German and Japanese compliance with the American agenda has been far from complete, though both countries have participated in international control agreements from the Shanghai Commission in 1909 to the UN Convention of 1988. The United States has taken it as a basic premise that this pattern of partial compliance is directly related to the domestic capacity of each country's policy makers. Clearly, however, this explanation, applied for the past ninety or so years to bilateral and multilateral relations, has failed to read German and Japanese responses accurately. This final chapter briefly summarizes the findings of the preceding analysis before turning to their implications for the future of U.S. drug control.
Prominent scholarship suggests that weak state capacity, stemming from preconditions such as limited territorial integrity and financial resources or from dynamics generated by state and societal structure, can lead to involuntary or voluntary defection from agreements. The United States has taken this hypothesis as its basic premise in attempting to account for noncompliance with the