Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947

By Julian Lewis | Go to book overview

FOREWORD

The late Professor R.V. Jones FRS, Head of Scientific Intelligence, Air Ministry, 1939-1946

The desperate situation of Britain in 1940 demanded every effort, both national and individual, if we were to survive: and those of us who were most involved became conditioned to thinking of almost nothing but the war until it was won. We did not regard too kindly those who were less involved and who turned their energies, prematurely we thought, to post-war planning. 'Every time the fortunes of war turn in our favour, ' I wrote after Alamein, 'up springs a crop of post-war planners', although also suggesting that as soon as we could confidently foresee the defeat of Germany some of the best of our colleagues should be released to think about post-war policy.

Dr Lewis has written a scrupulous and lucid account of strategic planning for the defence of British interests at the highest level-that of the Chiefs of Staff. There the same factors were at work as those that I encountered at my lower level, and even earlier: the first proposals for post-war strategic planning came from the Foreign Office, a body less immediately involved than the Chiefs with military operations. We can sympathise with the Chiefs who, while agreeing in principle, stated on 26 February 1942 that 'such problems must of necessity take a relatively low priority in the work of the Joint Planning Staff'. Since Benghazi had fallen only a month before, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had sailed up the Channel in the past fortnight, and Singapore had surrendered only nine days ago, the Chiefs could hardly be expected to enthuse. Churchill pungently shared their distrust: 'I hope that these speculative studies will be entrusted mainly to those on whose hands time hangs heavy.'

Although some progress was made in the following months it was difficult for the preoccupied Chiefs to contemplate a world in which they might have to co-operate in a Combined Chiefs organisation including Russia and China, or even a military staff based on a United

-xiii-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Note on Formerly Withheld Documents ix
  • List of Plates x
  • Foreword xiii
  • Acknowledgements xvii
  • Abbreviations xviii
  • Preface to the First Edition xxi
  • Introduction to the Second Edition xxv
  • 1 - The Foreign Office Origins of Post-War Strategic Planning 1942 1
  • 2 - The Military Sub-Committee 1942-43 17
  • 3 - The Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee 1943-44 55
  • 4 - The Post-Hostilities Planning Staff 1944-45 98
  • 5 - The Joint Technical Warfare Committee and the Future Nature of Warfare 1945-46 178
  • 6 - The Joint Planning Staff and an Approved Defence Strategy 1945-47 242
  • Appendix 1 340
  • Appendix 2 345
  • Appendix 3 349
  • Appendix 4 354
  • Appendix 5 357
  • Appendix 6 359
  • Appendix 7 370
  • Appendix 8 388
  • References 411
  • Index 443
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 475

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.