past at different rates? The answer is obvious: past time intervals between any two facts or events are mere logical consequences of the interval between their becoming present, i.e. - for a presentist - between their coming to exist or occur. But then, to stop that interval varying over time, any statement of it must be a temporally invariant B-statement, like 'Queen Anne's birth occurs 49 years earlier than her death'. And as in this example, so in others. The axioms of Prior's presentist system, which express the semantics of his operators 'P' and 'F', cannot derive their necessity just from A-concepts: they must also invoke the irreducibly B-concept of some facts and events becoming present more or less earlier than others.
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