Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935-1940

By N. J. Crowson | Go to book overview

Conclusion

This study has been both an analysis of how the Conservative party responded to the deteriorating international situation from 1935 and a consideration of how the party sought to influence the responses of its leadership. It is apparent that contemporary Conservatives perceived both diplomacy and rearmament as the tandem mechanisms by which to respond to the dictators’ increased belligerence. The fascist regimes were like a lintel being prevented from smashing down on the foundations of the British Empire by the twin pillars of diplomacy and rearmament. If one of these supports failed then the remaining one was expected to shoulder the entire burden. A strong defence programme would enable the government to negotiate, whilst if that negotiation languished, an adequately prepared defence scheme would repel the initial aerial assault and ultimately ensure military victory. The doubts about the ability of diplomacy to restrain the dictators became privately evident from September 1938. However, by the end of that year the party’s concerns about defence were proving more divisive and potentially damaging than those concerning foreign affairs—purely because this debate was being conducted with greater publicity.

In theory, policy issues are decided by the leader and handed down to the party. 1 But this classical analysis of the party structure places too great a stress upon the written constitution. In reality, although the party is based largely upon deference, it is accepted that the evolution of policy is subject to unwritten constraints. The leader is reliant on the support and goodwill of the party, and as a consequence the attitudes and preferences of four sectors of the organisation have an input into policy formulation. The leader needs to carry the front bench if a particular policy is to be successfully advocated. The views of the wider parliamentary party need to be accounted for. If not, there is a risk of presenting an image of disunity to the electorate and of

-198-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935-1940
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Illustrations ix
  • Acknowledgements xi
  • Introduction 1
  • Part I 17
  • 1 - Facing the Dictators 19
  • Part II 49
  • 2 - Abyssinia to Guernica, 1935-7 51
  • 3 - Berchtesgaden to Poland, 1937-9 82
  • 4 - The Rearmament Debate, 1935-8 121
  • 5 - The Call for National Service, 1937-9 147
  • 6 - The Prosecution of the War, September 1939 to May 1940 168
  • Conclusion 198
  • Appendix I 205
  • Appendix Ii: 210
  • Notes 212
  • Bibliography 254
  • Index 259
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 270

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.