THE NATURE of the relationship of the judicial process to civil rights and liberties has been the subject of a profusion of pertinent writings. In the first edition of my The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France ( Oxford University Press, 1962), I compiled four separate bibliographies of constitutional law totaling some twelve hundred books. And the second edition (due late in 1967) will have an even longer list, much of it separated into appropriate categories for each major segment of the field. Not all of these apply here, but a good many apply at least tangentially. Yet specific works on the problem of "line-drawing" itself are scarce, indeed; most of the published material treats the problem implicitly, rather than explicitly, and within the context of the particular publication's general theme. On the other hand there are some trenchant and stimulating works, generally relatively brief and topical, that do address themselves to line-drawing in a few selected fields. Among these are Sidney Hook thoughtful The Paradoxes of Freedom ( University of California Press, 1962), which deals with "intelligence and human rights," "democracy and judicial review," and "intelligence, conscience, and the right to revolution"; David Fellman The Limits of Freedom ( Rutgers University Press, 1959), an incisive and clearly written consideration of religious freedom, "the right to communicate," and "the right to talk politics"; Alan P. Grimes intriguing study, Equality in America: Religion, Race, and the Urban Majority ( Oxford University Press, 1964), in which he analyzes aspects of religious and racial equality with insight and perception; and John P. Roche Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action, 2nd ed. ( Random House, 1966), which deals briefly but engagingly with the rule of law, the judicial process, and certain rights of the citizen in democratic society.
The "double standard," discussed at length in my second chapter, has absorbed and troubled many students of the judicial process: Paul A. Freund outlines its difficulties in his The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Business and Purposes ( Meridian Press, 1961); Judge Learned Hand opposes it in -- among other works -- The Bill of Rights ( Harvard University Press, 1958); Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black upholds it in many of his opinions and most dramatically perhaps in his famous essay "The Bill of Rights," 35 New York University Law Review866 ( April 1960); Loren P. Beth favors it in "The Case for Judicial Protection of CivilLiberties,"