Accidental, inadvertent, and/or unauthorized launches (war), 43, 49, 58, 76, 120, 133, 158, 163, 173 |
American (U.S.) nuclear umbrella (extended nuclear deterrence), 1, 12, 15, 17-18, 54, 108, 165 |
Antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses, 4, 57, 73, 75-79, 97, 173 |
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 25, 26, 39, 51, 81, 97, 123, 132, 134, 161, 163, 164 |
Arms reductions (United States and Russia), 4, 17, 67-69, 122-123, 124 ; |
antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses, 73 ; |
Bayesian methods, 73, 85, 99 ; |
breaking out of treaty agreements, 92-95 ; |
first-strike stability, 68, 70, 72-73, 74, 75, 76, 79-80, 82 ; |
nuclear abolition and desensitization, 171-174 ; |
START treaties, 67-68, 69-71, 81, 82, 83, 93, 96, 98 ; |
strategic nuclear forces, 69-71 ; |
summary and observations, 95-100 ; |
valued assets, 72 |
Arms reductions (United States and Russia) and future deterrence, 74-75 ; |
effect of ABM defenses, 75-79 ; |
effect of lower alert rates, 79-80 ; |
geopolitical stability and alert rates, 80-83 |
Arms reductions (United States and Russia) launch on warning, 69, 72, 74, 84 ; |
feasibility of, 85 ; |
motivation for, 84-85 ; |
warning-system messages and confidence levels, 85-92 |
Asia, 27, 30, 32, 34, 107, 113, 132, 165, 166 |
Aum Shinrikyo, 35 |
Ballistic missile defenses (BMD), 4, 49-52, 122, 123, 132, 134, 164, 165. |
See also Antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses |
Bell, Robert, 92 |
Biological weapons. See Chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons |
Blair, Bruce, 175 n.10 |
Bomber force(s), 6, 8, 14, 16, 71, 72, 82, 84, 95, 97, 173 ; |
U.S. strategic-retaliatory forces, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 130, 136 |
Brezhnev, Leonid (regime), 157 |
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