By 1915, for the French, regular use of Montenegrin ports had become too dangerous. They could no longer escort convoys into the Adriatic without excessive risk. Landing operations, difficult before, were now impossible, given the appearance of Austrian submarines and aircraft. More and more, the French were reduced to a distant blockade, at the Strait of Otranto, and to a guerrilla war at sea. The broad naval outlines of the geostrategic situation were being set, and a sort of equilibrium laid out.
In the end, Lapeyrere repositioned the French Adriatic blockading fleet down to the southern end of the Otranto Strait, harder for Haus to get at, and waited some more.
Haus sat tight. Lapeyrere waited. The Adriatic’s geostrategic equation was in balance. Some change in one of the critical factors would have to take place. Impasse it was. But one or both of the admirals must have had some whisper that just such a change was in the wind.