(1988) 'Ansàtze zur Kritik des moralischen Universalismus. Zur moraltheoretischen Diskussion um Gilligans Thesen zu einer “weiblichen” Moralauffassung' [Approaches to a critique of moral universalism. On the discussion of Gilligan's theses on a 'feminine' view of morality] , Feministische Studien 6, 1:32-52.
(1989) 'Der AusschluB der Frauen aus den Menschenrechten' [The exclusion of women from human rights], Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte 7.
(1990) (ed. with Ute Gerhard, Mechthild Jansen, Pia Schmid and Irmgard Schultz) Differenz und Gleichheit. Menschenrechte haben (k)ein Geschlecht (Difference and equality. Human rights do (not) have a gender), Frankfurt am Main: Ulrike Helmer Verlag.
(1990) 'Gleichheit nur für Gleiche?' [Equality only for equals?], in Differenz und Gleichheit, pp. 351-67.
(1992) 'Universalismus versus Relativismus/Partikularismus?' [Universalism vs. Relativism/Particularism?], in Maja Pellikaan-Engel (ed.) Against Patriarchal Thinking. A Future Without Discrimination? (Proceedings of the VIth Symposium of the International Association of Women Philosophers (IAPh), Amsterdam), Amsterdam: VU University Press.
(1994) Geschlecht als Existenzweise [Gender as a manner of existence], Frankfurt am Main: Ulrike Helmer Verlag.
Andréa Maihofer is concerned with the roots of modern ethics in Enlightenment ideas of equality, humanity and dignity and their effects on the position of women in law and morality. She challenges the idea of universalism as a necessary basis for all modern ethics and as the sole alternative to relativism. The hegemony of the idea of identity or equality over the acceptance of difference is in itself already a feature of male-dominated thinking and has to be scrutinized and revised if equality is to mean more than mere adaptation of the female to the male norm.
Sources: Peui Kaan-Engel (ed.) (1992) Against Patriarchal Thinking, Amsterdam: V U Press.
American, b: 1911, Selden, Kansas, d: 1990, London. Cat: Analytic philosopher. Ints: Philosophy of language; epistemology; philosophy of mind; philosophy of religion. Educ: Universities of Nebraska, Harvard and Cambridge. Infls:G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Appts: 1940-2, Instructor, Princeton University; 1947-50, Assistant Professor, 1950-5, Associate Professor, 1950-64, Professor of Philosophy, 1964-78, Susan Linn Sage Professor; 1979-90, Visiting Professor, Cornell University; 1990, Fellow, King's College, London.
(1958) Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, with a biographical sketch by G.H.von Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press; second edition, with Wittgenstein's letters to Malcolm, 1984.
(1962) Dreaming, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1963) Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
(1971) Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein, New York: Harper & Row.
(1977) Memory and Mind, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(1977) Thought and Knowledge, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(1984) (with D.M. Armstrong) Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
(1986) Nothing is Hidden: Wittgensteins Criticism of His Early Thought, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
(1993) Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, London: Routledge.
(1995) Wittgensteinian Themes, Essays 1978-1989, ed. G.H.von Wright, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Putnam, Hilary, (1962) Dreaming and depth grammar, in R. Butler (ed.) Analytical Philosophy, First Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Malcolm's earliest work-and possibly some of his best-minutely analysed and rejected the argument, commonly propounded by epistemologists from Hume onwards, that no empirical judgement can be known for certain to be true since future experience may always give us reason to think it false. One of the most discussed of Malcolm's works, however, was his book Dreaming (1962), in which he argued that dreams are not mental experiences that take place during sleep. The idea that they are such mental experiences is an incoherent theory generated by the desire to explain a phenomenon that has no (philosophical) explanation, namely that 'sometimes when people wake up they relate stories in the past tense under the influence of an impression' (p. 87). (One reason this book was so widely discussed was that it seemed to encapsulate a sort of behaviourism that was widely thought to be unavoidable given