(1917) Raum und Zeit in der moderne Physik, Berlin: Springer (English translation, Space and Time in Contemporary Physics, Oxford: Clarendon, 1920).
(1918) Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin: Springer; second edition, 1925 (English translation, General Theory of Knowledge, Blumberg, Vienna and New York: Springer, 1974).
(1921) (ed. with P. Hertz) H.von Helmholtz, Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie, Berlin: Springer.
(1922) (with M. Rubner and E. Warburg) Helmholtz als Physiker, Physiologe und Philosoph, Karlsruhe: C.F.Müller.
(1925) 'Naturphilosophie', in M. Dessoir (ed.) Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Berlin, II, 397-492.
(1927) Vom Sinn des Lebens, Erlangen: Palm & Enke.
(1930) Fragen der Ethik, Vienna: Springer (English translation, Problems of Ethics, trans. Rynin, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939).
(1934) Les Énoncés scientifiques et la réalité du monde extérieure, Paris: Hermann.
(1935) Sur le fondement de la connaissance, Paris: Hermann.
(1937) L'École de Vienne et la philosophie traditionelle, Travaux du IXe Congrès International de Philosophie, Paris: Hermann.
(1938) Gesammelte Augsätze, Vienna: Gerold & Co.
(1948) Gesetz, Kausalität und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Vienna: Gerold & Co.
(1948), Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie, Vienna: Gerold & Co (English translation, Philosophy of Nature, trans. von Zeppelin, New York: Philosophical Library, 1968).
(1952) Natur und Kultur, ed. J. Rauscher, Vienna: Stgt Humboldt Verlag.
(1979) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols, ed. Mulder and van de Velde Schlick, Vienna Circle Collection no. 11, Dordrecht: Reidel.
(1986) Die Problème der Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhang, ed. Mulder et al., Hamburg: Suhrkamp (English translation, The Problems of Philosophy in their Interconnection, trans. Heath, Vienna Circle Collection, no. 18, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987).
Ayer, A.J. (1970) Logical Positivism, London: Allen & Un win.
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Haller, R. (ed.) (1982) Schlick und Neurath ein Symposion, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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Ryckman, T.A. (1991) 'Conditio sine qua non. Zuordnung in the early epistemologies of Cassirer and Schlick', Synthèse 88:57-95.
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Moritz Schlick was the key figure in the later development of the neo-positivist Vienna Circle. An early exponent of Einstein's relativity theory he was brought, at the suggestion of Hans Hahn, from Kiel to the Vienna Chair orginally created for Ernst Mach. At least initially, though, his work shows no trace of the verificationist doctrines usually associated with the Vienna Circle. Schlick's approach also differed from that of his associates in that there was little of their obvious left-wing and anti-clerical politics. Schlick's antimetaphysical programme sought a more scientific and rigorous philosophy, depending on a logical analytic approach. In this, no doubt, he was one source of the anti-historical attitude that so marked off the neo-positivists from even their hero Mach among their predecessors. In his early work the general theory of knowledge was to be modelled on the abstract sciences, particularly physics and mathematics. It was to be purely discursive, consisting of the knowledge of the relations between things, not the acquaintance with things in themselves, which he regarded as metaphysical. Such purely prepositional knowledge was to be attained by conjectural systems of concepts set up as signs to represent things, to symbolize them and their mutual relations, and be verified after the fact. Truth, not rejected by Schlick but regarded as easily obtainable compared with the more valuable generality of relations, is defined by the existence of unambiguous reference to the facts. In this discursive prepositional system concepts were defined im