International developments, political pressure from Westminster and, more importantly, rising suspicion surrounding German-Soviet relations meant that the Soviet Union could no longer be ignored by the British government in 1939. Several politicians and officials within the foreign-policy decision-making process began to overlook their anti-Soviet prejudices in favour of an agreement. Reservations still existed, however, and certain ministers found themselves torn between the realities of Soviet potential on the one hand, and their suspicion of Soviet intentions on the other hand. Several were not yet even willing to consider overlooking their ideological mistrust of the Soviet government. One example was Neville Chamberlain who, between March and May, revealed openly in the Cabinet and the Foreign Policy Committee, the strength of his prejudices and the extent to which he would go in order to prevent Anglo-Soviet collaboration.
On 15 March, German armed forces invaded Bohemia and Moravia. A puppet regime was established in Prague and what remained of Czechoslovakian independence disappeared. The governments of the states bordering Czechoslovakia were alarmed and began to fear for their own security. On 17 March, Veoril Tilea, the Romanian minister in London, informed the government that Berlin had issued an ultimatum to Bucharest, and that as a result, the Romanian government wanted Britain to assert itself in central and eastern Europe. 1 Tilea had in fact exaggerated the threat posed by Germany. However, by the time this was discovered, London had already taken action to begin collective resistance. Though the British government had said it would guarantee Czechoslovakia after Munich, the guarantee had never been ratified. London, therefore, had no obligation to defend Czechoslovakia. The occupation of Czechoslovakia did, nevertheless, unnerve the government. Poland, in particular, was now thought to be at risk. With support growing for action to be taken against the German dictator, and