Money and security : troops, monetary policy and West Germany's relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 /

By Hubert Zimmermann | Go to book overview

4
The Radford Plan: America and Its Troops
in Germany, 1955–1958

During the 1950s the American GIs in Germany were, in sharp contrast to the controversies surrounding the British troop commitment from 1955 onward, not a source of serious conflict between stationing and host countries — apart from one significant episode, which forms the subject of this chapter. Within a few years after the end of World War II, the American military presence became an integral feature of the European postwar settlement. Divergences on their military and political roles were usually fought out in internal strategic debates that did not significantly affect troop levels. This relative calm and stability does not indicate, however, that in U. S. government circles preoccupations similar to British ideas were nonexistent. On the contrary, the principle of a seemingly unlimited presence of its troops in Europe was never accepted by the American government as a whole nor by Congress and the American public. However, in the absence of powerful financial counterarguments, such as balance-of-payments problems, the political arguments for an undiminished commitment to the defense of Europe carried the day in discussions within the government. This changed only in 1959 and 1960, when the American dollar came under pressure just as the English pound had.

Allied force levels in Europe were influenced by changes in strategic thinking and revised war plans. However, this influence was felt mainly at the planning level. When the plans were to be implemented, financial and political considerations proved to be stronger than strategic doctrines. To understand the debate about force reductions, it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the basic lines of the strategic discussion within the Alliance during the 1950s.

-87-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Money and security : troops, monetary policy and West Germany's relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 /
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 275

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.