Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience

By Giuseppina D’oro | Go to book overview

3

Collingwood and the realism/anti-realism debate

In this chapter I wish to discuss the nature of Collingwood’s anti-realism. My goal is to establish, first, what are Collingwood’s reasons for rejecting realism and, second, what the exact nature of his anti-realism is. The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first I outline the realist claim. In the second I discuss the significance of Collingwood’s identification of realism with the claim that knowledge makes no difference to what is known and attempt to show that Collingwood’s anti-realism amounts not to a denial of the existence of a mind-independent world, but to a denial of the possibility of cognising things as they are in-themselves. In the third section I seek to clarify further the nature of Collingwood’s anti-realism. My primary concern, in this section, is to show that whereas Collingwood’s anti-realism certainly entails the rejection of the traditional theory of truth as correspondence (adaequatio intellectus et rei), his specific brand of anti-realism neither advocates the end of philosophy nor entails the dissolution of certain recurring philosophical problems such as the relationship between mind and body, freedom and determinism, theoretical and practical reason. In order to show that Collingwood’s rejection of the correspondence theory of truth is not meant to usher in a post-philosophical age, I contrast Collingwood’s anti-realism with the pragmatists’ rejection of the notion of truth as correspondence and argue that there are crucial differences between Collingwood’s and the pragmatic rejection of realism. I argue, first, that whereas the pragmatists seek to dissolve traditional philosophical problems, Collingwood seeks to rethink them within a new framework. I argue, second, that whereas the pragmatic rejection of the correspondence theory of truth leads, at least in some cases, to an abandonment of philosophy understood as a normative activity, Collingwood’s specific brand of anti-realism seeks to defend the idea of philosophy as a normative or, as he puts it, ‘criteriological’ science.


I

In An Autobiography (AA), 1 Collingwood refers disparagingly to realism as the claim that knowledge makes no difference to what is known. 2 He then

-37-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 180

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.