Dictionary of Terrorism

By John Richard Thackrah | Go to book overview

S

Sanctions

Only the USA and Britain have been willing to impose significant economic sanctions on such identified sponsors of international terrorism as Iran, Libya and Syria. In the case of the USA a military response is readily available i.e. on Libya after the terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Berlin in 1986, and in April 1993 when cruise missiles were launched in response to an Iraqi effort to assassinate former President George Bush.

The end of the Cold War prompted a fresh impetus to the activities of the United Nations Security Council to curb international terrorism. Sanctions against Libya for example were the first such case of collective action against a state believed to support terrorism. Since the imposition of sanctions against Libya there have been no allegations of state involvement in terrorist attacks against civil aviation (Gazzini, 1996). In the 1990s the role played by the Security Council in the fight against air piracy did contribute to convincing the states that in the past have been accused of sponsoring terrorist activities, to abandon such criminal policy.


Reference
Gazzini, T. (1996) 'Sanctions Against Terrorism: Legal Obligations of States', Conflict Studies (May/ June), London: RISCT.

Further reading
Bienen, H. and Gilpin, R. (1980) 'Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 89-98.

Sandinist National Liberation Front (SNLF)

The Front was named after a Nicaraguan patriot, General Augusto Cesur Sandino, who having opposed American rule for six years, was murdered in 1934 by supporters of the Somoza family. He was the great example for Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. Carlos Fonseca Amador, who with other leaders was killed by government forces in 1976, formed the liberation movement in 1961 as a pro-Havana group. The year before their deaths, the Sandinists split into three factions, the smallest of which was the Marxist-Leninist GPP. The largest was the extreme Third Party, or Terreristas, which waived its ideological bias to allow the bourgeoisie to join their common front against the Somoza regime. In this way it succeeded in winning a broad spectrum of support from peasants to upper-class intellectuals. The Front displayed a great capacity for survival despite numerous 'eradication' attempts during the later years of the Somoza regime. Despite some setbacks, the groups began to co-ordinate activities and establish operational unity by 1978. Subsequently unity waned to some extent and two Marxist groups entered an anti-Third Party coalition, while a fourth faction, the authentic Sandinist, emerged.

The Third Party dominated the 'junta of national reconstruction' which headed a provisional

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Dictionary of Terrorism
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Preface and Acknowledgements vi
  • Introduction viii
  • Abbreviations and Acronyms xii
  • Glossary xviii
  • A 1
  • B 23
  • C 32
  • D 62
  • E 82
  • F 97
  • G 103
  • H 112
  • I 126
  • J 147
  • K 151
  • L 156
  • M 164
  • N 177
  • O 185
  • P 191
  • R 220
  • S 229
  • T 256
  • U 277
  • V 293
  • W 296
  • Z 304
  • Films and Documentaries 305
  • Terrorism - A Historical Timeline 309
  • Index 311
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