Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century

By Gabriel Gorodetsky | Go to book overview

8

Russian Strategic Uncertainty in an Era of US Tactical Intrusiveness

ALVIN Z.RUBINSTEIN

From a geostrategic perspective, the USA's national interest in Europe is basically the same today as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century: to ensure that no single power dominates the European continent. This may not have been a crucial determinant of US involvement in the First World War, but it was certainly at the heart of US policy in the Second World War, and again in the post-1945 period, as well as throughout the era of bipolarity and rivalry between the USA and Soviet Union. Once the Cold War ended in December 1991, a dramatically different geostrategic environment was ushered in-or so it seemed at the time. In the early 1990s, the international environment in many ways resembled that of the 1920s. None of the major powers was faced by a serious military threat or by a polarizing ideological or military adversary. As in the 1920s, this was the start of an era of assorted transitions in Europe, east Asia and the Middle East in the wake of collapsed empires, while the major powers preferred to look inwards to domestic challenges, with an attendant desire to downgrade foreign policy.

The USA had 'won' the Cold War or, as some have argued, the Soviet Union had 'lost' the Cold War. The important outcome was that, geostrategically, the USA could dominate the slowly emerging acentric international system and influence its evolution much more effectively than it had been able to. In fact, if the USA had continued to operate within a status quo NATO, it could have promoted security, reform and cooperation for all the nation-states of Europe; it could have decisively shaped both Europe's security architecture and its political attitudes. Instead, Washington opted for the expansion of NATO. The determining arguments for NATO enlargement had little or nothing to do with the US national interest; little to do with a coherent US strategy for Europe and Eurasia; and little to do with advancing global security and interests. The

-86-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 202

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.