Acknowledgments | ix | |
Introduction | 1 | |
1. The Problem and Theory of Pivotal Deterrence | 5 | |
2. Power, Interests, and Alignment Options: Framing the Inquiry | 25 | |
3. Pivotal Deterrence in the Eastern Crisis, 1875-78: Why Bismarck Had It Easy | 46 | |
4. Pivotal Deterrence and the Chain Gang: Sir Edward Grey's Ambiguous Policy and the July Crisis, 1914 | 75 | |
5. Hurting the One Who Loves You Most: The United States and the Cyprus Crises, 1963-67 | 100 | |
6. Playing the Pivot in a Crowded Market: The United States and the Kashmir Conflict, 1962-65 | 135 | |
7. U.S. Pivotal Deterrence in the Unipolar Era, 1990-2002 | 169 | |
Conclusion: The Prospects for Pivotal Deterrence in U.S. Foreign Policy | 202 | |
List of Abbreviations | 219 | |
Notes | 221 | |
Index | 269 |
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