obtain their separate sector. Washington wisely advised Strobe Talbott to draw the Russians into discussions and keep them there until the resolution passed in New York. At that point, we reckoned, Moscow would have less leverage. For whatever reason, the Russians didn't block the resolution as it moved to passage.
But the discussions met Russian intransigence nonetheless. Shortly after 5:00 P.M., Colonel General Ivashov rejoined the military discussions and, using the American delegation's own analogy, stated that Russia had decided to "take her own train." After discussions inside the U.S. delegation, where someone had reportedly raised the idea of giving the Russians the French sector in the north, George Casey called