Nothing is ever really finished and it is a talent to know to stop at the point where too much attention upsets the balance.
It is necessary to distinguish between what depends on will—objective, method and successive steps and what is linked to circumstances—the choice of the moment and the details to come to a conclusion.
Jean Monnet, Mémoires
Using a framework of analysis which incorporates three approaches, this study assesses the extent of, and limits to, Franco-German cooperation during the Maastricht process. The Conclusion presents some final remarks about how the approaches used in tandem contribute to our understanding of both the role of the Franco-German couple in, and the nature of, the IGC process. Several modifications to the individual approaches are then suggested in light of the book’s findings. Finally, the relevance of the Maastricht process to the future of European integration is assessed.
This volume explores the relationship between France and Germany during a period of transition on the Continent. Both countries had to adjust to the changing balance of power in Europe caused by German unification and the collapse of the Soviet empire. Their response to this new European context, in tandem with the Delors Commission, were negotiations to establish a European Union. The analytical framework introduced in this volume highlights the manner in which France and Germany acted together, or individually, to define the Maastricht process. With Great Britain content to retain the status quo, the two countries were the main state actors, along with the contributions of Commission President Delors, at the EMU table. On political union, the combined weight of France and Germany was decisive to the outcome of negotiations. In the midst of the national ratification processes, and after the Danish rejection of the Treaty, it was the French referendum results which determined the subsequent course of the Maastricht process. Finally, well after the deadline inscribed in the Treaty, the Karlsruhe decision