Is truth a property of propositions? (This was Question 11 on our flow chart. 1) In section 5.1. I shall argue that propositions are the primary truth-value bearers. Is truth a stable property of propositions, a property that cannot be lost? (This was Question 12.) In sections 5.2 and 5.3 I shall map the options and plead for a kind of eternalist (as opposed to temporalist) position. In the final section I shall make a concession to temporalism.
Some philosophers [sc. the Stoics] placed the true and the false . . . in the incorporeal sayable [ἐν τῷ ἀσωμάτῷ λεκτῷ], others in the utterance [ἐν τῇ φωνῇ], others in the process of thought [ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας].
(Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, viii. 69 (cf. 11))
I see no reason now to think that we ever do call sentences or forms of words 'true', except in such an archaic-sounding expression as 'A true word is often spoken in jest.'
(Moore, SMPP, 262, note added in 1952)
There was no hope for him this time: it was the third stroke. . . . He had often said to me: 'I am not long for this world,' and I had thought his words idle. Now I knew they were true.
(James Joyce, 'The Sisters')
At least prima facie we ascribe truth and falsity to a motley multitude of entities such as allegations, beliefs, conjectures, contentions, judgements, reports,