actors, explaining the process of preference-formation through empirical observation, examining the nature of the actors involved (to what extent may they be characterised as rational actors, for example?), and by identifying the relationship between the policy environment and the taking of major constitutional decisions (Cram 1994, Wincott 1995). The policies which emerge from the policy-making process, moreover, and the impact on the various actors of their participation in this process, may be critical factors in determining the role which national governments play and the positions which they adopt in the negotiations on the future of the EU. Thus, by altering the environment in which the dominant actors (member states) take critical 'history-making' decisions, the activities of the institutions and other interests may also have had a major impact upon the integration process. A crucial insight of the early integration theories has largely been overlooked in recent years: namely, that in understanding the outcome of negotiations at the 'constitutional' level of EU decision-making it is crucial to take into account the learning and adaptation processes, which iterated contact between the various actors in the policy-making process has made possible, and to filter this into any theoretical account of the integration process.
See section on neo-functionalism p. 43.
In his advocacy of functionally-organised international organisations Mitrany referred, for example, to the organisation of the International Labour Organisation (1943, 1966:83-85).
Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1990, reproduced in part in Weigall and Stirk (1992:59).
Thanks to James Mitchell for this characterisation.
See A.J.R. Groom (1978) on this point and also below.
For example, in a footnote to his 1965 article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Mitrany notes one misplaced critique of 'functionalism': 'the experience of the European communities shows the unreality of the 'functionalist' thesis that starting from small, autonomous specialised authorities one could build a complete state!' (M.J. Petot cited in Mitrany 1965, 1966:198). Yet, as Mitrany reminds us: 'A complete state and its introverted nature happens to be the very idea which functionalism seeks to overcome internationally.' (Mitrany 1965, 1966:198). The critique, in fact, relates more closely to Monnet and Schuman's deracinated version of functionalism rather than to Mitrany's functionalist thesis.
Haas (1958) notes in particular: The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation; the Council of Europe; the Western European Union; and the European Coal and Steel Community.
See below for a summary of the key aspects of the realist approach to international relations.
Later this was to result in the criticism that neo-functionalism which based its analysis on results from the study of only one example of the integration process, did not travel well. Thus, that its strengths as a generalisable theory of integration were diminished (see Caporaso and Keeler 1995 on this point).
Although both of these were recognised as crucial aspects of European integration.
Although Haas specifically points out that the central institutions need not be federal but could equally be unitary state structures (Haas 1958:8).
Although, they may equally, Haas recognised become opposed to the integration process as they recognise its costs (Haas 1958:287-288).
Interestingly, Haas had found the ECSC legislature rather wanting in this respect-it had clearly not lived up to the expectations Monnet had of a federal executive-Haas felt, however, that the Assembly might prove to be a more 'faithful prototype' of a federal parliament' (Haas 1958:311).
Emphasis added by Cram.
Emphasis added by Cram. Haas (1960:376) quoted in Lindberg (1963:10-11).
Applications for membership came from Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1961 and from Norway in 1962.
See Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977) on Morgenthau.
Recall Haas's (1958:29) emphasis on the important role of institutions as 'agents of integration'.