We have seen that reciprocal co-operation (RC) is both substantively and procedurally rational in simple transparent worlds. However it may seem surprising that I propose RC as a solution to the compliance problem. The original compliance dilemma pitted straightforward rationality against morality. Following Gauthier, I used responsive constraints to improve on the rational performance of moral players. But I went further in this direction and, like Frankenstein, ended up with what some will see as a moral monster. Gauthier’s principle, constrained maximization, is recog-nizably moral. In contrast, my principle, reciprocal co-operation, whose distinguishing feature is a willingness to exploit unconditional co-operators (UC), looks morally defective. By showing that rationality directs one to exploit innocent agents, reciprocal co-operators re-open the gap between rationality and morality. Reciprocal co-operators seem to be part of the compliance problem, not part of its solution. In this new compliance dilemma, rationality points to my principle, RC, while morality points to conditional cooperation (CC).
This chapter addresses this new dilemma, in three steps. First, I review the terrain that we have covered, to remind us that RC is not morally vacuous. Second, I turn to the moral theory that Gauthier and I share, in order to assess the relative moral status of RC and CC. I shall argue that in terms of Gauthier’s standard of impartiality my principle of reciprocal co-operation does no worse than his own principle of constrained maximization. When I introduce another standard to address the treatment of naive agents, again constrained maximization does no better than reciprocal cooperation. Neither principle, RC or CC, really solves the problem