This study is neither a miniature nor an enlargement of the Almond and Powell model of structure-function analysis; because of its "genetic characteristics," it is an approximation of the Almond-Powell comparative politics model presented to us by Eastern European scholar Jan F. Triska of Stanford University.
As explained by participants in a panel on "comparing East European Political Systems" at the 1970 American Political Science Association meeting in Los Angeles, 1 there are at least three methodological problems with the Triska version of the Almond-Powell approach. 2 First, the comparative politics model assumes that each political system develops within specific environmental restrictions. However, we demonstrate in the chapters that follow that the Hungarian political system is not independent of other political systems—especially the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, it is both difficult and unscientific to clearly differentiate (as the Almond-Powell model would call for) between the Hungarian political culture and that of the other Eastern European socialist cultures in the Soviet bloc. For example, it is inaccurate to equate the Soviet oppression of Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956 with the rule application of the system existing at that time; evidence indicates that the Nagy regime in power in Hungary during the revolution was vehemently opposed to Soviet intervention in November 1956. Similarly, we cannot argue that the 1956 revolution (or counterrevolution) was a manifestation of a conversion function aimed at improving the policy-making process; in our opinion,