Military Persuasion in War and Policy: The Power of Soft

By Stephen J. Cimbala | Go to book overview

4

Military Persuasion in the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than any other Cold War event. Had it been handled like the July crisis of 1914, from which World War I erupted, unspeakable disaster could have resulted for the United States, for the Soviet Union, and for the planet. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed over the stakes in Cuba in 1962 than in the Balkans in 1914. Of course, part of the reason for this restraint by the crisis leaderships in Washington, D.C., and in Moscow was the fear of the unknown. A two-sided nuclear war had never been fought. But this fear of nuclear escalation does not account entirely for the remarkable restraint practiced by President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. After all, it was just as likely that one side might decide to plunge into war below the nuclear threshold before conceding the issues demanded by the other. And, in fact, some advisors to Kennedy and Khrushchev during the thirteen tense days of the crisis recommended exactly that.

The missile crisis was resolved by leaders who used techniques of military persuasion in order to defend their minimum positions while giving ground on their maximum demands. To a remarkable extent, these techniques were improvised by leaders and their advisors for the circumstances, and they were not without danger. Military persuasion was involved because the United States (1) mobilized forces for the invasion of Cuba, (2) put its strategic nuclear forces on their largest ever peacetime alert, and (3) instituted a naval blockade of Cuba that ran a deliberate but calculated risk of a confrontation on the high

-71-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Military Persuasion in War and Policy: The Power of Soft
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 271

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.