Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience

By Giuseppina D’oro | Go to book overview

1

Collingwood and the metaphysics of experience

The task of philosophy, for Collingwood, is not to enlarge or expand knowledge but to engender reflection on the fundamental principles or presuppositions on which knowledge rests. Philosophy, Collingwood claims, ‘does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of which we were simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which we already knew in some way’ ( An Essay on Philosophical Method (EPM), 161). Philosophy for Collingwood is a reflective activity whose task is to bring to light or render explicit what was already implicitly known. The subject matter of philosophy is the key principles underpinning certain areas of knowledge or experience such as art, natural science and history, principles which are implicitly known to the practitioners of those disciplines, to the practising artist, scientist and historian. The subject matter of philosophy, therefore, is second order: the philosopher is not concerned with particular works of art, scientific hypotheses or historical arguments but with the nature of the activity in which artists, scientists and historians are engaged. The practitioners of particular disciplines are not required to conceptualise or thematise the nature of their activities; if they do so, if scientists become, for instance, interested in second-order questions concerning the principles which underpin the scientific investigation of nature, they take on the role of philosophers. Any activity, therefore, be this art, science or history, is governed by certain fundamental principles, principles that delineate the nature of that activity, that need not be explicitly known to the practitioner and which constitute the subject matter of philosophy. How are these principles known, how are they brought to light or rendered explicit? In EPM 1 Collingwood says that the method of philosophy is neither deductive nor inductive (EPM, 151). It is not deductive because philosophers need to provide some justification for the principles they claim lie at the basis of particular areas of knowledge. Such principles need to be argued for; the philosopher, consequently, cannot argue from those principles deductively or treat these principles as mathematical or geometrical axioms from which conclusions are drawn through step-by-step deductive inferences. The method by which the philosopher brings these principles to

-9-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 180

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.