FREEDOM and DESTINY
In criticizing Locke for his treatment of the problem of freedom of will, Shaftesbury wrote that "he made great alterations on these points where, though a divine may often waver, a philosopher, I think, never can." 1 This problem, he adds, is "the test and touchstone of a genius in philosophy." 2 If Shaftesbury means by this remark that the test is not merely in the position taken but in the arguments advanced for it, then he himself fails the test. Though he is clearly committed to a form of indeterminism or self-determinism, he never explains exactly what his position is and he never faces the problems relating to human freedom inherent in his metaphysical system. We have seen that Shaftesbury opposes atheism-belief in the rule of chance in Nature-to theism, and if the postulates of true theism are correct, then it follows that all things are interrelated and interdependent, and "everything is necessary to everything." 3 Nothing that happens, therefore, is unnecessary, and the removal of a single cause in the Great Chain of Being would throw the Whole into disarray.
At the same time that Shaftesbury commits himself to this