If the self, as defined by an eighteenth century ideology of rights, does not exist, whose freedom are we trying so hard to protect? In any case, are “self” and “freedom” what they used to be?
(Maxine Greene 1995)
Roland had learned to see himself, theoretically, as a crossing place for a number of systems, all loosely connected. He had been trained to see his idea of his “self ” as an illusion, to be replaced by a discontinuous machinery and electrical message-network of various desires, ideological beliefs and responses, language forms and hormones and pheremones. Mostly he liked this. He had no desire for any Romantic self-assertion. Nor did he desire to know who Maud essentially was.
(A.S. Byatt, Possession [italics added])
As Maxine Greene and A.S. Byatt imply in their written words, a deep confusion reigns over the meaning of terms such as “freedom” “identity, ” and “self” in contemporary life. There is also subtle implication in such words that much of what we come to understand as meaningful within the realm of the “political” takes on forms that either become objectionable to some members of society or relate to one's direct personal experience. As many scholars suggest, such