Mind, matter and sense qualia
Whether or not mental states turn out to be physical states of the brain is a matter of whether or not cognitive neuroscience eventually succeeds in discovering systematic neural analogs for all of the intrinsic and causal properties of mental states.
Paul Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), p. 206
Whatever explanation of cognition will in the end prove satisfactory, we can at least suppose that only one kind of existence–the real kind–will be involved. Ockham did not share the faith of many today that the mind is wholly physical. But if the mind must be explained in terms of the nonphysical, at least it need not be explained in terms of the nonreal.
Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (1997), p. 85
Traditionally, especially within the period of Modern Philosophy (e.g., from Descartes to Kant), when philosophers turned their attention to perception and our knowledge of the external world, a standard set of issues, problems, principles and concepts were invoked, assumed and occasionally modified. A recent statement of the representative theory of perception characterized that theory as holding to two claims: mental operations of the mind arise “from causal impingement by the world” and the mind has “mental states and events which represent the world. ”1____________________