Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms Build-Up

By Raymond P. Ojserkis | Go to book overview

CHAPTER 2

Consolidation

THE STABILIZATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

By 1948, American military spending had tumbled so far that the Truman administration was forced to decide where the floor would be on military spending. Analysts set about creating a more comprehensive strategy for matching American military means and ends, linking goals, limits, and requirements. 1 As with any military budgeting, political desires, competing demands for funds by other sectors of government and society, current capabilities, and the existing military balance all affected the decision-making process.

Opposing forces affected spending. The American monopoly on nuclear weapons, the American military’s emphasis on strategic bombing (which was relatively cheaper than the conventional armed services), the priority placed on paying off the federal debt, a president who assumed that the military leadership would squander funds, the seeming remoteness of a major war, and the American tradition of small peacetime military budgets drove costs down. On the other hand, the maintenance of occupation forces in defeated Germany and Japan, the use of American military personnel to help train Allied armies, the maintenance of a bomber force capable of posing a nuclear deterrent, the new postwar internationalism that permeated American political culture, and, most importantly, the continuing disagreements on postwar settlement issues with the Soviet Union drove costs up. 2 In the 1945–47 period, the factors driving costs down outweighed those driving costs up, but by 1948, an equilibrium between

-13-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms Build-Up
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Preface and Acknowledgments vii
  • Preface ix
  • Introduction 1
  • Chapter 1 - Demobilization 5
  • Chapter 2 - Consolidation 13
  • Chapter 3 - Reconsideration 47
  • Chapter 4 - Transformation 85
  • Chapter 5 - Globalization 107
  • Chapter 6 - Actualization 129
  • Conclusions 153
  • Bibliography 215
  • Index 231
  • About the Author 239
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 239

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.