Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran after the Gulf Wars

By Dilip Hiro | Go to book overview

1

SADDAM CENTER-STAGE, EXIT BUSH

The three Western permanent Security Council members - America, Britain and France - wasted little time in bending Resolution 688 to serve their own policies. On April 16, 1991, they argued that it entitled them to send troops to northern Iraq and establish secure encampments to provide supplies to Kurdish refugees. Iraq denounced this as interference in its internal affairs.

Following an undeclared ceasefire between the Kurdish insurgents and the Iraqi army on April 17, talks between the central government and the delegates of the seven-member Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), led by Masud Barzani of the KDP and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), began in Baghdad. The Kurdish leaders saw Saddam's current weakness as an opportune moment to strike a deal. A week later both sides announced an interim agreement which, based on the 1970 pact, reiterated Kurdish autonomy, and gave Kurds the additional right to return and revive the 3,800 villages and towns that had been razed during the past seventeen years.

Keen to receive international aid, Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN secretary-general's Executive Delegate, Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, on April 18. It permitted the UN to offer humanitarian aid - providing food, medical care, agricultural rehabilitation and shelter - to Iraqis, including those in the north, but only in cooperation with the central government. In its preamble the MOU mentioned Iraq's rejection of Resolution 688. Baghdad welcomed UN efforts to promote the voluntary return home of Iraqi refugees, chiefly Kurds. Yielding to Western pressures, Saddam Hussein deputed two Iraqi generals to meet the US commander in charge of Operation "Provide Comfort", launched to set up safe havens for the Kurdish refugees inside Iraq. To facilitate the process they agreed to withdraw Iraqi security forces from the border Zakho area. Little did they know that by so doing they had unwittingly started a process that would rob Baghdad of full control of the north for many years to come.

The UN began establishing its humanitarian presence in the 3,600 sq miles (9,320 sq km) of the safe haven area - later renamed "security zone"-that the Coalition had created in the Iraqi-Turkish border region with 16,000 troops. By late May more than half of the 500,000 Kurdish refugees in the region had left

-45-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran after the Gulf Wars
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page vii
  • Contents ix
  • Plates xi
  • Abbreviations xiii
  • Glossary of Arabic, Kurdish and Persian Words xvi
  • Preface xxxi
  • Introduction 1
  • Part I - Iraq 43
  • 1 - Saddam Center-Stage, Exit Bush 45
  • 2 - Enter Clinton, Saddam's New Nemesis 69
  • 3 - A Shattering Betrayal, Then Lucky Breaks for Saddam 90
  • 4 - The Mother of All Failed Coups 102
  • 5 - Saddam and Re-Elected Clinton 120
  • 6 - "Desert Thunder" That Didn't Thunder 135
  • 7 - Operation "Desert Fox" 154
  • 8 - Iraq, a Return to Normalcy 179
  • Part II - Iran 193
  • 9 - Rafsanjani's Reconstruction and Economic Liberalization 195
  • 10 - Khatami, a Moderate with a Mission 225
  • 11 - Political Reform and Reaction 241
  • 12 - Reform Restrained 265
  • Conclusions and Future Prospects 281
  • Epilog 301
  • Appendix I 311
  • Appendix II 313
  • Appendix III 315
  • Appendix IV 324
  • Appendix V 326
  • Appendix VI 331
  • Notes 341
  • Select Bibliography 365
  • News Agencies, Newspapers and Periodicals 367
  • Index 369
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 389

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.