This chapter begins by examining the relationship between the organisation in Brussels and that in Mostar. This was the most fundamental source of success, but also the cause of several shortcomings. This leads on to a consideration of the basic aims and methods of the EUAM (as set out in the so-called ‘Memorandum of Understanding’). Then we review the internal organisation of the EUAM as a whole, and that of the Department of Reconstruction in particular. Next the relationship between the EUAM and the local municipal administrations is considered. This is followed by a consideration of the relationship between the political mission and the technical mission. The last section draws some conclusions.
The Brussels-Mostar Relationship
The key to the practical success of the EUAM was almost complete delegation from Brussels. A single organisation, with a single decision maker—the Administratorhad been established on the ground. The essential objectives were given in the Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the parties before the beginning of the mandate. The financial resources were defined and handed over to the control of the Administrator. The team on the ground, with the Administrator fully in charge, decided everything, and implementation followed at speed. If necessary and appropriate, one could obtain Mr Koschnick's formal approval to a project on Monday, draft a contract on Tuesday and sign it on Wednesday, order payment on Thursday and the money would be transferred by the following Monday.
About 500 contracts were signed, and DM170 million paid in two years on reconstruction projects, starting from a tabula rasa in every respect. It is certain that without delegation, and without professional expertise, little would have been achieved. This arrangement was a revolutionary step for the Union and in particular the Commission. Nothing of the sort had ever occurred before. Normally, all decisions of legal and financial significance—however small—must be taken in Brussels and never at local level. But responsibility in Brussels is divided and the speed of decision-making is slower than the natural pace of events. Also, there are no permanent technical officials in the Directorate-General responsible for Bosnia. At least until early 1997 (when I left) the EC had no expert reconstruction team in theatre, except in Mostar.